Resurrection Debate: A New Approach
John W. Loftus has generously extended his invitation to me to become a member of this blog, and for that I am grateful. In the upcoming months I hope to contribute regularly on topics related to Christianity and its weaknesses, as well as the continuing debate between its prominent defenders and their critics. For those curious about my religious background, here is a little info:
I was not raised in a Christian home or religious environment, but nevertheless found my way into a Christian church, through a friend, prior to entering high school. It was in that church my friend attended that I became a Christian, and remained so until the end of my high school career, right before I left for college. Like many others, the doctrine of hell did not sit comfortably with me -- both on an intuitive and intellectual level -- and was thus the main reason for my departure from the Christian faith. Since then, after completing both undergraduate and graduate degrees in philosophy (I stopped at the MA level), I found many other compelling reasons which justified my abandonment of Christianity, which I hope to share and elaborate here.
In this entry, I will outline a new approach skeptics can and should take in the resurrection debate. As almost everyone agrees, skeptics and apologists alike, the ability for the apologist to establish a good case for the resurrection is vital to a successful defense of the Christian faith, and so, unsurprisingly, an enormous amount of time and effort has been spent devoted to this one area. A testament to the latter is the fact that anyone new (or old) to the scene will often observe the following: the debate can get really really complicated, especially among scholars. Why? A natural reason one might draw from this is that the case for the resurrection is not as terrible as one might think -- after all, if even the scholarly critics have to present elaborate and sophisticated arguments to answer their opponents, then the apologist's case can't be that bad. In actuality, the case for the resurrection can be very weak, despite the sophisticated nature of the debate, but it sure doesn't seem that way to those lost in the minutia of the historical details. I admit to being among the perplexed.
Hence I advocate a new approach to the debate, one that will cut through all the smoke and thus expose how weak the case for the resurrection truly is. To begin, one should pay close attention to the claim that the apologist wants -- needs -- to establish when he argues for the resurrection: it is the claim that God raised Jesus from the dead. And thus from this we can observe what the claim is not: it is not, merely, that Jesus was raised from the dead, which is obviously insufficient if the causal agent responsible for the resuscitation were not supernatural, but natural. The apologist undoubtedly needs to first establish the latter assertion in order to establish the former, but the two are clearly not equivalent -- in fact, the two are worlds apart. Here we come to my new approach: we should challenge the apologist to see if he can demonstrate (with probability, of course) that, if Jesus was really raised from the dead, it was God who did it. For, even if it were a historical fact that Jesus was raised from the dead, if it cannot be shown that God was the cause of the event, then what is the worth of historical apologetics to the rational defense of Christianity? None.
Below are arguments detailing why the inference from "Jesus was raised from the dead" to "it was probably God who raised Jesus from the dead" cannot be made nonfallaciously.
Argument 1
1. It is fallacious to infer that X probably can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all Zs can't y, when either: (a) we know of a plausible reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y; or (b) when X does not fall within the category of Z, and we know of no good reason to suppose there are no relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. [assumption]
3. Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, either a natural entity or supernatural entity. [assumption]
4. Jesus does not fall within the category of non-supernormal human being, and we know of no good reason to suppose there are no relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus, but not non-supernormal human beings, to rise naturally. [premise, supported by C1 and c2 below]
5. We know of a plausible reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus, but not non-supernormal human beings, to rise naturally.
[premise, supported by the claim that Jesus may not have been not fully biologically human if we assume the virgin birth story]
6. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus probably could not have risen naturally from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. (from 5, 1, and 4, 1).
Edit: I realize premise (1) needs some explaining.
Consider Mike, a body-builder builder who works out 15 hours a day, and suppose one claims: Mike probably can't bench press 500 lbs, and this is thought to follow from the premise that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench press 500 lbs. This inference is clearly fallacious, but why? According to condition (b) of premise (1), the inference is fallacious not only because Mike and the other body-builders don't belong in the same category, but also because we have no good reason to assume that with respect to being able to 500 lbs, Mike is just like everyone else. If we had good reason for assuming that Mike was just like all the other body-builders (say, for instance, he has a muscular disorder which makes his 15 hours equivalent to a normal 2 hour work-out), then the inference would be nonfallacious. Hence: if X does not fall within the category of Z, the burden falls on the one making the inference to supply good reason for why we should assume the absence of any relevant difference between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y.
