Presuppositions, Assumptions, Worldviews and Control Beliefs.

In my book I explicitly state that some skeptics may not like the way I argue. One of the reasons is because I talk about presuppositions, assumptions, worldviews, and control beliefs. In one of my posts a discussion flared up about this starting with author Jeffrey Mark’s comment. While he wasn’t responding directly to anything I had written let me respond.

I think scientifically minded and theologically or philosophical minded people go head to head over these ideas. As a philosophical minded person let me try to explain this to scientifically minded people, if I can.

The definitions of these words are similar but not exactly the same. They apply differently depending on the particular subject at hand. And they involve different things depending on whether the context is a discussion with someone else, or simply describing what we believe to be the case.

Let’s say we are discussing or debating an idea with someone else. When we engage in any argument we all have our presuppositions and assumptions. Those beliefs are the ones we presuppose and are assumed to be true. These beliefs are not presently on the table at the moment. They are presupposed for the sake of further conversation. If two Christians are debating over Arminianism and Calvinism they do not need to begin by arguing whether or not God exists or whether the Bible is God’s word. They are presupposing them in this context. If two philosophers are arguing about the existence of God they must presuppose that they are communicating with each other in a real material world, and that the discussion is an important one. If two scientists are arguing about something the same thing applies with regard to the importance of science, the reliability of induction and their senses.

Any presupposition or assumption can be laid on the table though, and discussed. A Christian Arminian would be frustrated in discussing Christian theology with someone who didn’t accept the Bible as the word of an existing God. A philosopher may be frustrated in having to continually revisit whether there is a material world before he can argue other things with other philosophers about other topics. A scientist would abhor having to go back and revisit the reliability of his senses with a pantheist who might require it, since the pantheist believes everything is maya, or an illusion. So some discussions between people who see things differently might be extremely frustrating, for they don’t agree on some basic common beliefs. That’s why Christian philosopher James Sire’s book is called, The Universe Next Door. Some of us see things so differently we live in different intellectual universes. There is even debate among theologians, philosophers and philosophers of science whether or not there is common ground between people who live in these different intellectual universes. Philosophers of science debate whether differing scientific paradigms are commensurable or incommensurable (ala Thomas Kuhn). Applied scientists are usually not informed about this kind of debate.

When it comes to what we believe, our problem is to try and isolate one of our particular assumptions for analysis. It’s extremely difficult if not impossible to do. For all assumptions and presuppositions we hold to are placed within the context of a whole worldview. We try to make consistent sense of our beliefs about God, the universe, ethics, politics, history, death, and so forth. A worldview is our particular way of making all of our beliefs cohere into a single consistent system of thought. Since it's impossible to lay our whole worldview on the table for analysis we can only isolate and analyze one or two particular beliefs at a time within it. But when we do so the other beliefs that form our worldview play a part in our analysis of that one particular belief we are trying to isolate for analysis. These other beliefs are called background beliefs. Our background beliefs consist of everything we have ever experienced and everything we have ever come to believe (minus that one particular belief we are trying to analyze). These background beliefs of ours control how we evaluate that particular belief in question, so I call them control beliefs. They control how we view that one particular belief in question. These control beliefs can actually explain away the evidence if they are strongly held ones. This is little different than the differing stories that a prosecutor and defense attorney might tell based upon the available evidence, one showing the defendant guilty and the other one showing that he is innocent. The evidence is the same. How do you decide?

An additional and telling problem is that no one has probably analyzed all of his beliefs. There are beliefs we have assumed are true based upon early childhood experiences that we have never placed on the table. Analyzing all of our beliefs is probably impossible otherwise we’d have to revisit every book we’ve ever read, every conversation, and every experience. So we all have unexamined beliefs we assume to be true, all of us. Some beliefs are more important and controlling than others, some have less evidence for them than others, and some are so well founded in our minds that we cannot question them, but we all have them. And they control how we see things, everything, for they are all placed within our own particular worldview. Furthermore, every belief we have is disputed by someone else in the world who can offer his reasons for doing so, even if we may disagree. Throughout history you will find this the case as well. No matter what you believe there has been a scholar, a philosopher, or a scientist who believed differently. That’s why philosopher/scientist A. N. Whitehead wrote, “Some assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know that they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them.”

