An Implausible Parallel Argument to the Moral Argument for God

In a question to William Lane Craig, a person named Manol from Albania noticed a parallel argument to the Moral Argument for the Existence of God. Here’s Dr. Craig’s Moral argument:

1) If God does not exist then objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values do exist.
3) Therefore God exists.

Speaking to Dr. Craig Manol writes:

Your argument in support of premise 2 is that in the same way the outer world is objective, in the same way moral values are objective. Our perception of objective moral values is on a par with our perception of the outer world with the five senses.

But if this parallelism between moral values and the outer world is true, then it means that the argument may be turned into something like this:

1) If God does not exist, then an objective outer world does not exist.
2) An objective outer world does exist.
3) Therefore God exists.

If this second argument is used and it is proven not convincing, why should be the moral argument, which is a parallel argument, be convincing? Or, if you think this second argument is not convincing, why is it so?

Dr. Craig responded by saying:

On this basis you construct a parallel argument, which, if dubious, ought to make us think that the moral argument is also dubious. Now the parallel argument you construct is actually a sort of cosmological argument for God’s existence. In fact, I think it is a sound argument! It is obviously valid, and both the premises seem to me to be true. For the objective outer world obviously exists, and if God did not exist, then no world at all would exist, including an objective outer world! It’s not that if God did not exist, then the outer world would be merely a subjective illusion; rather it’s that there wouldn’t be anything at all!

The first premise of your parallel argument threatens to beg the question and is not apt to appear more plausible than its negation to someone who is not already a theist. By contrast, as you know, the first premise of the moral argument is one that many atheists themselves believe and argue for. Thus, although the premises of your two arguments are parallel, the support for the premises is quite different.

What Craig said is that these two arguments are parallel but that the one for the existence of an outer world threatens to beg the question and that skeptics just wouldn't be apt to think it’s plausible.

As a skeptic I think there is more room for discussion here. Doesn’t the first premise in the moral argument "threaten" to beg the question in the same way? And can’t we reverse things and say that since the argument for the outer world isn’t plausible then neither is the moral argument?

I think so. Any thoughts?

A Critique of William Lane Craig's Moral Argument

(I am a new blogger. For my introduction, please see below and ask me a question there. I am doing a rare double-post to provide the blog and its readers with an example of my own mode of analysis, so if you have a question about the Moral Argument specifically, ask here).

Dr. William Lane Craig's moral argument for God goes as follows:

1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist.
3) Therefore, God exists.

Although the argument itself is (deductively) valid, we will discuss how Bill's definition of "objective moral value" given in Reasonable Faith leads to the logical impossibility of Premise (1) and at least a shaky ground for Premise (2), thereby literally closing the book on this version of the moral argument for good. The argument is presented within a letter I sent my friend Dr. Paul Copan, who spoke with me personally at the same time I was addressing Bill at the conference.

Paul,

One point of interest that needs to be brought up: we got distracted on Calvinism in the middle of what I was supposed to say for the Moral Argument.

Premise (1) states that "If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist." My friend Marques, the fan of Bill's whom I mentioned during our session, informed me that Bill defines an objective moral value as essentially "a moral assertion that remains true independent of human consciousness." I think this is the notion you and he defined during our talk and that which is given in RF.

The problem with Premise (1), as I mentioned, is that Bill only uses Existentialists in his lectures and similar notions in RF to provide an argument from authority - but we already discussed the "argument from authority" problem when we spoke, so I'll move on.

The further problem, which I did not get to address due to my unfortunate forgetfulness of how much gas the Calvinism subject empties out on a room (honestly sorry!!!), is that Premise (1) is logically equivalent to "If objective moral values exist, God exists,"; to prove this statement logically without appeal under Bill's definition, one must show that either:

(a) Objective moral values are present as an inherent property of reality qua reality independently of any consciousness, including God's, not unlike a Platonic "form" or Aristotelean "essence";

(b) Objective moral values exist because God delivered them by Divine Command, Divine Decree, creating Platonic forms to house them, etc., or in the hearts of men as Paul states.

No other means of morals being objective is at all possible. With what Bill says,

Option (a) is immediately an invalid option to prove Premise (1), for if morals existed as an inherent quality of reality, then either God created them in reality, leading to my objection for Option (b), or they exist in reality apart from God, making Premise (1) automatically invalid prima facie due to the fact that it presents either a possibility for objective moral values under atheism or objective moral values under a nonlawgiver God.

Option (b) renders any proof of Premise (1) automatically invalid by improper deduction. Premise (1) states that "if objective moral values exists, then God exists." But if we assert that objective moral values rest on God's existence due to either Divine Command/Decree, His creation of independent Platonic "moral vats" in reality, etc., as pressed forth in option (b), then Premise (1)'s logical proof fails deduction, to wit:

(1a) Assume objective moral values exist.
(1b) If a Moral Lawgiving God exists, then objective moral values exist due to His Divine Decree/Command, creation of independent "Platonic Morality Vats," etc.
(1c) Therefore, God exists.
(1d) Therefore, the statement "if objective moral values exist, then God exists" is true. Premise (1) is proven.

This argument is wrong from deduction.

Additionally, Bill's definition for an "objective moral value" drops the context of the identity of man, i.e. the context of a **finite** rational being. Indeed, Bill said both that these values would exist if God did not decide to create mankind, and that these values are nonbinding on a God of infinite nature. You might be interested to know that I assert that objective moral values *do* exist, but in a different sense than Craig; they are only possible if men exist, but they are *not* subjective because men exist *in reality.*

objective moral value != "a moral assertion that remains identically true for any rational being within this assertion's context."

If evolution arrived at another humanlike creature, then this objective morality would be the exact same assuming this, um, hypothetical "frog man" is rational; it depends on the identity of a rational being, not just on man qua man. It is objective because rational beings exist in reality, and the contexts of such moral actions exist in reality (i.e. outside of "Sophie's Dilemma" type extremes, all logically demonstrable). I will not go into this morality here, but it is much like Rand's morality that you provide a critique of in your God goes to Starbucks book - however, you'd be surprised that you have some incorrect notions, and that the morality - especially the neo-Ayn Rand version without the harshness she added to it - *isn't* as horrible as it sounds, and *is* objective (i.e. pertaining to reality above subjective consciousness), and *does* bridge "is-ought." I will describe it further if it is of interest to you.

Note that none of this disproves God, or even a moral lawgiver. But it shows that Premise (1) is invalid and that Premise (2) is on shaky ground given Bill's definitions, rendering his standard presentation invalid. Bill would do better to not use it as an isolated argument, but instead depend on Kalam and the Teleological Argument to first establish a God, and then to rule out atheistic "Platonic moral vats" or potential "Moral Lawgiving Gods" separate from a creator and designer of the Universe (as Bill does in his book on both counts, but not as well-developed by method) to then leave God the property of being the moral lawgiver. This is the most that is left for the moral argument given that my critique stands.

Best,
Darrin

What Is the Best Argument for the Existence of Allah?

In the comments I've been asked by Christian apologists Trent Horn and C. Michael Patton to tell my readers what I consider the best argument to the existence of God. Okay. Here goes. The best argument on behalf of Allah is the moral argument to his existence.

Let me quote from my book Unapologetic:

Regarding the case for the existence of God due to objective morality, the moral argument to the existence of God depends on one’s morality. Many Christian theologians and philosophers attempt to make an argument from the existence of objective morality to the existence of their God, who just happens to have the same kind of morality they do, surprise!
...
Take for example the Islamic State (or ISIS). They could make the same moral argument to the existence of their god, using their own morality, where it’s okay to rape women, own slaves, chop off heads, and burn people alive. Christians would have to agree with their moral argument, but subsequently disagree with their morals. However, the morals of ISIS are used as evidence that their god exists, just as the specific morals of Christians (depending on the century) are used as evidence their god exists. So certain kinds of morals lead to certain kinds of gods. Or certain kinds of gods are used to justify certain kinds of morals. Which comes first? I’m as sure as sure can be that the morals come first.

The moral argument works in an inductive manner with some degree of probability to it above 50%. But it only works if one's morals are absolute, unchanging and also good. Since it's demonstrably and unmistakably the case that morals are not absolute and unchanging then there cannot be an absolute and unchanging divine lawgiver. So even the best argument to the existence of Allah isn't a good argument at all. This applies to the Christian god Yahweh as well. Even the best argument to the existence of Yahweh isn't a good argument at all.

Discuss. What do you think of my answer?

The Case Against Christianity in 15 Minutes or Less

One of my favorite foils in the Christian blog world is JW Wartick, (one of many apologists who have blocked me) so I thought I would take one of the favorite posts on his blog, and have a little fun with it. I find it interesting that Christianity is constantly on the defensive, because if it was a logical, with consistently held belief, it would be easier to defend against skeptics without using Humpty Dumpty semantics and/or ad hoc measures. However, since this is not the case, Christians such as Wartick and others of his ilk are constantly trying to defend their inconsistent and illogical beliefs, so Wartick came up with his, "The Case for Christianity in 15 Minutes (or Less).  Well, we'll see about that....lol.

Read more »

The Moral Argument Revisited: Further Thoughts on Bill Craig's Presentation

In this article, I will revisit some thoughts I made last week about Dr. William Lane Craig's morality argument for the existence of God. The critique has been adjusted to answer the top two or three objections presented in the post, and also adds some additional thoughts I've had over the past week.

As you may recall, Bill's argument goes like this:

1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist.
3) Therefore, God exists.

First, some definitions.

Value def. "An idea by which one guides his or her life." (Craig 172)

Moral value def. "A value that can be identified as good or bad." (Craig 172)

Moral duty def. "A binding idea that one ought to do, in which doing so is 'right' and not doing so is 'wrong.'" (Craig 172)

Objective moral value def. "[A moral value] that is true independent of what people think or perceive." (Craig 173)

We assume objective moral duties, mentioned on page 175, are similarly defined, though Bill doesn't define that term himself.

To begin, one might note what the difference is between something that is "good" or "bad," and something that is "right" or "wrong." Craig seems to define the former (i.e. "objective moral value") as something nonbinding on a human being. For instance, Bill states that it is good for one to become a chemist, doctor, etc., but since one may choose only one profession, all of these professions, while good, are not binding on someone.

