Is Atheism a Set of Beliefs?

One of the most annoying and persistent accusations made against atheists is that we have a set of beliefs. Let me try, probably in vain, to disabuse believers of their ignorance on this. They utterly fail to understand what we think. It's as if they close their eyes and stop their ears and shout while we try to explain it. Randal Rauser claims he's trying to understand us. Is he? There is a distinction to be made. Can he make it? Let's see.

There is an important distinction between affirming a proposition and doubting it. To affirm that a god exists is to affirm a proposition, that a god exists. To doubt that proposition is to, well, doubt that proposition. It's equivalent to saying there isn't sufficient objective evidence to assent to the proposition that a god exists. Believers will retort that since we cannot say with certainty there isn't a god, we have a set of beliefs based on the probability there isn't a god. This is a non-sequitur, it does not follow. Since certainty is unattainable all we have are the probabilities. All an atheist can do is to say it's improbable that a god exists, or rather that they lack such a belief. What does belief have to do with the probabilities? Nothing I can see. Not all propositions are conceivably false in the same sense and to the same degree. Or, to be consistent, would believers say the person who believes in fairies has a belief in the same sense and to the same degree as the person who says that such a proposition lacks sufficient objective evidence for it? How can this be?

More perhaps later.