I haven’t covered everything on this topic but for the record I do think we should follow the evidence and I do trust the reliability of our senses and the scientific method as the only possible way out of this quagmire of beliefs. And I think it is intellectual dishonesty to assume with any kind of certainty a whole worldview like the presuppositionalists do. To do that is to be impervious to all outside criticism. It is to lock oneself inside an ivory tower in the sky that never has to touch down on earth. I do not assume my whole worldview web of beliefs are all true with any degree of certainty. Some beliefs form the center of my web, like logic and my senses, while those in middle and on the periphery become less and less firmly held ones. And I must continually isolate one belief after another for analysis, even I cannot give up those that are closer and closer to the center of my web because I have solid reasons for trusting in them.

In any case I acknowledge the problem. So when it comes to my critique of the Christian theistic worldview I spend over half of my book arguing for my particular set of skeptical control beliefs. I do not assume them when crossing over into a different intellectual universe such as Christianity. As an outsider I shouldn’t do this if I want to be heard. I must first argue for them. To anyone who attempts to critique a different worldview he must argue for why he sees things differently. In the case of Christianity he must argue why he trusts science, rather than assuming it, and he must argue for why he adopts a skeptical set of control beliefs, rather than merely assuming a skeptical position. He must truly engage their worldview by understanding it. And he must start by critiquing their supernatural assumptions and their belief in the Bible as God's word.

37 comments:

Jeff C said...

Hi John,

Wow! I was offline for the rest of yesterday and was a bit startled to see what I caused. I need to read through all the postings before responding to the responses to my comment.

For what it's worth, I wasn't directing my comments at you, which you say you realized. One of the reasons this has come up for me is the only place I've seen the word "presupposition" is when theologians go against scientists; it's usually the theologians who bring the term up, and the scientists get completely flustered at such a foreign idea (as I have been). The idea of presuppositions simply doesn't come up in the scientific community. This is especially the case when Ken Ham and is buddies at Answers in Genesis and The Creation Museum try to defend their ideas against scientists.

One thing I've noticed that's unique about you is you're so educated in theology that you're one of the few people who can actually go head-to-head with theologians and actually speak their language. And so it makes sense that you would understand and make use of philosophical concepts such as presuppositions. (That's also why I suspect you mentioned that my book is good for laypeople, and I recognize that; a theologian probably wouldn't have much use for my book.)

You also bring up a good point about laying our entire worldview out on the table. When I wrote my book, that's what I attempted to do, but there's obviously no way to do that completely, as you point out. Just the other day I was going to write a posting on my own blog about the issue of the Cincinnati Zoo vs the Creation Museum (it's in google news for those that want to read about it). I tried to write up my stand on this, but I stopped writing the blog when I became frustrated. I simply couldn't completely explain my stand on the topic in such a short space. And so I felt like saying, "Screw it, just read my book if you want to know how I feel about this." But even that wouldn't totally explain my worldview.

One thing I have definitely found in most debates is there's usually a fundamental issue where the people haven't laid the groundwork up front, and the participants of the debate will actually be arguing two separate topics without realizing it. To an impartial observer, it can appear almost comical (or at least ironic) because that observer may clearly see the break in communication.

For those of us like me with scientific training and absolutely no theological training, it can become frustrating in debating with people who have the exact opposite training, because we clearly *don't* see eye to eye. That's why I usually steer clear of philosophical arguments and prefer to try to reach out to people who are trying to understand science but are getting incorrect information from places like Answers in Genesis.

It's particularly frustrating when Ken Ham and his team tries to say why evolution is wrong and argue for a young-earth model while making blatant scientific errors. But third-party observers (such as visitors to his museum) won't be aware of his mistakes and simply buy into it and develop an even greater disregard for science. (However, I should probably acknowledge that Ken Ham actually doesn't have any training in theology, as I understand it, so his situation is particularly unique.)

Thanks, John, for some really good points about this. Now I need to try to read all the responses on the other posting so I can catch up...!

Anonymous said...

Thanks for your thoughtful response, Jeffery. I didn't mean to specifically single you out, but since you more than adequately expressed the concerns of the scientifically minded skeptic I thought I'd address people who think like you. I was merely describing how theologians and philosophers see things for the scientifically literate person like you are. When it comes to science you are much better informed than I. There needs to be a better understanding between scientifically minded skeptics and philosophically minded skeptics, that's all.

I do understand your frustration talking with creation scientists, especially the young earth ones. But I was trying to help people like you understand exactly why you are frustrated. They have different control beliefs. Yours are much better founded, of course, but that's what you'll run into with people like them.

Cheers.

Adrian said...

John,

I'm really torn by accusations of "presuppositions" by Christians. On the one hand I do acknowledge that Christians often presuppose that God exists and that I do not. The implication is that I'm somehow being dishonest by not granting Christians this privilege when I happily grant other presuppositions when in a discussion with others. This is true to a very limited extent but the differences are revealing.