Bill then dives headlong into wondering whether "objective moral values" exist, slipping in the word "evil" for the word "bad," and including the Holocaust as an example. If a moral value, by Craig's definition, is not binding, how does this example relate to the thesis presented? If it isn't binding, it isn't objective by Craig's definition of the word. It directly depends on a human being, on the situation the human finds himself in, and so on; becoming a Nazi is not a choice one makes in the same sense as becoming a chemist or doctor.

Bill corrects himself without knowing it on page 173 by pointing out that being a Nazi is wrong, i.e. that it is something one ought not to do, i.e. that it is a moral *duty* under his terminology. So it seems to me, first of all, that there is a bit of equivocation going on between "moral value," and "moral duty." But no matter; Craig presents a similar argument on page 175 for objective moral duties, so we'll dismiss this for now and get straight to the heart of the matter, and take "objective moral values" to encompass both (although we will, as Bill does, mostly appeal to duty).

Premise (1) states that "If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist." As I stated before, we are not presented with evidence to verify this statement. All we have is a parade of arch-materialists like Richard Dawkins and crew, who present men as some kind of DNA-propagating birdbrained cretins lacking any sort of identity they think they have, because we evolved from beings that did not have that identity. One wonders whether they will state that we are really underwater, because our ancestors were all underwater, but whatever. They deny the identity of man as a rational being, by means of their own (mistaken) behavior as rational beings. Besides, the only thing that can be reached here is, at most: "If evolution is true, objective moral values do not exist," not Premise (1).

In addition to this, a regiment of philosophers is brought before us, who, like Nietzsche, already buy Premise (1). This is simply an appeal to authority, and also can't substantiate the premise.

Continuing on, the objection made in my earlier post was that I presented a false alternative; that objective moral values proceed from the identity of God, not from God's decree or from some other means independent of man and God. Very well; objective moral values can be divided into these two possibilities:

(1) Proceeding from or coexistent with God (by whatever means)
(2) Not proceeding from nor coexistent with God (by whatever means).

Craig dispenses of (2) entirely on page 178 and 179.

We are now left with the following statement from this information:

"objective moral values exist if and only if God exists"

Of course in this case, Premise (1) is automatically valid: if God does not exist then objective moral values obviously do not exist.

The problem is now in Premise (2) for this consideration: "Objective moral values exist" is equivalent to "God exists."

So the argument turns from

1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist
3) Therefore, God exists.

into

1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) God exists.
3) Therefore God exists.

The argument thus begs the question, and is invalid.

Someone wondered in the previous post why I said that the proof as Craig presents it does not prove that God is the moral lawgiver: Bill himself recognizes this difficulty on page 172 right after his introduction, but states that the conclusion that the morals come from God "tends to be implicit" in Premise (1). Bill leaves it at that, as he realizes the stove here is quite hot; that very point, i.e. the implicit direct relation between God and objective moral value as Bill defines it, is what makes the argument beg the question.

As an aside, I do believe in objective moral values, although my definition for objective is "that which is based in reality," which is not necessarily Craig's definition. Since men ultimately exist in reality and have situations ultimately based in reality, and since men have a solid identity and their situations have a solid identity, objective moral values proceed from this. This doesn't itself rule out God, for a God could have brought us about with this identity, but it doesn't demand the need for a God, either. In my own opinion, God must be proven by different means, and I have not seen an effective proof (if God is well-defined to begin with).

I am looking forward to another good discussion on this important topic! I enjoyed the civility and focus when I first brought this up, and I want to thank everyone on both sides for maintaining it. :)

-Darrin

A Review of John Beversluis' book C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion: Revised and Updated

C.S. Lewis has had an enormous impact on the evangelical mind. His books still top the charts in bookstores. But what about the substance of his arguments? Philosopher Dr. John Beversluis wrote the first full-length critical study of C. S. Lewis's apologetic writings, published by William B. Eerdmans, titled C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (1985). For twenty-two years it was the only full-length critical study of C.S. Lewis’s writings.

Beversluis was a former Christian who studied at Calvin College under Harry Jellema who inspired Christian thinkers like Alvin Plantinga (who was already in graduate school), and Nicholas Wolterstoff (who was a senior when he entered). Later he was a student at Indiana University with my former professor James D. Strauss. He became a professor at Butler University.

In this first book, Beversluis took as his point of departure Lewis's challenge where he said: “I am not asking anyone to accept Christianity if his best reasoning tells him that the weight of the evidence is against it” (Mere Christianity p. 123). Beversluis thoroughly examined that hypothesis and found the evidence Lewis presents should not lead people to accept Christianity.

According to Beversluis, his first book “elicited a mixed response-indeed, a response of extremes. Some thought I had largely succeeded. I was complimented for writing a ‘landmark’ book that ‘takes up Lewis's challenge to present the evidence for Christianity and ... operates with full rigor’” (p. 9-10). But the critics were “ferocious.” He said, “I had expected criticism. What I had not expected was the kind of criticism…I was christened the "bad boy" of Lewis studies and labeled the "consummate Lewis basher" (p. 10).

In his “Revised and Updated” book published by Prometheus Books, which was prompted by Keith Parsons and Charles Echelbarger, Beversluis claims “this is not just a revised and updated second edition, but a very different book that supercedes the first edition on every point” (p.11). According to him: “Part of my purpose in this book to show, by means of example after example, the extent to which the apparent cogency of his arguments depends on his rhetoric rather than on his logic…Once his arguments are stripped of their powerful rhetorical content, their apparent cogency largely vanishes and their apparent persuasiveness largely evaporates. The reason is clear: it is not the logic, but the rhetoric that is doing most of the work. We will have occasion to see this again and again. In short, my purpose in this book is not just to show that Lewis's arguments are flawed. I also want to account for their apparent plausibility and explain why they have managed to convince so many readers” (pp. 20,22).

Additionally, Beversluis tells us, “My aim in this revised and updated edition is twofold. First, I will revisit and reexamine Lewis's arguments in light of my more recent thoughts about them. Second, I will to reply to my critics and examine their attempts to reformulate and defend his arguments, thereby responding not only to Lewis but to the whole Lewis movement—that cadre of expositors, popular apologists, and philosophers who continue to be inspired by him and his books. I will argue that their objections can be met and that even when Lewis's arguments are formulated more rigorously than he formulated them, they still fail” (p. 11).

C.S. Lewis’ writings contain three arguments for God’s existence, the “Argument from Desire,” the “Moral Argument,” and the “Argument From Reason.” Lewis furthermore argued that the Liar, Lunatic, Lord dilemma/trilemma shows Jesus is God. Lewis also deals with the major skeptical objection known as the Problem of Evil. Beversluis examines all of these arguments and finds them defective, some are even fundamentally flawed. Lastly Beversluis examines Lewis’ crisis of faith when he lost the love of his life, his wife. (He denies he ever said Lewis lost his faith).

I can only briefly articulate what Beversluis says about these arguments here, but his analysis of them is brilliant and devastating to Lewis’ whole case. The Argument From Desire echoes Augustine’s sentiment in his Confessions when addressing God that “You have made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you.” Lewis develops this into an argument for God’s existence which can be formulated in several ways, but the bottom line is that since humans have a desire for joy beyond the natural world, which is what he means by "joy," there must be an object to satisfy that desire in God. Beversluis subjects this argument to criticism on several fronts. How universal is the desire for this "joy"? Is "joy" even a desire? Is Lewis’ description of "joy" a natural desire at all, since desires are biological and instinctive? Do all our desires have fulfillment? What about people who have been satisfied by things other than God, with their careers, spouses and children? In what I consider the most devastating question, he asks if there is any propositional content to the object of Lewis’ argument? Surely if there is an object that corresponds to the desire for "joy" then one who finds this object should be able to describe it from such an experience. Based upon Lewis’ argument she can’t. In fact, Beversluis argues if she cannot do that how does she even know it's an object that corresponds to her desire for "joy" in the first place?

Lewis’ Moral Argument is basically that all people have a notion of right and wrong, and the only explanation for this inner sense of morality must come from a Power behind the moral law known as God. Beversluis claims this argument is based on a few questionable assumptions related to the Euthyphro dilemma, and it depends on the theory of ethical subjectivism from which Lewis only critiques straw man versions rather than the robust versions of Hume and Hobbes. And if that isn’t enough to diminish his case, deductively arguing that there is a Power behind this moral law is committing “the fallacy of affirming the consequent.” (p. 99). 1) If there is a Power behind the moral law then it must make itself known internally within us. 2) We do find this moral law internally within us. .: Therefore, there is a Power behind the moral law. As such this argument is invalid. Of course, there is much more here in Beversluis’ argument.

The Argument From Reason, as best seen in Lewis’ book, Miracles, “is the philosophical backbone of the whole book,” from which “his case for miracles depends.” (p. 145). Lewis champions the idea that if naturalism is true such a theory “impugns the validity of reason and rational inference,” and as such, naturalists contradict themselves if they use reason to argue their case. If you as a naturalist have ever been troubled by such an argument you need to read Beversluis’ response to it, which is the largest chapter in his book, and something I can’t adequately summarize in a few short sentences. Suffice it to say, he approvingly quotes Keith Parsons who said: “surely Lewis cannot mean that if naturalism is true, then there is no such thing as valid reasoning. If he really thought this, he would have to endorse the hypothetical ‘If naturalism is true, then modus ponens is invalid.’ But since the consequent is necessarily false, then the hypothetical is false if we suppose naturalism is true (which is what the antecedent asserts), and Lewis has no argument.” (p. 174).

Lewis’ Liar, Lunatic, Lord Dilemma/Trilemma is one of the most widely used arguments among popular apologists, in variations, where since Jesus claimed he was God, the only other options are that he was either a liar or a lunatic, or both, which Lewis argues isn’t reasonable. Therefore Jesus is God, who he claimed he was. Even William Lane Craig defends it in his book Reasonable Faith. But it is widely heralded as Lewis’ weakest argument as he defended it, and fundamentally flawed. Beversluis subjects Lewis’ defense of it and his defenders to a barrage of rigorous intellectual attacks. There is the problem of knowing what Jesus claimed, which by itself “is sufficient to rebut the Trilemma.” (p. 115). Also it is a false dilemma. Even if Jesus claimed he was God he could simply be mistaken, not a lunatic, for lunatics can be very reasonable in everyday life and still have delusions of grandeur. And it’s quite possible for someone to be a good moral teacher and yet be wrong about whether he was God. Furthermore, the New Testament itself indicates many people around him including his own family thought he was crazy. In the end, Beversluis claims, “we can now dispense of the Lunatic or Fiend Dilemma once and for all….If the dilemma fails, as I have argued, the trilemma goes with it. In the future, let us hear no more about these arguments.” (p. 135). I agree.