To illustrate with another example, consider Dejohn the daily steroid-taker who works out less than 2 hours a day. Claim: Dejohn *probably* can't bench 500 lbs. Premise (data): All body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs. Is this inference fallacious? Suppose we know that all the body-builders in our data don't take steroids, and Dejohn has been taking them for the past 8 years on a daily basis (let's assume they don't cause him any harm). Hence, even though Dejohn and everyone else works out the same amount of hours, there is a clear (possibly relevant) difference between the two that justifies an initial category distinction: we can separate Dejohn and the other body-builders -- since none of them take the drug -- into two classes (steroid taker vs. non-steroid takers). If we have no good reason to assume that with respect to being able to bench 500 lbs, Dejohn and everyone else are the same, then we must conclude that the inference is fallacious. Stated another way, given the justified category distinction, the inference is fallacious unless the one making the inference can supply good reason to suppose the distinction to be irrelevant -- like if we knew, for instance, that the steroids Dejohn takes only affects his lower legs and not his chest or upper body.
Condition (a) of premise (1) can be shown with the following illustration. Suppose one claims: Jane probably can't put her bare hand over a hot flame for 10 minutes without it be severely burned. Premise (data): over 100 million people can't put their bare hands over a hot flame for 10 minutes without their hands being severely burned. Is the inference fallacious? Not at all, until we find out the following fact: for over 10 years of her life, Jane has been a subject in numerous super-secret government experiments involving resistance to pyrogenic substances. Does this mean there are in fact relevant differences between Jane and everyone else (assuming those in the latter group were never involved in such experiments)? Not at all, because for all we know, those experiments might have been utter failures, or their scope very limited, and so forth. Nevertheless, because we are in the dark, and because there is some plausible reason to suppose there *might* indeed be relevant differences between Jane and everyone else, as a result of those experiments, the original inference would therefore be fallacious given this new information.
Argument 2: defense of premise (4)
P1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should not assume it is implausible that these capability differences cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in the physiology of X and O. [premise]
P2. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have. [assumption]
P3. There are no very good reasons to suppose we should assume it is implausible that these capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. [premise]
C1. Therefore, we should not assume it is implausible that capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. (from P3, P1)
Argument 3: defense of premise (4)
p1. If A can't p, while B can p, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should assume there exist relevant differences between A and B which could explain how B, but not A, can p, even when A and B appear to be very similar.
p2. Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead. [let's suppose]
p3. There are no very good reasons to assume there exist no relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which would explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead.
c1. Therefore, we should assume there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which would explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead. (from p3, p2, and p1)
p4. If we should assume there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead, then either: (a) there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise naturally from the dead, or (b) there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise supernaturally from the dead.
p5. Either (a) or (b). (from p4, c1)
p6. If there are no good reasons to suppose that (a) is false, then we should not suppose that (a) is false.
p7. There are no good reasons to suppose that (a) is false.
c2. Therefore, we should not suppose that (a) is false: that is, we should not suppose there exist NO relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise naturally from the dead. (from p7, p6)
I was not raised in a Christian home or religious environment, but nevertheless found my way into a Christian church, through a friend, prior to entering high school. It was in that church my friend attended that I became a Christian, and remained so until the end of my high school career, right before I left for college. Like many others, the doctrine of hell did not sit comfortably with me -- both on an intuitive and intellectual level -- and was thus the main reason for my departure from the Christian faith. Since then, after completing both undergraduate and graduate degrees in philosophy (I stopped at the MA level), I found many other compelling reasons which justified my abandonment of Christianity, which I hope to share and elaborate here.
In this entry, I will outline a new approach skeptics can and should take in the resurrection debate. As almost everyone agrees, skeptics and apologists alike, the ability for the apologist to establish a good case for the resurrection is vital to a successful defense of the Christian faith, and so, unsurprisingly, an enormous amount of time and effort has been spent devoted to this one area. A testament to the latter is the fact that anyone new (or old) to the scene will often observe the following: the debate can get really really complicated, especially among scholars. Why? A natural reason one might draw from this is that the case for the resurrection is not as terrible as one might think -- after all, if even the scholarly critics have to present elaborate and sophisticated arguments to answer their opponents, then the apologist's case can't be that bad. In actuality, the case for the resurrection can be very weak, despite the sophisticated nature of the debate, but it sure doesn't seem that way to those lost in the minutia of the historical details. I admit to being among the perplexed.
Hence I advocate a new approach to the debate, one that will cut through all the smoke and thus expose how weak the case for the resurrection truly is. To begin, one should pay close attention to the claim that the apologist wants -- needs -- to establish when he argues for the resurrection: it is the claim that God raised Jesus from the dead. And thus from this we can observe what the claim is not: it is not, merely, that Jesus was raised from the dead, which is obviously insufficient if the causal agent responsible for the resuscitation were not supernatural, but natural. The apologist undoubtedly needs to first establish the latter assertion in order to establish the former, but the two are clearly not equivalent -- in fact, the two are worlds apart. Here we come to my new approach: we should challenge the apologist to see if he can demonstrate (with probability, of course) that, if Jesus was really raised from the dead, it was God who did it. For, even if it were a historical fact that Jesus was raised from the dead, if it cannot be shown that God was the cause of the event, then what is the worth of historical apologetics to the rational defense of Christianity? None.