In one life I write/wrote computer software and am frequently tracking down software bugs. Whenever I discuss them with others or seek to solve problems, I start with a set of "presuppositions" - my observations are accurate, the keyboard/mouse inputs are being accurately sent to the program, the CPU is correct, the compiler is correct, underlying frameworks are generally correct, and bugs are probably in my own code. Developers, good developers at least, start by looking at their code and trusting that everything else fits into place. I think this is what is often called a "presupposition", yet unlike an article of faith, I've got a lot of evidence to support these and given contrary evidence I'm always willing to reconsider them. Over 15 years, I have found one compiler bug, two bugs in the underlying compiler, and several bugs in the computer hardware (caused by the CPU overheating).

When I try to think about other disciplines and what presuppositions they may have comparable to the presupposition that God exists, again I come up scratching my head. Cosmologists generally assume that physical laws are uniform however this isn't just an assumption, it's backed up by countless empirical observations and as anyone that's read about the early moments after the Big Bang knows, cosmologists are perfectly willing to drop this assumption once evidence comes in.

I think that "presuppositions" as beliefs which are held without evidence are extremely rare within science and they are always open to challenge and scrutiny. If Christian apologists bring this up as some tu quoque they are making yet another mistake. No assumption, not even the reliability of our own senses, is untouchable. They're confirmed by evidence and good working rules but if we have reason to believe that they're invalid, scientists will and have dropped them. Consider John Forbes Nash of "A Beautiful Mind" who learned late in life that he suffered delusional episodes and that he could not trust the evidence of his own senses. No doubt he trusted what he saw and heard but when faced with contradictory evidence dropped even this "presupposition".

Do we trust in the scientific method? In general yes but much ink is spent discussing its flaws, how and why it succeeds and making clear its limitations. It isn't a blind trust, it's simply an acknowledgement that it's the only system we know of today which can accommodate human failings and still circle in on deeper and deeper understanding of our world. In our working lives we may assume it works but it's not above challenge, it's not above question, and our trust is anything but blind.

So I agree that Christians may presuppose the existence of God when discussing issues with other Christians but this is no excuse to not provide evidence and support for this belief when challenged. You say "these beliefs are not presently on the table" which is fine in a church but when you engage in apologetics those beliefs are on the table and it's a dishonest distraction to argue that these beliefs should escape scrutiny just because they've escaped in the past.

Unknown said...

John wrote...
"These background beliefs of ours control how we evaluate that particular belief in question, so I call them control beliefs. They control how we view that one particular idea in question. These control beliefs can actually explain away the evidence if they are strongly held."

If I can expand on this idea a little, I think what you lay out here is the core insight that those who want to encourage Christians to challenge their biblical worldview need to consider in devising their approach.

As a former Christian myself and someone whose been involved in the discussion for a while now - from both sides of "the looking glass" - I strongly believe that the background/control beliefs Christians have about morality and purpose/meaning in life coming from God, amongst other things, need to be addressed first and foremost before actually challenging his/her Christian worldview itself.

By first offering the Christian an alternative basis and understanding for all these things, it can help to resolve the dependence between these background/control beliefs* and that of the bible being true in the Christians mind. The Christian will be in a better position to be able to openly question his/her belief in biblical Christianity itself, once having the comfort that these things that give him/her a sense of well-being about life will not be lost if he/she comes to conclude that Christianity is not true.

Unfortunately, most if not many of those engaging Christians in this discussion attempt to just jump to the latter, without helping the audience lay this ground work (a psychological "safety net" of sorts), thereby limiting their success to just those Christians in the audience who are psychologically able to not only challenge his/her belief in Christianity, but also his/her beliefs about life having meaning, there being a reason for right and wrong, a reason for solace in the face of death, and many other related beliefs that are currently dependent for him/her on Christianity being true at this point.

Is this really a reasonable expectation? More likely a reasonable expectation is to get what is so often gotten: aggressive defensiveness / a big psychological wall going up. And understandably so. One can't really blame Christians once one understands this issue of background/control beliefs. Or Christians who are challenged, fell devastated because of all that hangs on their faith for them and immediately running to find some apologetic explanation so he/she can rationalize it away and get all this back again.

We can circumvent this cycle. And considering this issue of background/control beliefs, approach addressing a Christian audience on this matters in a much more humane way.


*Background/Control beliefs that many Christians and Humanists share in fact... that life is best approached with a sense of meaning, there is a right/wrong, etc.

Scarecrow said...

Tyro, well said.

Luke said...

John,

This is a very nice, brief introduction to the importance of control beliefs. Thank you.