In Lewis’ book, The Problem of Pain, he deals head on with the Problem of Evil coming at the heels of WWII. Suffice it to say, as Victor Reppert summarized the argument of his first book, Beversluis: “If the word ‘good’ must mean approximately the same thing when we apply it to God as what it means when we apply it to human beings, then the fact of suffering provides a clear empirical refutation of the existence of a being who is both omnipotent and perfectly good. If on the other hand, we are prepared to give up the idea that ‘good’ in reference to God means anything like what it means when we refer to humans as good, then the problem of evil can be sidestepped, but any hope of a rational defense of the Christian God goes by the boards.”

This is must reading if you think C.S. Lewis was a great apologist, and it's part of the Debunking Christianity Challenge. Beversluis’ arguments are brilliant and devastating to the apologetics of Lewis and company.

Exbeliever's Swan Song

Because of other obligations (e.g. finishing my thesis, moving across the country, starting a new PhD program, etc.), I've decided to resign my membership in this wonderful blog.

During my time here, I repeatedly asked Christians to give some kind of reason for their faith. I asked them to supply some kind of argument that ends in "therefore, god exists." This challenge was repeatedly ignored. Instead, the Christians' strategy was to point out philosophical problems that have been studied by philosophers for centuries and say that somehow a term "God" was the answer to all of them. When an atheist had an understandably difficult time resolving a difficult problem, the Christian would declare himself the winner because of his "answer"--which really is a non-answer.

A couple of months ago, Richard Carrier and Tom Wanchick engaged in an on-line debate published on The Secular Web.

Below, I respond to Wanchick's opening statement. I decided that I would only read his opening statement in the debate and respond to it without reading Carrier's rebuttals or Wanchick's answers. It is possible, then, that Wanchick later clarified his statements and a further response would be necessary. I'm satisfied, however, with my responses.

Leibnizian Cosmological Argument

It seems reasonable to believe that every substance has an explanation for its existence: it was either caused by something else, or exists necessarily (it cannot not exist). This premise is evidently more plausible than its denial, for if confronted with a new substance, everyone would assume it has an explanation before they assumed it didn't. Absurdly, if the latter presumption were equally plausible, we could justifiably pronounce everything to be a brute given, making science, philosophy, etc. frivolous. Indeed, the general assumption that objects have explanations has been successfully confirmed so often that those wishing to reject it must provide good reason for doing so.

Additionally, if we have an adequate explanation for an object, it would clearly be unreasonable to conclude instead that that object was unexplained. Again, explanation is prima facie more reasonable than nonexplanation. Thus, Quentin Smith, the foremost atheist expert on cosmological arguments, admits that if naturalism cannot explain the universe like theism can, that is evidence for theism over naturalism.

Now, interestingly, the universe itself is a substance having properties: density, temperature, etc. Therefore, like all substances, it has an explanation. Indeed, scientists have long assumed this in cosmological studies, as they've developed myriad theories as to how the universe exists.

Thus, we construct this argument:

1. Every substance has an explanation of its existence either in an external cause or in the necessity of its own nature.
2. The universe is a substance.
3. Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence either in an external cause or in the necessity of its own nature.
4. The universe does not exist necessarily.
5. Therefore, the explanation of the universe is an external cause.


This conclusion follows from the premises. I've justified 1 and 2 above. Premise 4 requires little argument, since the universe appears obviously contingent. Scientists even tell us that it had a beginning and will end somewhere in the future. Being non-necessary, then, it finds its explanation in an outside cause.

This cause can exist timelessly and spacelessly, since it can cause the space-time universe. Moreover, it must be immaterial, since it is nonspatial. And it must also be a mind, since only minds and abstract objects can exist timelessly and immaterially, and only the former can cause anything. Furthermore, the only two types of explanation are natural/mechanistic and personal; and since there was no nature prior to the universe, its cause is personal.

Moreover, the ultimate cause cannot itself be a contingent reality. As Charles Taliaferro notes, "If contingent object A is explained by B which is explained by C and so on into infinity, we will never get a complete or fully satisfactory explanation of A." Thus, the explanation of the universe must be a metaphysically necessary, uncaused being.

My first argument therefore proves the reality of a transcendent, timeless, and spaceless mind that exists necessarily and has the ability and know-how to cause and sustain the universe.

Wanchick's first premise is "Every substance has an explanation of its existence either in an external cause or in the necessity of its own nature."

How does one know this to be true? Wanchick attempts to substantiate his claim when he writes, ". . . for if confronted with a new substance, everyone would assume it has an explanation before they assumed it didn't."

In other words, this claim is true because of induction. Everything that we have observed that exists has an explanation for its existence. I certainly agree with this claim, but I wonder how it can be extrapolated and used to describe the existence of the universe.

Let me explain. Every existing thing that we have observed has been observed in a physical universe acted upon by physical laws. These physical laws certainly affected the "substances" observed.

How is it, then, possible to confidently assert that, in the absence of our physical laws, the universe (even if we allow the dubious claim that the universe is a "substance" and not "the set of all substances") must have an explanation of its existence? In other words, Wanchick is applying an inductive argument that is true under one set of conditions to an entirely different set of conditions that he knows nothing about. Scientists agree that, in the earliest stages of the beginning of the universe, the laws of physics break down. There are no physical laws that we know of that can exist when the universe is at infinite mass and space time is bent infinitely.

Perhaps an analogy would help. Let's say that I make the claim, "In every case in which I weigh a person and then strap 20 lbs of Styrofoam to their waists, their weight increases by exactly 20 lbs." This is a very reasonable claim under what we consider "normal" conditions (e.g. they are in a doctor's office on a true scale). Now, imagine that I am weighing people in a pool of chest-high water. When I strap the 20 lbs of Styrofoam to their waists, their weight would actually decrease, because the Styrofoam is buoyant and would lift them off the scales. The exact opposite effect would occur.

In the same way, Wanchick is taking an inductive claim made under a specific set of conditions and applying them to a situation in which the conditions are completely unknown. In fact, we know that the conditions of the earlier universe in a singularity are very different from the conditions of our current universe. Why should we accept his claim, then, that we can apply the same inductive argument that we have observed under specific conditions to "a substance" that did not come about in those same conditions. How do we know that the universe does not exist in conditions that are exactly the opposite of all of the substances we observe within the universe? How can we say that this first premise holds in different conditions?

Wanchick's first premise cannot be substantiated and his argument fails before it begins.

Kalam Cosmological Argument

Like the universe's existence, its origin too needs explaining. Leading philosophers and scientists confirm that the universe came into existence from nothing. Currently, the big bang model leads the pack among cosmological theories and entails a definite beginning of space-time. Renowned physicist Stephen Hawking admits, "almost everyone now believes that the universe, and time itself, had a beginning at the Big Bang." Carrier concurs.

An eternal universe is disconfirmed philosophically, too, for it implies that there are infinite past events. But it would be impossible to reach the last event in this series--i.e., the present. We could literally never reach the end of infinity; no matter how many events we traversed, there'd always be infinite to go. But since we have reached the end, the set of past events must be finite.

Moreover, an infinite set of things entails metaphysically impossibility. If we have infinite things numbered 1 through infinity and subtract all even ones, we would have an infinite number remaining. But if we subtract only those marked over #5, we would be left with 5. Since it is metaphysically impossible to subtract equal quantities and get contradictory answers, it must be impossible for an infinite to exist. Thus, the number of past events in the universe is finite. The universe had a beginning.

This is significant, since, as we all know, objects cannot just pop into being from nothing, uncaused. Imagine finding a whale or a stadium simply appearing willy-nilly on your doorstep! David Hume even announced, "But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause."

Inductively, of course, no one in all of history has witnessed an object leap into reality this way. If this is possible, it's strikingly curious that it's never occurred.

Indeed, the inductive evidence simply accords with sound metaphysics, for if nothing existed without the universe, then not even the potentiality for it existed. But how can something come into existence if there was no potential for it? Carrier's own view is that "things exist potentially wherever the elements necessary to form them exist." But since nothing existed without the universe given naturalism, neither did its potential, thereby ruling out its actuality on that view.

Thus:

6. Every substance that begins to exist has a cause.
7. The universe began to exist.
8. Therefore, the universe has a cause.


Premise 6 and 7 are more reasonable than their negations, as argued above. And since the argument is valid, the conclusion follows unavoidably.

As noted in the prior argument, the cause of the universe will be an uncaused, timeless, spaceless, and nonphysical mind. However, other significant qualities come through here: its incomprehensible power and knowledge. This creator has the awe-inspiring power and knowledge to create whole universes from nothing. It's hard to see, then, what power or knowledge he lacks.

This cosmological argument fails in exactly the same place that the previous one did. The first premise states, "Every substance that begins to exist has a cause." Even if we grant that the universe is a "substance" and not "the set of all substances," this is still an inductive claim made within conditions in which the universe itself does not exist.

Wanchick explicitly states that his is an inductive argument. He writes, "Inductively, of course, no one in all of history has witnessed an object leap into reality this way. If this is possible, it's strikingly curious that it's never occurred."

Again, however, everyone "in all of history" has only witnessed objects coming into existence within the physical universe. The universe itself does not exist within the physical universe, so it is impossible to extract an argument that relies on the conditions within the universe and apply it to the universe itself which does not exist within the universe.

The statement, "Every substance that begins to exist has a cause." Is a statement that is true because of the physical laws of the universe. All of the physicists that I am aware of admit that physical laws break down if there is no physical universe. We simply can't know if those laws apply outside of the universe.

Wanchick cannot maintain his first premise, therefore, the argument fails to prove anything.