Below are arguments detailing why the inference from "Jesus was raised from the dead" to "it was probably God who raised Jesus from the dead" cannot be made nonfallaciously.
Argument 1
1. It is fallacious to infer that X probably can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all Zs can't y, when either: (a) we know of a plausible reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y; or (b) when X does not fall within the category of Z, and we know of no good reason to suppose there are no relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. [assumption]
3. Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, either a natural entity or supernatural entity. [assumption]
4. Jesus does not fall within the category of non-supernormal human being, and we know of no good reason to suppose there are no relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus, but not non-supernormal human beings, to rise naturally. [premise, supported by C1 and c2 below]
5. We know of a plausible reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus, but not non-supernormal human beings, to rise naturally.
[premise, supported by the claim that Jesus may not have been not fully biologically human if we assume the virgin birth story]
6. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus probably could not have risen naturally from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. (from 5, 1, and 4, 1).
Edit: I realize premise (1) needs some explaining.
Consider Mike, a body-builder builder who works out 15 hours a day, and suppose one claims: Mike probably can't bench press 500 lbs, and this is thought to follow from the premise that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench press 500 lbs. This inference is clearly fallacious, but why? According to condition (b) of premise (1), the inference is fallacious not only because Mike and the other body-builders don't belong in the same category, but also because we have no good reason to assume that with respect to being able to 500 lbs, Mike is just like everyone else. If we had good reason for assuming that Mike was just like all the other body-builders (say, for instance, he has a muscular disorder which makes his 15 hours equivalent to a normal 2 hour work-out), then the inference would be nonfallacious. Hence: if X does not fall within the category of Z, the burden falls on the one making the inference to supply good reason for why we should assume the absence of any relevant difference between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y.
To illustrate with another example, consider Dejohn the daily steroid-taker who works out less than 2 hours a day. Claim: Dejohn *probably* can't bench 500 lbs. Premise (data): All body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs. Is this inference fallacious? Suppose we know that all the body-builders in our data don't take steroids, and Dejohn has been taking them for the past 8 years on a daily basis (let's assume they don't cause him any harm). Hence, even though Dejohn and everyone else works out the same amount of hours, there is a clear (possibly relevant) difference between the two that justifies an initial category distinction: we can separate Dejohn and the other body-builders -- since none of them take the drug -- into two classes (steroid taker vs. non-steroid takers). If we have no good reason to assume that with respect to being able to bench 500 lbs, Dejohn and everyone else are the same, then we must conclude that the inference is fallacious. Stated another way, given the justified category distinction, the inference is fallacious unless the one making the inference can supply good reason to suppose the distinction to be irrelevant -- like if we knew, for instance, that the steroids Dejohn takes only affects his lower legs and not his chest or upper body.
Condition (a) of premise (1) can be shown with the following illustration. Suppose one claims: Jane probably can't put her bare hand over a hot flame for 10 minutes without it be severely burned. Premise (data): over 100 million people can't put their bare hands over a hot flame for 10 minutes without their hands being severely burned. Is the inference fallacious? Not at all, until we find out the following fact: for over 10 years of her life, Jane has been a subject in numerous super-secret government experiments involving resistance to pyrogenic substances. Does this mean there are in fact relevant differences between Jane and everyone else (assuming those in the latter group were never involved in such experiments)? Not at all, because for all we know, those experiments might have been utter failures, or their scope very limited, and so forth. Nevertheless, because we are in the dark, and because there is some plausible reason to suppose there *might* indeed be relevant differences between Jane and everyone else, as a result of those experiments, the original inference would therefore be fallacious given this new information.
Argument 2: defense of premise (4)
P1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should not assume it is implausible that these capability differences cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in the physiology of X and O. [premise]
P2. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have. [assumption]
P3. There are no very good reasons to suppose we should assume it is implausible that these capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. [premise]
C1. Therefore, we should not assume it is implausible that capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. (from P3, P1)
Argument 3: defense of premise (4)
p1. If A can't p, while B can p, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should assume there exist relevant differences between A and B which could explain how B, but not A, can p, even when A and B appear to be very similar.
p2. Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead. [let's suppose]
p3. There are no very good reasons to assume there exist no relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which would explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead.
c1. Therefore, we should assume there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which would explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead. (from p3, p2, and p1)
p4. If we should assume there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead, then either: (a) there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise naturally from the dead, or (b) there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise supernaturally from the dead.
p5. Either (a) or (b). (from p4, c1)
p6. If there are no good reasons to suppose that (a) is false, then we should not suppose that (a) is false.
p7. There are no good reasons to suppose that (a) is false.
c2. Therefore, we should not suppose that (a) is false: that is, we should not suppose there exist NO relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise naturally from the dead. (from p7, p6)