Luke

Anonymous said...

DJ said...I strongly believe that the background/control beliefs Christians have about morality and purpose/meaning in life coming from God, amongst other things, need to be addressed first and foremost before actually challenging his/her Christian worldview itself.

Without sounding too much like I'm promoting my book, I agree. That's why the very first chapter in it, after describing my deconversion story, does just what you suggest.

Cheers.

Anonymous said...

Tyro, I think what you're describing is the distinction between a "from above" and a "from below" approach to these issues. I agree with you that we should start "from below" with the evidence of the world. But when approaching believers of most any stripe we must first argue for why we start "from below." They may not assume with us our starting point. We must argue for it.

Nice comment.

Derick said...

Very good article on many counts. I am a Christian who argues presuppositionally and you gave me much to think through. Yet, I have discussed many worldview and presuppositional ideas with atheists who seem to not even know about the base of beliefs.

Derick Dickens
www.areopagus.us

SirMoogie said...

I agree with Tyro. I'm not sure "presupposition" is a useful term when framing an argument. I've heard the term thrown out as a "parry" in debate between Christians and Skeptics, such as, "You make presuppositions too". If presuppositions are just what we take as being "on the table" before entering into a conversation, I'm not sure why this makes for a useful attack, or counter attack*. It might be better to make a distinction between justified beliefs, and faith-based beliefs (or beliefs taken as "givens" either due self-evidence, whatever that might mean, assumption, or revelation).

* - Not even taking into account the tu quoque fallacy that is present in any counterpoint that contains the phrase "you do it too".

a helmet said...

I think all worldviews are in competition with each other and that's good so! The better worldviews and belief systems shall become apparent in dispute.

May the truth prevail.

T said...

A helmet wrote, "The better worldviews and belief systems shall become apparent in dispute."

I so wish that statement were true.

Anthony said...

John and DJ, I see what your point is regarding control beliefs. I would tend to think that both control beliefs and evidential problems such as evolution and biblical critical issues should be dealt with at the same time. For those who have deconverted from Christianity what issues have the most affect? For me at least the evidential issues challenged many of my control beliefs.

District Supt. Harvey Burnett said...

John,

Good article and good information. I appreciate it.

So was I right to say that just as an atheist brings a presuppostion that God does not exist to an argument that a Christian brings a presupposition that God DOES exist to the argument?

Let me tell you how I think this works for me and most individuals including non-Christians such as yourself:

I wasn't born a Christian, I became one. You as a non Christian wasn't born a Christian, you became one and are now a non-Christian again...how can either of us make any argument WITHOUT the frame of refrence of our experiences? I believe you state that as Control belief. That to me is a presupposition. Is that right?

Secondly, I view presuppostions as subject to change and former Christians such as yourself are a perfect example of such. Some of you actually argued FOR Christianity strongly when you were Christians. Am I pointed in the right direction here?

Thanks.

Anonymous said...

District Harvey the short answers to your questions are all "yes."

;-)

High Power Rocketry said...

Great page keep it going!

For my part, I fear I dont have the time to deal with this issue. Only so much time in they day, and I cant be occupied with UFOs, the Kennedy assassination, or god.

District Supt. Harvey Burnett said...

Thanks John. I appreciate the info and your perspectives. Out of all that we disagree about I do believe you offer a balanced view of some very difficult subjects. Thanks again.

mg01 said...

John, what you describe are simply the premises on which individuals base their arguments. There doesn't seem to be as much of a difference between what you termed philosophical thinking and scientific thinking as you seem to imply, your description uses different language, but the idea is the same.

Your point that it is these underlying premises that have to be addressed first is spot on. A discussion concerning the radius of the earth will not get very far with a flatearther.

The idea of a psychological safety seems valid. Though I tend respond in kind in discussions, worldviews do not change overnight. Anyone shifting sides over an idea goes through a range of positions in the process. However only after you find common ground and set external factors aside can an issue be debated from both both angles. That's where the net starts to form.

Anonymous said...

mg01, okay, if that's how you see it then we've found a rapprochement between philosophically minded and scientifically minded people.

What do you do when some philosophers deny the existence of the material world, or say God is a basic belief, or that the human mind (or language) structures reality, or that the world is an illusion?

Just curious.

Can you propose a scientific experiment to test such things? Are scientists willing to cede ground to the philosophers here?

mg01 said...

John: Are scientists willing to cede ground to the philosophers here?

Absolutely, and since theology is a form of philosphy, the same applies.

You could can claim the universe flashed into existence two seconds ago just as we perceive it. You can't test this in any way, nor can you prove the negative that it wasn't. So you recognize the idea for what it is, an philosophical hypothesis outside the realm of science.