Design of/in the Universe

In the past 30 years, science has revealed the razor thin conditions that make life in our universe possible. The universe is "fine-tuned" for life. Indeed, there are dozens of factors that must be set precisely in order for life to exist here. With their slightest alteration, life would be impossible. Thus, while there are millions of ways the universe could physically be, very few of them are life-permitting. Robin Collins sums up the scientific consensus:

Scientists have increasingly come to realize how the initial conditions of the universe and the basic constants of physics must be balanced on a razor's edge for intelligent life to evolve.... Calculations show that if the constants of physics--such as the physical constant governing the strength of gravity--were slightly different, the evolution of complex, embodied life forms of comparable intelligence to ourselves would be seriously inhibited, if not rendered impossible.

But the unimaginably precise fine-tuning appears more epistemically probable given theism than it does given naturalism. For because conscious life is good, it's not surprising that God would make a world containing it. But why would we ever expect the world to have life-permitting conditions if naturalism were true? Indeed, this appears wholly improbable, since the possible universes that disallow life incomprehensibly outnumber those that allow it. It's like picking the prize-winning white marble out of a barrel of black ones. Thus:

9. Fine-tuning is not improbable given theism.
10. Fine-tuning is improbable given naturalism.
11. Thus, fine-tuning is more probable on theism than naturalism.


In other words, fine-tuning provides evidence that theism is more probable than naturalism.

This seems, to me, a particularly bad design argument, but I'll address it as is.

Wanchick writes, "But the unimaginably precise fine-tuning appears more epistemically probable given theism than it does given naturalism. For because conscious life is good, it's not surprising that God would make a world containing it. But why would we ever expect the world to have life-permitting conditions if naturalism were true?"

The addition of God to this "problem" does nothing to solve it. If a god existed, he would have available to him an infinite number of options in creating the universe. There were as many possible universes without conscious life available to a god as there are available to chance. Why should we believe that a god would be compelled to create one with life? Could he not have just as easily created a universe that did not sustain life?

Wanchick tells us it is more probable that a god would have created a universe supporting life because "conscious life is good." Well, that's interesting. I don't think of conscious life as "good" or "bad," I simply believe it "is." What reasons are there for me to believe that conscious life is "good"? Would it be "bad" if life didn't exist? If a god did eternally exist, was it "bad" until life was created?

I do not see how existence can be labeled "good" or "bad." Existence is a precondition of moral judgments. It simply makes no sense to make a moral judgment about a precondition of moral judgments.

It does not matter, then, that ". . . the possible universes that disallow life incomprehensibly outnumber those that allow it." This is true whether if chance is responsible for the universe or if a god freely chose to create. Both chance and a god would have the same number of possible universes. That this universe exists the way it does is no less statistically "miraculous" whether by chance or by a god with infinite possibilities.

Knowability and Discoverability

Additionally, many things within the universe indicate a God-like designer. Scholars have documented that our universe is not only fine-tuned for sentient life, but also for scientific discovery and knowability. The universe is structured in just the right way to allow the study of natural laws and phenomena, greatly adding to our scientific knowledge. Such features make sense if God wants us to discover and enjoy creation; but why would these features exist on naturalism?

Same problem. If a god existed, he would be able to create any number of universes in which laws and phenomena are not knowable or discoverable. Chance is no different. There are the same number of options available to both chance or a god.

Beauty

Collins notes that "beauty is widely recognized by physicists as being an important characteristic of the laws of nature, one which has served as a highly selective guide to discovering the fundamental laws of nature in the twentieth century." Moreover, the laws of nature (and many things in nature) exhibit simplicity, harmony, and elegance. It wouldn't be surprising for a creator to make such a universe, but, again, why would this be so if naturalism is true?

This, of course, assumes that "beauty" is universal. Aesthetic judgments, however, are notoriously subjective. Beauty has no universal properties. The very property that makes one thing beautiful makes another thing ugly (e.g. the curve of a "beautiful" vase could be the reason that vase is beautiful, but the same curve in another vase with different properties could be the reason that vase is ugly).

Additionally, this argument falls prey to the same problems listed above. Both chance and any supposed "god" would have the same number of possible universes. Why would a god be any less likely to choose one over another? Maybe an uglier universe would have better fulfilled a purpose this god had.

Evil

Typically, if an object is undesigned or serves a purpose only accidentally (e.g., a hillside serving as a stage), we conclude that it cannot be used correctly or incorrectly. Design or intention appears to be a necessary condition for proper function. A bike can be used properly; a fallen meteor cannot.

It's interesting to apply this insight to sentient beings. Can they be misused? The obvious answer is 'yes.' Humans shouldn't be used as slaves, for instance; doing so is evil. Indeed, the misuse of beings seems to be a necessary and sufficient condition for evil. Evil events involve a patient out of its proper state.

So evil is a departure from the way things ought to exist. But this contradicts naturalism, wherein every living thing is like the hillside: accidental byproducts having no design plan, no proper state.

Objectors might hold that if we used the hillside as a stage long enough, this would become its conventional function, and to stop doing so would seem a misuse. Thus, objects can acquire proper function accidentally over time. But this seems false for at least sentient beings, for no matter how long humans are enslaved, they should never be used as such. Their function is inherent rather than conventional.

Evil obviously exists; think of child pornography or rape. And since evil entails that the universe and its inhabitants have a specific function or purpose, it follows that they were designed by an intelligent being having the knowledge, ability, and intention to build a world with purposeful and moral dimensions.

Wanchick asserts that "Evil obviously exists. . ." Actions certainly exist, and people certainly call some actions "evil" sometimes, but does something called "evil" obviously exist? I can't taste, hear, touch, see, or smell it. How is this obvious?

Also, how is it that objects can be improperly used? It is true that a bicycle has a design function, but what if I don't want a bicycle for the function for which it was designed? Is that an "improper" use of it?

Say that I am a set designer for a movie production. My company is making a horror film set in an old cabin in the woods. I have to decorate that cabin, and I want to hang a rusty, non-functional bicycle from the wall. For me, a brand new mountain bike is a "bad" bike. A rusty, old, non-functional bicycle, however, is a "good" bike for my purposes. That this bike does not do what it is designed and intended to do is exactly what makes it "good."

Wanchick states, "Humans shouldn't be used as slaves, for instance. . ." I agree, but others don't. Some people believe that others should be enslaved. They believe it is "good" that people are enslaved.

I would certainly fight to keep people free from slavery, but that doesn't mean that I believe it is universally "wrong." It is, however, wrong according to my moral framework, and my moral framework forces me to fight against slavery with all of my power (and within my ethical guidelines). Whether I believe it to be "universally" immoral is irrelevant.

The "power" of this argument is its emotional appeal. Most people agree that slavery is evil, but they feel that it lessens the immorality of it if it is not "universally" so. I will deal with this more in the next argument.

[As an aside, it is interesting to me that Wanchick argues for the immorality of slavery when the Christian god is quoted as saying, "Your male and female slaves are to come from the nations around you; from them you may buy slaves. You may also buy some of the temporary residents living among you and members of their clans born in your country, and they will become your property. You can will them to your children as inherited property and can make them slaves for life. . ." (Leviticus 25:44-46) and "If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his property." (Exodus 21:20-21). If slavery is "evil" and the Christian god calls it "good," then is the Christian god "evil" or is slavery "good"?]

Moral Argument

But what makes us obliged not to mistreat humans? After all, if naturalism is true, "a human being is a biological animal," as naturalist Julian Baggini admits. But unless humans have unique moral worth not had by beasts, it seems objective moral truth wouldn't exist. It wouldn't, for instance, be immoral to rape or kill, for animals do so to each other regularly with no moral significance.

Paul Draper pinpoints the problem such properties would cause for naturalism: "every human being has a special sort of inherent value that no animal has, and every human has an equal amount of this value. Such equality is possible despite the great differences among humans, because the value in question does not supervene on any natural properties. It is a nonnatural property that all (and only) humans possess." The great naturalist philosopher J.L. Mackie, and myriad others, agree.

Unfortunately, to defend naturalism, Draper and Mackie (like Carrier) have to absurdly deny that humans have such unique inherent worth. Carrier even says some animals are more morally valuable than certain humans in virtue of their superior intellect, rationality, etc. But such positions are obviously false. Humans have moral worth not found in animals, regardless of their comparative capabilities, and the failure to recognize this is simply a lack of moral insight.

But since these moral properties obviously do exist in human beings and aren't natural, they must have a supernatural source. And since moral properties exist only in persons, the source of moral properties must be a supernatural person.

The moral order, then, is evidence of a supernatural person who grounds moral truth. Additionally, at least some moral truths are necessary, and thus their foundation must be a necessary being grounding moral facts in all possible worlds.

I've dealt with the issue of morality at length before. I believe that moral judgments are relative to moral frameworks.

***
But are all relative judgments invalid?

Consider motion. Imagine sitting next to me in a bar when I suddenly begin screaming, "My Guinness is moving! Sweet Lola, save me, my Guinness is moving!" You look at my glass, however, and say, "Man, atheism is really rat poison to the intellect! Your Guinness isn't moving; it's perfectly still."

Is it both possible that my Guinness is moving and that my Guinness is not moving? Of course it is!

I could respond to your skepticism, "Isn't this continent drifting, the earth rotating and revolving, our solar system spinning in a pinwheel galaxy, and our galaxy speeding away from others in the universe? How can you say my Guinness isn't moving?!"

At the same time, you could have said, "Look EB, there is a spot on the bar next to your glass and we can tell by this ruler that your glass is neither moving towards that spot nor away from it. Your glass is stationary."

Both contradictory statements are correct, but are relative to specific spatio-temporal frameworks. From certain spatio-temporal frameworks, my Guinness is stationary; from others, it is moving. The "fact" of the motion of my Guinness is relative to the spatio-temporal framework that is adopted. There is no one, "true" spatio-temporal framework that truly determines whether something is "really" moving or not, there are only different frameworks from which to judge.

But though my Guinness' motion is relative, it is still "objective." You would certainly admit the validity of my statement that my Guinness is moving from any of the other spatio-temporal frameworks that I mentioned as justification. I would certainly admit the validity of your statement from the spatio-temporal framework that you mention. Both statements are correct, but are so relative to specific spatio-temporal frameworks.