ID is another example. There is no test to discern if a particular attribute is designed or the result of natural causes. Since you can't question the mind of the designer, any testable result you get is explained by the notion that's the way the designer intended. It is the same as above, an untestable (theological based) philosophical hypothesis outside the realm of science.

Scientists willingly concede the point. It is the premise behind the mantra heard at every school board meeting it's discussed, "ID is not science". IDers/creationists (same thing) maintain that it is, though if you ask what specifically would they teach, they have nothing. Claiming "because it was designed that way" is not doing science.

I would however draw possible exception to the notion of God as a basic belief. In the relatively new field of evolutionary psychology there is the idea that humans may in fact be hardwired to accept superstitious ideas when held by a group as a way of cohesion or submission to a leader.

Take any primitive observation in a pre-scientific culture and ask either why or how. The answer is magic. Primitive religions are essentially failed early sciences (consider astrology to astronomy, alchemy to chemistry) expressed differently across cultures. As a universal human phenomenon it supports the idea of a possible psychological origin.

An idea finding acceptance within a group is generally self perpetuating and not easily disregarded. "It is because we believe and we believe because it is." All to your original point, founded on some unstated major premise. If the premise is untestable, piling on additional claims is to construct a house of cards.

Responsible theologians recognize this as well. I'm occasionally impressed when I hear someone speak of faith for what it really is and avoid infringements upon reality, while at the same time pointing out to other theists the pitfalls of doing so.

Larry Hamelin said...

First, I don't think there is a fundamental difference between philosophically and scientifically minded people. There is a definite philosophy underlying the practice of science. The difference is, I think a question of focus. That is when philosophers are not simply engaging in egregious bullshit (See Bullshit and Philosophy).

I think you're taking two different concepts for granted: "presumptions", the ideas that we take more-or-less for granted and have not (yet) been deeply examined, and "presuppositions", those metaphysical assumptions that cannot be plausibly challenged by logic or evidence.

(One of the first more-or-less serious articles I wrote is on this topic: Presuppositionalism and Metaphysics; please pardon the awkward style. The article follows about a year of discussing Van Til/Bahansen-style Presuppositionalist Apologetics on IIDB.)

The distinction between presumptions and presuppositions in the sense defined above is important. We can put our presuppositions on the table, but there's not much we can do about them except be honest and explicit about what they are.

What I've noticed is that theists' presuppositions are ontological. Skeptics' and scientists' presuppositions, on the other hand, are methodological and epistemological.

Theists (especially Christians) typically presuppose statements about how the world actually is (there is a God, it's a He, He is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, He sent his only begotten son, etc.) and try to construct a methodology around those presupposed facts about the world.

Scientists presuppose a particular way of looking at the world: drawing ontological conclusions — conclusions about existence — based on the epistemic foundation of perceptual evidence.

Because scientific presuppositions are methodological, I very strongly object to Burnett's assertion that atheists presuppose that God does not exist: some atheists may presume from laziness that no God exists, but skeptics simply do not make any ontological presuppositions, positive or negative.

The only skeptical presuppositions about God are methodological. If the label "God" is not defined in such a way that statements about "God" cannot in any way be determined to be true or false except by raw presupposition, then the statements are either emotive or semantically meaningless. If statements about "God" cannot be determined to be true or false by observation and experiment, then they are ontologically meaningless.

Skeptics and scientists can put the scientific method and methodological naturalism on the table, but there's little that can be done to justify it, other than observe that our sense are so physically compelling, that pain hurts, that we are forced by a kind of philosophical desperation to do the best we can to make sense of them.

Larry Hamelin said...

Er... I think you're conflating presumptions and presuppositions.

Anonymous said...

BB said...I think you're conflating presumptions and presuppositions.

If you want to avoid the use of the word presuppositions because of Van Tillian's usage then you can. But wouldn't this just be a different nomenclature?

Larry Hamelin said...

I think you're conflating the ideas themselves, regardless of the specific terminology. There's a real difference between any old statement that we simply haven't yet examined carefully, and a statement so deeply foundational there's no structure with which we could in principle examine it carefully.

Anonymous said...

Okay, fine, BB. But what one person considers deeply foundational and what another person considers deeply foundational can and is different. And while I agree with you overall as a fellow skeptci, I'm trying to bridge the gap between the believer and us. So if you deny me the right to use use this language in my attempts to bridge the gap then you are also denying the bridge.

Jeff C said...

John, thanks for the great explanations.

Now that I'm starting to understand the concept of presupposition better, I'm thinking about my own position in what I believe and don't believe.

For a long time I've hesitated to use the term "atheist" to describe myself. I go back and forth in my mind whether it's an appropriate word for where I stand. In my book I basically call myself an agnostic, but only reluctantly, as I don't like labels. (That one is especially difficult because it seems to mean something different to every person who uses it or hears it.)

I prefer not to go through life with the presupposition that God exists, or with the presupposition that God doesn't exist. Up until recently I've hesitated to say point blank, "God does not exist" (although lately I've been saying it more often). The reason is I acknowledge that, from a scientific perspective, we simply don't know everything. We don't yet know the all the answers of how the universe came to be. There could be a God...although I seriously doubt it.

And I certainly don't hold onto a belief in a God/god. I have no belief in a God; I do not inside myself feel there's some greater being that can hear me if I pray. When I look at it that way, then, I call myself an atheist. I hold onto no god-beliefs. There's not some entity that I worship and pray to.

But here's where I get frustrated: that doesn't mean I'm presupposing there is no god. In that regard, my answer is: "I don't know." And that's why I get a bit confused when some people say that I'm presupposing there's no God. I'm not. The best that I can say is that I've searched and searched for a God and didn't find one. (In fact, I like the way Richard Dawkins put it: "There is almost certainly no God.")

That's why the concept of presupposition still gives me trouble for my own personal beliefset (and why I go back and forth on the word "atheist" -- although if I like the way Dawkins put it about there almost certainly being no God, and Dawkins is perhaps today's most famous atheist, then perhaps the word atheist is correct for me.)

Web-ling said...

Interesting discussion.

I'm an evangelical Christian, and a young-earth creationist. I've read John's Why I am an Atheist, Dan Barker's Losing Faith in Faith, Charles Templeton's Farewell to God, and Babinski's Leaving the Fold, among other books. My brother-in-law is an atheist, and I have had discussions with him regarding our beliefs.

The issue of presuppositions is critical in all of these discussions and debates. As a Christian, my presuppositions are 1) God exists, and 2) God has revealed Himself to humans through the Bible. Atheism is built on the assumption that no gods exist (Therefore, the Bible is mythology, since it claims God exists).

Every argument in each of the books I have mentioned can be refuted by using biblical assumptions. Likewise, every Christian argument can be refuted by using atheistic assumptions.

The issue seems not to be the arguments, but the unstated assumptions behind them.

Most modern science also has the underlying assumption of naturalism - nature is all that exists, and everything can be explained by natural causes. Science must be observable, testable, and repeatable. God is excluded before analysis of the data has even begun, because He is not directly observable, testable, or repeatable. Creationists begin with a different assumption, the assumption that God created all, and that natural law is an extension of God's law.

Both creationists and non-creationists see the same facts, but we interpret the data differently, due to our different assumptions.

I completely agree with Jeffery Mark that there are usually a fundamental issue where the people haven't laid the groundwork up front. Usually, the individuals debating don't even realize these underlying issues exist. He's right - the idea of presuppositions simply doesn't come up in the scientific community. Most scientists, regardless of religious beliefs, simply do not realize the presuppositions underlying modern scientific principles.

I really respect people like John Loftus, Dan Barker, and Charles Templeton, because they have thought through the implications of their basic assumptions, and have changed their worldviews to be consistent. The conclusions they arrived at are very consistent with their presuppositions. However, I disagree with them - I think their presuppositions are simply wrong.

I wish more people - Christian, atheist, agnostic, or whatever - would recognize their presuppositions, and think through the logical implications of their beliefs.

The question is, which set of presuppositions - biblical, atheist, or something else - is most consistent with what we observe in the world. I hold that the Bible is most consistent with reality, and this is why none of the arguments against the Bible and God are persuasive to me. Others will disagree with me.

It's certainly a critical issue to understand, whichever side of the fence you're on.

Looking forward to continued discussion!

Larry Hamelin said...

Web-ling:

Every argument in each of the books I have mentioned can be refuted by using biblical assumptions.

This is not an interesting property of biblical or Christian assumptions. Any conclusion that God does not exist would be an immediate proof by contradiction that some assumption was false.

Likewise, every Christian argument can be refuted by using atheistic assumptions.

This is a false symmetry: There are no such thing as "atheistic" assumptions, except among the lazy. Atheism is a *conclusion*, not an assumption.

Most modern science also has the underlying assumption of naturalism - nature is all that exists, and everything can be explained by natural causes.

This is a substantially oversimplified understanding of naturalism. "Nature" is defined to mean everything we can know about; this sort of "metaphysical" naturalism just boils down to the assertion that there's no point in talking about things we cannot in principle know about.