Now, what if the same could be said of moral judgments? What if I could say objectively that it is morally wrong of P to D (I'm stealing all of this from Princeton's Gilbert Harman if you are wondering), but had to qualify my statement that it was morally wrong according to a specific moral framework? My judgment would be objective, but not universal.

If morality is not universal, though, must I accept everyone's moral judgments as equally valid? Of course not. For one thing, it is certainly possible that someone makes a moral judgment that does not fit the moral framework they use to justify it [Just like it would be possible for someone to say that something is stationary from a framework in which that judgment is inconsistent].

Secondly, acknowledging that a belief may be justified by reference to another moral framework does not mean that I have to abandon my own moral framework. For example, I believe that it is morally wrong to rape someone. If I were to happen upon a man trying to rape a woman, my moral framework demands that I do whatever action is permissible according to that framework to prevent that action from taking place. I may acknowledge that the action is permissible according to the rapist's moral framework, but that does not mean that I must ignore what is demanded by my own moral framework.

Moral relativism, then, does not necessarily lead to moral nihilism.

Anyone familiar with Foucault's work on power structures will know that, if he is correct, social ideas and morality are shaped by power. There is nothing called "madness" out in the world. One cannot catch "madness" in a bucket and paint it pink. It is an idea that must be defined. Originally, the church and the family were the primary power structures that made this definition. The church needed a way to distinguish between God's directions to his people through the Holy Spirit and the babblings of a madman. People that had certain heretical "visions" and "promptings" from God were considered "mad." Now, it is the physicians who define these kind of terms. Whatever the age, though, power is the driver behind these definitions.

In the case of morality, then, power will be the stabilizing (or destabilizing) force behind societal morality. Obviously, that does not mean that one must accept society's morality (both the Christians here and myself reject our current society's morality, but for drastically different reasons). For example, though most of current, American society opposes same-sex marriage, I adamantly support it. I do not have to accept the majority opinion even if I acknowledge that that opinion is justified by reference to a certain moral framework. I can exert my power (however limited it is) to try to change societal opinion. I can also point out that denying homosexual couples marriage is inconsistent with other, primary societal values like equal treatment under the law.

Just like one can make objective statements about motion even though the statements are relative to spatio-temporal frameworks, so I can make objective statements about morality that are relative to specific moral frameworks. So, contrary to Bahnsen's argument, I can be outraged by the Holocaust and not have a universal morality to do so. Does someone else have to agree with my outrage? Certainly not, but I will exert every power available to me via my moral framework (which excludes violence) to make others see things my way. Morality, like every idea (according to Foucault) is a power struggle.
***

Wanchick writes, "Unfortunately, to defend naturalism, Draper and Mackie (like Carrier) have to absurdly deny that humans have such unique inherent worth. . . But such positions are obviously false. Humans have moral worth not found in animals, regardless of their comparative capabilities, and the failure to recognize this is simply a lack of moral insight."

Well, this is certainly a passionate assertion! It is only that, though, an assertion. If it is "obviously false" that humans do not have a "unique inherent worth," why didn't Wanchick demonstrate its falsity? All he did was follow it up with rhetoric.

That humans are capable of feeling a stronger attachment to our fellow humans is not surprising given the nature of our brains and our evolutionary history, but other animals also experience loss and pain at the death or injury of another animal. That a human life is more significant to us, humans, is no surprise. That we feel a unique bond to other humans is no surprise. This is mirrored (to a lesser extent) in the animal kingdom as well (i.e. some animals "value" the lives of other of their kind more than they "value" the lives of other animals).

Ontological Argument

Philosophically, to say something can possibly exist is to say it could exist in at least one 'possible world' (PW). PWs (including our own) are simply possible total states of affairs. (These are not necessarily possible universes--e.g., God existing alone is a PW excluding any universe.)

By definition, a necessary being is one existing in all PWs. Obviously, if such a being were found in our (actual) world we would know that it exists in all PWs. The reverse also holds. Label our world X and another PW Y. Assume Y holds a necessary being. Inhabitants of Y would know that that being would exist in X too, since it would exist in all PWs. Thus, if any PW holds a necessary being (i.e., if that necessary being is possible), then that being must exist in the actual world, too.

Some theists have seen God as a necessary being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. He is maximally great (MG). But then if God is possible, He is actual. Theists have developed this ontological argument:

12. It is possible that an MG being exists.
13. If it is possible that an MG being exists, then an MG being exists in some PW.
14. If an MG being exists in some PW, then it exists in all PWs.
15. If an MG being exists in all PWs, then it exists in the actual world.

The argument is valid. The question is, why think an MG metaphysically possible?

First, nothing about this being seems impossible: He appears compatible with our modal intuitions. Much of mankind has indeed thought He exists. In the absence of a defeater, there seems no reason to reject our intuitions.

Moreover, my prior arguments establish 12. The Leibnizian argument proves a necessary mind who caused the universe. This being is seemingly omnipotent and omniscient given the kalam and design arguments. And He is the necessary source of moral goodness and truth, as shown in the moral argument. So my case reveals the reality and thus the possibility of an MG being. Indeed, even if the arguments aren't sound, their conclusions appear at least metaphysically possible. One doesn't simply look at the conclusion and see its obvious falsity; quite the opposite. The beings entailed appears possible, and thus the argument must be evaluated. But if the beings in those arguments are possible, then why is it impossible for one being with all those properties to exist? Since this surely does seem possible, then that person must actually exist. The MG God is a reality.

Ontological arguments suck. Fight fire with fire, though, I guess. Here is my ontological argument:

P1: It is possible that a possible world in which a god does not exist exists.

P2: If it is possible that a possible world in which a god does not exist exists, then a possible world in which a god does not exist exists.

P3: If a possible world in which a god does not exist exists, then a god would not exist in every possible world.

P4: If a god does not exist in every possible world, then it is possible that a god does not exist in the actual world.

P5: A god does not exist in a possible world in which a god does not exist.

C: Therefore, it is possible that a god does not exist in the actual world.

Theists assert that a god does exist in the actual world. It is their responsibility, then, to demonstrate this.

I'll give my argument the same support that Wanchick gave his above:

The argument is valid. The question is, why think a possible world in which a god does not exist possible?

First, nothing about this possible world seems impossible: It appears compatible with our modal intuitions. Much of humanity has indeed thought it exists. In the absence of a defeater, there seems no reason to reject our intuitions.

Moreover, my refutation of Wanchick's prior arguments establish that it is possible that a god does not exist. My refutation of his Leibnizian argument disproves a necessary mind who caused the universe. Given my refutation of the kalam and design arguments, there is no reason to believe an omnipotent and omniscient being exists. As shown in my refutation of the moral argument, it is not true that a god is the necessary source of moral goodness and truth. . .

Resurrection of Jesus

Despite media rumors, there is wide agreement among New Testament specialists regarding the events surrounding Jesus' death. Even a minimal list of almost universally affirmed facts among liberal and conservative scholars provides sufficient evidence that Jesus really was resurrected.

(a) Jesus died by crucifixion around 30 AD. Even radically liberal Crossan confesses, "That [Jesus] was crucified is as sure as anything historical can ever be."

(b) The tomb where Jesus was buried was empty days after His death. There are almost two dozen arguments for this: (i) If the tomb weren't empty, Christianity would've been defeated in Jerusalem by Jewish authorities revealing so. (ii) Women are the first witnesses to the empty tomb. However, women's testimony in Jesus' culture was considered generally unreliable and far inferior to that of men. If the empty tomb story were fabricated, why insert women as the primary witnesses? (iii) The empty tomb is noted by Paul in the 1 Corinthians 15:3-5 creed originating within three years of Jesus' death, far too early to be legend. (iv) The Jewish denial of the empty tomb implies its reality. Why concoct stories accounting for a tomb that's full? (v) The story is benignly straightforward, unlike legendary stories of Jesus' era.

(c) Jesus appeared visually to various people days after His death, as independently attested in early creeds, Paul, the Gospels, and nonbiblical sources. Paul tells of his and the other disciples' appearances in 1 Corinthians 15, explaining his personal verification of their accounts. Lüdemann concludes, "It may be taken as historically certain that Peter and the disciples had experiences after Jesus' death in which Jesus appeared to them as the risen Christ."

(d) James and Paul both believed Jesus was resurrected after seeing Him postcrucifixion. These appearances must have vividly occurred for such dedicated opponents of Christ to convert. Paul went from the main persecutor of Christianity to its main apostle! And James turned from confirmed skeptic to an early church pillar.

If the Resurrection occurred, this series of facts can be explained plausibly and coherently. But what coherent natural explanation can be offered?

Moreover, without the Resurrection, how does one account for Christianity's origin? A lone resurrection of an executed Messiah was utterly foreign to pre-Christian Jews and blatantly contradicted their Messianic expectations. It seems impossible that any would've conceived of, let alone invented, the resurrection account.

There were various other Messianic movements before and after Jesus, but they uniformly died with their founders. Only Jesus was claimed to have risen. Only His followers, who saw Him afterwards, turned from a failed group to a vibrant movement proclaiming resurrection unto death. Something remarkable must've occurred to motivate the transformation. Only the Resurrection seems sufficient.

Again, these facts are affirmed among virtually all scholars, Christian or liberal. As Craig notes, in denying any of them or that resurrection is their best explanation, Carrier will have to "believe that the majority of the world's historians who have studied the life of Jesus are mistaken about the historicity of his empty tomb, postmortem appearances, and the origin of the Christian Way, or else embrace some naturalistic explanation of these facts which has been overwhelmingly rejected by historical scholars."

But since men cannot rise from death naturally, the Resurrection must've had a supernatural cause. And since Jesus claimed allegiance with the Old Testament God, the most plausible cause of Jesus' rising is precisely He.

In answer to a - d above:

(a) I agree that a man named Jesus was crucified around 30 CE.

(b) I do not know whether or not Jesus' tomb was empty days after his burial. All I have to go on are works written by biased followers years after the event. (i) There is no indication that the Jewish authorities felt threatened enough by the Christian sect as to desire to disprove their claims. Plus, if the first record we have of an empty tomb was written 3 years after the burial of a body, there would be nothing left of that body to disprove the Christian claim. The Jewish authorities would be helpless to defeat Christianity because the body would have been unrecognizably decomposed (maybe completely so). (ii) Who knows why the biblical writers wrote what they wrote. As a team member recently pointed out, there are many inconsistencies with the gospel stories. Maybe the gospel writers were idiots. (iii) Legends can appear much faster than 3 years. (iv) By the time the Jews "denied the empty tomb" the body would have decomposed. They would have been denying that it was empty because of the resurrection. (v) How a story about a person miraculously raising from the dead can be considered "benignly straightforward" is beyond me. If this is straightforward, what is a "legend" to this man?

(c) Why should anyone believe the writers of the Bible and church creeds are attempting to give an honest historical account?

(d) This assumes that the conversion stories of James and Paul are not also made up. How do I know they are not?

Wanchick writes, "If the Resurrection occurred, this series of facts can be explained plausibly and coherently. But what coherent natural explanation can be offered?"

Jesus was buried in a tomb and his body decomposed before people started claiming he was resurrected. The gospel writers were people of faith who believed what they wanted to believe much like the Heaven's Gate cult. They were so convinced that they were willing to die, just like Marshall Applewhite, the founder of the Heaven's Gate cult. The conversion stories of Paul and James were embellished to make it sound better.

As to the argument for the Christian god. The arguments above do not prove that Jesus rose from the dead, so there is no need for a supernatural cause of an event that cannot be proven to have occurred.

Collectively, then, I've demonstrated the reality of a transcendent, immaterial, uncaused, metaphysically necessary, and morally perfect mind of unsurpassable power and knowledge who has revealed Himself in Jesus. My arguments, in effect, demonstrate the reality of not only God, but, alas, the God of Christianity.

Every one of Wanchick's arguments have been refuted above. The case for a god is unproven and must be rejected until some valid evidence is given.

I've collected all of my other posts on this blog here. I consider the following to be my best entries:

An Evidentialist Challenge, Restated--A post in which I answer the two most popular presuppositionalist's questions, "Without the Christian God, how can you account for universal laws of logic and morality?" I also issue a challenge for Christians to demonstrate the validity of their faith.

Step into My Vortex--Discussing the vastness of the universe and our insignificance in it. Has a cool link that shows how big (and small) the universe is.

Life After the Vortex (An Existentialist Reading)--My philosophy for living a full life in light of our insignificance in the universe. Discusses Albert Camus' The Myth of Sisyphus.

Presuppositionalism: Arguments 4, Supports 0--Argues that all presuppositionalists arguments are unsupported, that presuppositionalism is trickery, not a valid argument.

*I will respond to comments on this particular post until they die down in a few days. After that, I will fade away into the sunset.

It has been a true pleasure.

The Moral Argument to the Existence of God

As far as I can tell, the Islamic State could make the same moral argument to the existence of their god, using their own morality, where it’s okay to rape women, own slaves, chop off heads and burn people alive. Christians like Wallace Marshall would have to agree with their Moral Argument, but disagree with their morals. However, their morals are used as evidence that their god exists, just as his morals are used as evidence his god exists. So certain kinds of morals lead to certain kinds of gods. Or certain kinds of gods are used to justify certain kinds of morals. Which comes first? I’m as sure as sure can be that the morals come first. Where do believers get their morals from? That’s as tricky of a question as it is for me. But I can guarantee you Marshall does not get his morals from the Bible. For if he did, his morals would look much like the morals of the Islamic State. For in the Bible we see much of the same things, like slavery, holy wars, genocide or ethnic cleansing, and Inquisitions.

Regardless, there is no time in the history of ethics where Marshall could not make this argument based on the morals of his day. He could own slaves, offer up his child to Yahweh or have sex slaves and be heard to argue at the local pub that his god is the source of objective morals. This argument to god from morals is empty rhetoric without any content.

Since morals come first, I think Philosopher Raymond Bradley has produced a good counter-argument. Bradley: “If there are universal objective moral truths, then there is no God of the Bible. He then provides some universal objective moral truths that are counter to biblical morality: 1) “It is morally wrong to deliberately and mercilessly slaughter men, women, and children who are innocent of any serious wrongdoing”; 2) “It is morally wrong to provide one’s troops with young women captive with the prospect of their being used as sex slaves”; 3) “It is morally wrong to make people cannibalize their friends and family”; 4) “It is morally wrong to practice human sacrifice, by burning or otherwise”; 5) “It is morally wrong to torture people endlessly for their beliefs.” He argues that “if we take these moral principles as objective ones, as Christians themselves do, then since we find them commanded and permitted by the God of the Bible, he does not exist.”

Understanding Presuppositionalism

Since it seems inescapable that this blog must contend with presuppositionalism, I thought it might be wise to get a clear idea of just what it is. That way, there can be no more accusations of misrepresentation and no more actual misrepresentations.

Because of the time involved, it doesn't seem fair to simply ask, "What is presuppositionalism?" and ask our detractors to go about explaining it. I thought I would state it as clearly as I can and, then, open myself up for correction. As I stated in my brief bio, my exposure to presuppositionalism was limited, so my explanation will, no doubt, be the same. I will not be so bold, then, to offer both my statement of it and my critiques in the same post. I will, however, intimate what seems to be a potential threat to the presuppositionalists' endeavor.

First, it seems to me that presuppositionalism must be rooted in reformed theology. Reformed theology refuses to compromise with "the world." It demands that this world is God's world. If, in fact, this world is God's world, then it makes no sense to abandon it and pretend that it is not. For this reason, John's "Outsider Test" is unacceptable to presuppositionalists. Why should they pretend the world is something that it is not--viz. the atheists' world?

The presuppositionalist does not look for "neutral ground" from which to reason, because if God is God, there is no "neutral ground." It is "his ground." So, if there is "common ground," it is anything but "neutral;" it, too, is God's ground, and it's "borrowed ground" at that for the atheist. In other words, in order for the atheist to even deny the existence of God, she must borrow from the Christian worldview to do so.

But why is the atheist borrowing from the Christian worldview? According to the presuppositionalists, only the Christian worldview can explain why reasoning is even possible. How, they ask, could rational dialogue exist if the universe began, expands, and exists by chance? How can chance account for immaterial, universal laws of logic?

How do immaterial laws of logic exist in an atheistic universe? If they are not physical, then where did they come from? If they are merely conventions, then how can their universality be the case? Are we willing to say that in some possible universes A could be both A and not-A?

The Christian answer appears relatively simple: universal laws of logic exist because God has imposed them on the universe. God did not simply declare them by divine fiat so that they are arbitrary, nor did God declare them reasonable because they were reasonable so that they are external to him. Instead, the laws of logic are simply how God thinks and has created the universe to exist. There is no problem understanding how the Christian worldview accounts for these universal, immaterial laws.

So now, the atheist must give an answer before the presuppositionalist allows the conversation to proceed. The presuppositionalist is unwilling to allow the atheist to borrow "God's ground" and then attempt to use it against that same God.

This is where the transcendental argument comes in. The presuppositionalist argues:

The existence of logic presupposes God's existence

Logic exists

Therefore, God exists

But, this is not the only way the argument works. Consider this argument:

The existence of logic presupposes God's existence

Logic does not exist

Therefore, God exists

This is still valid because the act of forming the argument is a work of logic. Making the logical argument proves that God exists.

Additionally, if God does not exist (according to the argument), then logic is unintelligible because logic presupposes God.

It can be extremely frustrating for the atheist to debate a presuppositionalist, because the argument is never allowed to move past the stage of justification. The atheist must justify her use of logic before the presuppositionalist allows her to level logic against his God.

A popular analogy is the image of a young child sitting on his father's lap slapping his face. The young child is able to connect his blows only as long as the father is supporting the child on his lap. If the father were to move the child's foundation, the child would not be able to land his blows.

The presuppositionalist seeks to remove the "lap" from underneath the atheist and demand that the atheist supply her own foundation on which to stand and "strike" the "Father." Until the atheist provides that ground, there can be no further discussion.

Similarly, morality is said to be unaccounted for in the atheists' worldview. If the atheist is to level charges of immorality against the Christian God, the atheist must give an account for what standard she is judging that God by. The Christian stands ready to explain his standard of morality--viz. it is the nature and commands of the Christian God. Unless the atheist can explain why her standard of good and evil should be adopted in the charges against the Christian God, then the presuppositionalist can simply reject that standard as arbitrary and deny the charges.

Essentially, the presuppositionalists' argument disallows any critique of God without forcing the critic to justify the standards by which she is criticizing. This simplifies the presuppositionalists' task tremendously. They do not have to answer the specific charges of the atheist (though many of them are capable of doing so), but rather simply challenge the ability of the atheist to level those charges.

In Greg Bahnsen's debates with Stein and Tabash, he was able to demonstrate each of these different foundational problems. With Stein, the argument centered around universal laws of logic. With Tabash, universal moral laws were the issue. When Stein stated that the laws of logic were conventional, Bahnsen stated that he could simply declare himself the winner of the debate and Stein would have no recourse, no "court of appeal." When Tabash complained that God allowed the Holocaust, Bahnsen simply stated that Tabash had no foundation for calling an act "evil" or "good." If the atheists' worldview was correct, then the Holocaust was simply an example of one "bag of biology" doing something to another "bag of biology." There was nothing "moral" about it.

Though, I know this is an oversimplification, I think it is the essence of presuppositional apologetics. First, they maintain that this world is God's world and refuse to adopt an atheistic worldview in order to prove that the Christian worldview is actually the case. Second, they demand that the atheist account for any standard by which they presume to judge the validity of their worldview. The fact that universal laws of logic and universal objective morality cannot be accounted for in the atheistic worldview together with the fact that universal laws of logic and universal objective morality exists, proves that the atheistic worldview is untenable. It is a worldview that is incapable of explaining the state of the world. Christianity, it is argued, perfectly explains the existence of these immaterial universals. The Christian worldview is, thereby, proven superior.

I welcome all forthcoming additions and corrections to what I have just presented.

Since this is an atheistic blog, however, I would be remiss if I did not offer at least one challenge to what I have said above.