Science must be observable, testable, and repeatable. God is excluded before analysis of the data has even begun, because He is not directly observable, testable, or repeatable.

You are mistaking positivism and naive empiricism for science. Science specifies that our knowledge must relate to what we can observe. Science has no problem talking about things like causality that we cannot directly observe. How our scientific theories should properly relate to observation is a matter of controversy, but that theories must somehow relate to observation distinguishes scientific from non-scientific epistemologies.

To place God beyond the bounds of science it is necessary to say that we cannot distinguish between the sentences "God exists" and "God does not exist" by relating those sentences in any way to observation.

Both creationists and non-creationists see the same facts, but we interpret the data differently, due to our different assumptions.

Without drawing any conclusions about you personally, not all creationists seem to acknowledge the same facts.

Scientists make methodological assumptions, assumptions about how we should interpret the facts. Creationists and many other religious types make ontological assumptions, assumptions about specific properties about the world.

It is important to note that the methodological assumptions that scientists make are the exact same assumptions that everyone must make to have an accurate idea of prosaic, mundane reality. The creationist and the naturalist both drive with their eyes open; it is only the creationist who is adding something more.

Larry Hamelin said...

Note that the scientific criterion of "repeatability" is ambiguous. In one sense "repeatability" is required only when we are investigating spacetime-invariant universals. Obviously the *differences* between one experiment and another cannot spacetime-invariant.

In another sense, we use "repeatability" as an expedient technique to control for idiosyncratic features of an individual's perceptual and cognitive capabilities, essentially testing that data from one modality (direct observation) coheres with data from a very different modality (hearing someone else talk about their own observation).

Web-ling said...

The Barefoot Bum:
Thanks for your response.

There are no such thing as "atheistic" assumptions, except among the lazy.

Wouldn't "no gods exist" be an atheistic assumption?

Atheism is a *conclusion*, not an assumption.

The same can be said for Christianity. It certainly was for me.

Scientists make methodological assumptions, assumptions about how we should interpret the facts. Creationists and many other religious types make ontological assumptions, assumptions about specific properties about the world.

The methodological assumptions made by scientists are based on ontological assumptions, especially when dealing with non-observational science. For example, there is no observational proof that the universe is billions of years old, yet it is generally assumed to be so. Radiometric dating methods have been built on the assumption that long ages have existed. Radiometric dating assumes that little or none of the daughter element was present in the initial formation of a rock, because this yields results that show long ages. This is in spite of the fact that many rocks formed today by volcanoes have significant amounts of the daughter elements. It's a classic circular argument: The methodology results in an old age, because it assumes an old age, and the assumption of old ages is based on ontology.

When dating a rock, what are the facts? The rock is the fact. The direct observations (weight, density, chemical makeup, etc.) are the facts. Any attempt to determine how or when the rock was formed is not a fact, it is an interpretation of the facts, and the conclusion will be determined by the assumptions, whether methodological, ontological, or both, of the one making the conclusion.

The creationist and the naturalist both drive with their eyes open; it is only the creationist who is adding something more.

It is only the creationist who recognizes and admits they are adding something more.

Thanks for the dialog. I am enjoying the discussion.

Larry Hamelin said...

Web-ling

I think our discussion might be more productive if we distinguish some crucial ideas. The specific terminology is unimportant; the distinction between the ideas is fundamental.

There are three types of "assumptions" we can make: presumptions, presuppositions and hypotheses.

A presumption is an assumption believed "lazily", without very much consideration. We can
dismiss presumptions from further consideration; an idea held lazily can be always examined in more detail.

A presupposition is an idea held "come what may"; uncritically or definitionally. Nothing inside a process defined by one or more presuppositions can challenge those presuppositions.

The methodological assumptions underlying the scientific method are thus more precisely characterized as presuppositions:

First, subjective experience is authoritative (but not necessarily veridical). Our project is to explain, i.e. — i.e. understand, organize and predict — our subjective experiences, especially those experiences commonly labeled "perceptual".

Second, we want to explain our specific experiences in a cognitively rigorous, always-the-same-outcome manner.

Third, we want to explain our experiences in the simplest way possible.

The first presupposition is forced upon us: Our experiences simply occur. Furthermore, that pain simply hurts is also forced upon us. The latter two presuppositions are purely methodological.

Working under these presuppositions, we create a special kind of statement: hypotheses. Hypotheses act as axioms in a formal sense: They are not deduced from simpler statements. But hypotheses are not presuppositions: They are not outside or fundamental to the scientific process; they are not accepted definitionally or uncritically. Hypotheses are, rather, the entire subject of methodological scrutiny.