What if someone could reasonably maintain that the laws of logic and moral laws may not be universal, but may still play a significant part in the world? Bahnsen, I feel, quickly dismissed this possibility. He seemed to believe that a non-universal moral law was not a moral law at all, and a conventional law of logic was no law of logic at all.

But are all relative judgments invalid?

Consider motion. Imagine sitting next to me in a bar when I suddenly begin screaming, "My Guiness is moving! Sweet Lola, save me, my Guiness is moving!" You look at my glass, however, and say, "Man, atheism is really rat poison to the intellect! Your Guiness isn't moving; it's perfectly still."

Is it both possible that my Guiness is moving and that my Guiness is not moving? Of course it is!

I could respond to your skepticism, "Isn't this continent drifting, the earth rotating and revolving, our solar system spinning in a pinwheel galaxy, and our galaxy speeding away from others in the universe? How can you say my Guiness isn't moving?!"

At the same time, you could have said, "Look EB, there is a spot on the bar next to your glass and we can tell by this ruler that your glass is neither moving towards that spot nor away from it. Your glass is stationary."

Both contradictory statements are correct, but are relative to specific spatio-temporal frameworks. From certain spatio-temporal frameworks, my Guiness is stationary; from others, it is moving. The "fact" of the motion of my Guiness is relative to the spatio-temporal framework that is adopted. There is no one, "true" spatio-temporal framework that truly determines whether something is "really" moving or not, there are only different frameworks from which to judge.

But though my Guiness' motion is relative, it is still "objective." You would certainly admit the validity of my statement that my Guiness is moving from any of the other spatio-temporal frameworks that I mentioned as justification. I would certainly admit the validity of your statement from the spatio-temporal framework that you mention. Both statements are correct, but are so relative to specific spatio-temporal frameworks.

Now, what if the same could be said of moral judgments? What if I could say objectively that it is morally wrong of P to D (I'm stealing all of this from Princeton's Gilbert Harman if you are wondering), but had to qualify my statement that it was morally wrong according to a specific moral framework? My judgment would be objective, but not universal.

If morality is not universal, though, must I accept everyone's moral judgments as equally valid? Of course not. For one thing, it is certainly possible that someone makes a moral judgment that does not fit the moral framework they use to justify it [Just like it would be possible for someone to say that something is stationary from a framework in which that judgment is inconsistent].

Secondly, acknowledging that a belief may be justified by reference to another moral framework does not mean that I have to abandon my own moral framework. For example, I believe that it is morally wrong to rape someone. If I were to happen upon a man trying to rape a woman, my moral framework demands that I do whatever action is permissible according to that framework to prevent that action from taking place. I may acknowledge that the action is permissible according to the rapist's moral framework, but that does not mean that I must ignore what is demanded by my own moral framework.

Moral relativism, then, does not necessarily lead to moral nihilism.

Anyone familiar with Foucault's work on power structures will know that, if he is correct, social ideas and morality are shaped by power. There is nothing called "madness" out in the world. One cannot catch "madness" in a bucket and paint it pink. It is an idea that must be defined. Originally, the church and the family were the primary power structures that made this definition. The church needed a way to distinguish between God's directions to his people through the Holy Spirit and the babblings of a madman. People that had certain heretical "visions" and "promptings" from God were considered "mad." Now, it is the physicians who define these kind of terms. Whatever the age, though, power is the driver behind these definitions.

In the case of morality, then, power will be the stabilizing (or destabilizing) force behind societal morality. Obviously, that does not mean that one must accept society's morality (both the Christians here and myself reject our current society's morality, but for drastically different reasons). For example, though most of current, American society opposes same-sex marriage, I adamantly support it. I do not have to accept the majority opinion even if I acknowledge that that opinion is justified by reference to a certain moral framework. I can exert my power (however limited it is) to try to change societal opinion. I can also point out that denying homosexual couples marriage is inconsistent with other, primary societal values like equal treatment under the law.

Just like one can make objective statements about motion even though the statements are relative to spatio-temporal frameworks, so I can make objective statements about morality that are relative to specific moral frameworks. So, contrary to Bahnsen's argument, I can be outraged by the Holocaust and not have a universal morality to do so. Does someone else have to agree with my outrage? Certainly not, but I will exert every power available to me via my moral framework (which excludes violence) to make others see things my way. Morality, like every idea (according to Foucault) is a power struggle.

[In giving this next argument, some of you might have a "revelation" about my identity. I ask that you, please, respect my anonymity in your comments]

As for the laws of logic, what if they are only seemingly universal, but are truly not so? In the atheistic worldview there are objects in the universe. The relationships between those objects, however, are "not" in the universe. Steven Pinker's work (expanding on Chomsky's) has shown that the brain has different grammatical "sections" inside it. One section holds information about nouns, another verbs, another conjunctions.

When I say that the universe contains objects, I have the idea of "nouns" in mind. Now, what if the brain has simply evolved in a way that it attempts to grammatically relate nouns to each other? The laws of logic rely on words like "and," "or," "not," "is," etc. These words do not name things that exist in the universe. The laws of logic are made up of these words, however. The law of non-contradiction could not exist, for example, if the concept of "not" didn't exist. The laws of logic give rules of how objects relate to one another. There would be no laws of logic were it not for our language that holds certain relational concepts.

If the laws of logic were simply the result of the way that the human brain has formed, this explains why they would certainly "seem" universal. Inasmuch as human brains are similar (and they are very much so), then the laws of logic would seem universal to everyone with a similarly functioning brain. We could not fathom a possible world in which those laws would not apply because we cannot imagine the world differently than our brains allow us to. We would read our thoughts about the relationships of objects into every world that we imagined. The laws of logic would seem to us universal even if they were not.

But this theory does more than just explain why laws of logic can seem universal. It also has powerful explanatory power in cases of so-called "madness." If the laws of logic are simply mental constructs about the relationships of objects, then this would explain why people with brain damage and "malfunctioning" brains are so consistently "illogical." These people constantly deny the laws of logic. They see the world very differently than the rest of us. If the brain is responsible for constructing relationships between objects, then, it would come as no surprise when people with damaged or "malfunctioning" brains did not construct these same relationships.

Imagine, for example, a world filled with people with a similar brain damage. The laws of logic would look very different in this world.

Also, this theory has powerful explanatory powers when it comes to the Saphir-Whorf hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that language is responsible for shaping worldviews. In countries with dramatically different languages, what is considered "logical" is very different. We have Eastern and Western logics that are extremely dissimilar. While the condition of the human brain would explain the similarities between different cultures, the languages of those cultures would explain these logical differences.

My point, here, is to demonstrate that while universal laws of logic may, in fact, be unjustifiable in an atheistic worldview (though many atheists have good reason to deny this), seemingly universal laws of logic are easily justifiable by the theory I explained above.

What I have attempted to give is a justification for atheistic morality and logic. I have attempted to sketch an answer to the two questions that have repeatedly come up on this blog--viz. "What is your standard of morality?" and "What is your standard of reason?"

I do not presume to speak for any atheist other than myself. I know, for a fact, that some of the Objectivists who visit here would adamantly oppose what I have laid out. John Loftus has also expressed reservation about adopting a more relativistic worldview.

I am not even saying that I have worked this out completely myself. This is a theory. I believe it is a theory with great explanatory power and one that takes seriously the idea of an "atheistic worldview."

Now, I know that many of the Christians here will want to jump in and begin to pick apart the second part of my post in which I have laid out a possible atheistic worldview, but I ask that you do not forget to help me in my understanding of presuppositionalism as I described it above.

Because of other obligations, I will not have time to respond to questions in the comment section of this post (I really didn't have time to write this post at all). After I have read and considered all of your comments, I will try to make time to write another post answering any objections.

Have fun! [I feel like I am releasing vultures over an elephant graveyard ;-) ]

--------------------------
John's note: Read the comments for this post and then to see more of exbeliever's arguments against TAG and presuppositionalism see here.

A Quick and Dirty Refutation of Divine Command Theories

Robert Adams has played a significant role in reviving divine command theories in ethics (DCT). According to Adams, and many before him, the most plausible construal of DCT entails that moral obligation depends on the expressed will of God, where these expressions are properly construed as commands.1 Call any such view a ‘command formulation’ of DCT. Recently, Mark Murphy has argued that command formulations of DCT are untenable, and that the most plausible formulation of DCT entails that moral obligation depends upon the will of God, whether or not it is expressed.2 Call any such view a ‘will formulation’ of DCT. In this paper, I will argue that, while Murphy-style arguments against command formulations are decisive, the arguments Adams advances against will formulations seem equally decisive. But the most salient implication of these results is not that their particular versions of will and command formulations of DCT - those of Adams and Murphy - are inadequate. Rather, as I will argue, a much more dramatic implication follows: no possible formulation of DCT is an adequate moral theory.

This paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, I will briefly describe the defining features of the two most plausible formulations of DCT. In the second, I will discuss Murphy’s main objection to command formulations of DCT. In the third section, I will discuss Adams’ main objection to will formulations of DCT. In each of sections two and three, two goals are achieved: (i) a conclusion that an objection against a formulation of DCT is persuasive, and (ii) the uncovering of a necessary condition for any adequate moral theory. Finally, in the fourth section, I will utilize these results to argue that no version of DCT is adequate.

I
According to all formulations of DCT, at least some moral properties - such as the morally permissible, impermissible, and obligatory - are somehow dependent upon the will of God. Will formulations state that the dependence is direct. That is, certain kinds of divine acts of will are both necessary and sufficient for the exemplification of moral properties. By way of contrast, command formulations state that the dependence is indirect. That is, although certain sorts of divine volitions are necessary for the exemplification of moral properties, they are not sufficient. For such volitions to generate (e.g.) moral obligations, God must also communicate such volitions to the relevant people.

Are either of the above-mentioned versions of DCT plausible? As I mentioned earlier, Murphy has offered powerful criticisms of command formulations of DCT, and Adams has advanced powerful arguments against will formulations of DCT. We will now examine the best of these arguments in turn.

II
A key objection3 to command formulations of DCT can be expressed simply: If God’s ability to impose moral obligations depends on the expression of certain of His intentions in the form of commands, then they are objectionably contingent. For then God would be powerless to obligate without the existence of certain sorts of social practices, in particular, the practice of commanding. Such contingency is objectionable, for if (e.g.) the morally impermissible depends on God’s commands in this way, then it seems metaphysically possible for a community of people to exist in which either (i) the requisite social facts don’t exist, or (ii) they do exist, but God hasn’t commanded anything. But if either case obtains, then there will be actions that aren’t (say) impermissible, but should be. But this is implausible: such moral properties would be exemplified even if (i) or (ii) obtained. Therefore, command formulations of DCT are implausible.

Adams has a reply to this objection: “This does not ground a serious objection to divine command theory. A practice of commanding exists in virtually all human communities, and I think we need not worry about what obligation would be (if it would exist at all) for persons who do not live in communities in which they require things of each other4.”

This is surely too quick and dismissive. For it hardly suffices to say that, as a matter of fact, all (or virtually all) communities have a practice of commanding. For, prima facie, it seems (metaphysically) possible that a community without such a practice could exist. And it also seems that wrongness could supervene on acts in such a community. For consider a possible world, W, in which there exists a community of five people: a man (call him ‘Zed’), and four children, none of which is older than ten years old. Suppose further that this community has no practice of commanding. Finally, suppose that Zed regularly sodomizes these children. Since, by hypothesis, this community has no practice of commanding, command formulations of DCT entail that none of Zed’s acts are morally wrong. But, surely, moral wrongness supervenes on at least some acts in W. But then moral wrongness doesn’t require the existence of a community practice of commanding as a part of its supervenience base. And if not, then command formulations of DCT are false. Therefore, it appears that Murphy is correct: command formulations of DCT are objectionably contingent. With this objection, then, we have uncovered a necessary condition for any adequate moral theory:

The Non-contingency Condition (NC): No moral obligation, R, is objectionably contingent.

Corollary: For any moral obligation R, if R isn’t binding without a human social practice of commanding, then R is objectionably contingent.

It will be important to keep this condition in mind when we come to assess the adequacy of divine command theories in general.

III
Adams’ main argument against will formulations of DCT is also simple: Moral obligations cannot exist unless they are communicated. But will formulations of DCT falsely imply that it is possible for certain sorts of God’s uncommunicated volitions to morally obligate us. Therefore, will formulations of DCT are false.5

There are two ways to support the main premise of this argument. According to the first, uncommunicated intentions can’t obligate because they are generated when (and only when) at least one person requires something of another person. But requiring is a communicative act. If, for example, a parent forms an intention (of a certain sort) that his teenage daughter be home before 8 p.m. every weeknight, but he doesn’t convey this intention to her, then she is not obligated to be home by 8 p.m. on weeknights. As soon as he communicates his intention to his daughter, however, an obligation is generated, and she must now be home at the stated time. Now if this is how obligations are generated, then, necessarily, if God has created obligations, then He has expressed them. But will formulations of DCT falsely imply that it is possible for certain sorts of God’s intentions to generate moral obligations even if those intentions remain forever unexpressed. Therefore, will formulations of DCT are false.6

According to the second way, uncommunicated intentions can’t obligate because a certain version of the “ought implies can” principle is true: If x is obligatory for S, then S must be aware (or at least be capable of becoming aware) that x is obligatory for S7. The general idea here is that one can only be responsible for what one is capable of doing. So, for example, suppose my hands are handcuffed together. If so, then I can’t raise just one of them. So if someone commands me to raise just one of my hands, I won’t be able to comply, even if I want to. But if not, then I can’t be held responsible for failing to raise just one of my hands. Similarly, I can’t be held responsible for failing to comply with an obligation if I can’t come to know of that obligation. For knowing of an obligation is a necessary condition for being capable of (intentionally) complying with it. But will formulations of DCT imply that the following type of situation is possible: (i) Due to a divine intention of a certain sort, at least one person is morally obligated to do something (or refrain from doing something), and (ii) she is unable to come to know of this obligation, since God has not expressed His intention. But since the above-stated “ought implies can” principle is true, this situation is not possible. Therefore, will formulations of DCT are false.

What to make of these objections to will formulations? If we don’t consider the “ought implies can” rationale behind the main premise, then the force of the argument will depend upon whether one finds a social theory of moral obligation persuasive. I suspect that many won’t find it persuasive. But even if we don’t, I think the “ought implies can” rationale is strong enough, all by itself, to support the main premise. However, Murphy disagrees. He thinks that no self-respecting moral realist can accept it. For, he argues, it seems to be a straightforward implication of moral realism that moral facts exist independently of human beings, just as rocks and trees exist independently of us. But then it follows that it is possible that there are moral values that we are not aware of. In particular, there could be moral obligations that we are not aware of. But if so, then the above-mentioned “ought implies can” principle is false, and so the argument doesn’t go through.8

I think this objection misses the mark. For recall the way that the “ought implies can” principle was formulated above. The principle doesn’t have the implication that there can’t be unknown moral obligations. Rather, it implies that there can’t be unknowable moral obligations. But surely any plausible moral theory must have the latter implication. A fortiori, any theistic version of moral realism must have this implication. For, prima facie, God’s holding His creatures accountable for failing to comply with obligations that He doesn’t express is incompatible with His goodness.9 So it appears that, necessarily, if a divine command theory is true (one according to which the divine commander is the God of traditional theism), then if God places obligations on His creatures, then He communicates them (or somehow makes it possible for His creatures to discover them). But as we have seen, will formulations allow for the possibility of morally binding, yet forever unexpressed, divine intentions. I submit, then, that Murphy has not shown that the above-mentioned “ought implies can” principle is false with respect to moral realist theories. It appears that we have found another necessary condition that any adequate moral theory must satisfy:

The Accessibility Condition (AC): Necessarily, for any moral rule, R, R is binding only if R is cognitively accessible in principle.

Unfortunately for Murphy, the principle shows that will formulations of DCT are inadequate. For unlike other versions of moral realism, will formulations of DCT entail that moral obligations can exist, and yet be incapable of discovery (even in principle) if God doesn’t express them. Therefore, will formulations of DCT are untenable.

IV
It is now time to take stock. In section II, we saw that any adequate moral theory must meet the following condition:

The Non-contingency Condition (NC): No moral obligation, R, is objectionably contingent.

Corollary: For any moral obligation R, if R isn’t binding without a human social practice of commanding, then R is objectionably contingent.

And in section III, we saw that any adequate moral theory must also satisfy the following condition:

The Accessibility Condition (AC): Necessarily, for any moral obligation, R, R is binding only if R is cognitively accessible in principle.

Putting these together, we get the following thesis:

The Adequacy Thesis: A moral theory is adequate only if it simultaneously satisfies both NC and AC.

Finally, the discussions of sections II and III together provide strong support for the following thesis:

The Incompatibility Thesis (IT): No version of DCT can simultaneously satisfy both NC and AC: For any version of DCT, T, T satisfies NC iff T does not satisfy AC.

For it is clear from the discussion in these sections that the feature of command formulations that enables them to satisfy the Accessibility Condition - the one that grounds the claim that no divine intention can generate a moral obligation unless it is communicated - is the very feature that prevents them from satisfying the Non-contingency Condition. It is also clear, from the discussion in these sections, that the feature of will formulations that enables them to satisfy the Non-contingency Condition - the one that grounds the claim that divine intentions (of a certain sort) can generate obligations, even if God does not express them - is the very feature that prevents them from satisfying the Accessibility Condition. But IT entails that no divine command theory satisfies the Adequacy Thesis. But if not, then it follows that neither formulation of DCT is adequate.

If the points of the previous paragraph are correct, then it is a short step to the conclusion that no possible formulation of DCT is adequate. For anything that could possibly count as a formulation of DCT would have to ground (at least some) moral properties in either (i) God’s commands alone, (ii) God’s intentions alone, or (iii) God’s intentions expressed in the form of commands.10 Now we have already dealt with (ii) and (iii). But our objections to (iii) apply to (i) as well. For, even apart from the inherent implausibility of type-(i) versions of DCT11, they imply that God’s ability to obligate would depend upon an existing practice of commanding. But if so, then version-(i) DCT fails to satisfy the Non-contingency Condition. Therefore, it cannot be an adequate moral theory. But since versions (i), (ii) and (iii) are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive formulations of DCT, any possible version of DCT must be an instance of one of these versions. And since we have just seen that each version is untenable, it follows that no possible version of DCT is an adequate moral theory.

In summary, then, we have taken a brief look at the only two formulations of DCT that have been advertised and endorsed. While discussing these accounts, we uncovered two necessary conditions of any adequate moral theory. We then saw that, while each of these formulations could meet one of the two conditions, neither version could meet both. Finally, we exploited some of these results to refute the only other possible formulation of DCT, one that no one endorses. And these results yielded the (perhaps) startling conclusion that DCT is doomed.

-----
1His most developed defense of this view is to be found in his Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford UP, 1999). See especially chapter 11 of that work.

2 Murphy, Mark. “Divine Commands, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation”, Faith and Philosophy 15 (January, 1998), pp. 3-27.

3The following argument is a modified version of the one Murphy gives in “Divine Commands, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation”, pp. 5-7.

4Adams, Robert. Finite and Infinite Goods, p. 266.

5This is a rough summary of Adams’ argument in his Finite and Infinite Goods, pp. 261-2.

6This is Adams’ primary rationale. See Finite and Infinite Goods, p. 262.

7It should be noted that Adams is uncomfortable with putting much weight on this second rationale. See Finite and Infinite Goods, p. 261-2, and footnote 27 on p. 262.

8This is a paraphrase of Murphy’s reply in “Divine Commands, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation”, p. 8.

9Adams seems to be raising the same problem for will formulations when he says that they yield “...an unattractive picture of divine-human relations, one in which the wish of God’s heart imposes binding obligations without even being communicated, much less issuing a command. Games in which one party incurs guilt for failing to guess the unexpected wishes of the other party are not nice games. They are no nicer if God is thought of as a party to them.” Finite and Infinite Goods, p. 261.

10 Surely, no ethical theory that entailed that moral properties are grounded *neither* in God’s will *nor* in His commands (nor a combination of them) could count as a version of DCT.

11E.g., it appears that type-(i) versions imply that there could be a morally binding divine command that God does not want us to obey, which seems absurd., end