Very briefly, an hypothesis is accepted to the extent that it explains and predict our subjective experiences. Likewise, the procedure we use to deterministically connect our hypotheses to our experiences is also accepted to the extent that it explains and predicts our experiences.

Under this framework, many of the "presuppositions" under science — material reality, other minds, etc. — are seen as successful hypotheses: the simplest hypotheses that explain our experience in a rigorous way.

With this background in mind, let me address your specific points in more detail in my next comment.

Larry Hamelin said...

Wouldn't "no gods exist" be an atheistic assumption?

As you note, it's a conclusion; the simplest rigorous hypothetical explanation that we presently understand does not include any entities that have the attributes popularly attributed to a God, except as the loosest, most hyperbolic metaphor.

The same can be said for Christianity. It certainly was for me.

Fair enough, but it was you yourself who brought up Christian presuppositions: "As a Christian, my presuppositions are 1) God exists, and 2) God has revealed Himself to humans through the Bible." Presuppositions are, by definition, not conclusions. Given that I'm trying to shove some definitions down your throat, though, I will not consider it a retreat or moving the goalposts if you want to rephrase your position.

For example, there is no observational proof that the universe is billions of years old, yet it is generally assumed to be so.

You are misusing even the loosest definition of "assumed to be". The simplest rigorous explanation for the observations that we have presently made is that the universe is billions of years old.

I suspect you're also mistaking positivism or empirio-criticism for the modern scientific method. There really isn't any such thing as observational "proof" of anything, except our internal subjective experiences. Even such a basic notion as causality is, as Hume noted, not ever directly observed.

Radiometric dating methods have been built on the assumption that long ages have existed.

This is simply false. Please take some trouble to determine the scientific facts before you embarrass yourself further.

Radiometric dating assumes that little or none of the daughter element was present in the initial formation of a rock, because this yields results that show long ages. This is in spite of the fact that many rocks formed today by volcanoes have significant amounts of the daughter elements.

Again, you are negligently misrepresenting the science of radiometric dating. Scientists are not idiots, and they understand the nature of volcanic rock.

I'm happy to discuss the specifics of various sciences with you. I don't expect you to believe scientists, but I do demand you accurately describe what they actually do and actually say.

On my own blog, such misrepresentation earns a harsh response. Since this is not my blog, I will simply not respond if you continue to misrepresent scientific thought.

Web-ling said...

Barefoot Bum,

I am a scientific layman, although I have had some formal science training. I enjoy learning about science, as well as the Bible and opposing worldviews. That's why I'm on this site, in order to learn more from "the other side."

I overstepped my expertise in my previous post. My mistake. I deserved the thrashing.

Let me try again.

My understanding is that the ontological presuppositions of many who develop scientific methods influences their methodology. If God didn't create, then we must have gotten here by natural means, which would require vast amounts of time, at least millions, and probably billions, of years.

Perhaps could explain to me, in layman's terms, how we can know anything from "prehistory" without making assumptions (of whatever kind) that are unverifiable in the present?

For example, radiometric dating, as I understand it, requires 5pieces of information in order to work: 1) the present ratio of parent to daughter elements, which is measurable in the present. 2) The rate of decay, which is measurable in the present. 3) The initial ratio, which is not measurable in the present, and must be assumed. 4) One must assume the rate of decay has been constant, and 5) No parent or daughter elements have either left or been added, due to leaching, etc.

How can points 3, 4, or 5 be known? If they are not known, then how can the date determined by the method be reliable? Aren't these totally dependent on the assumptions of the scientists?

Additionally, if these types of dating methods are reliable, then why have rocks formed by Mt. St. Helen in the 1980s been dated at several million years old? Why is carbon-14 regularly found in coal, supposedly formed millions of years ago, and in diamonds, supposedly billions of years ago? Carbon-14 shouldn't be measurable in objects more than about 60,000 years old, it should all be gone.

These are points made by creationist geologists, such as Dr. Andrew Snelling and Dr. Steve Austin, both PhD geologists, and others.

Can you explain these things, in layman's terms?

Thanks.

Larry Hamelin said...

I overstepped my expertise in my previous post. My mistake. I deserved the thrashing.

OK. Bygones.

Unfortunately, Talk.Orgins is presently unavailable. This is probably your best source as to the current science underlying evolution and related topics. Again: you are not expected to believe what's written at Talk.Origins, but it's a well-accepted authoritative source about what actual scientists have to say about these topics.

In the meantime, the Wikipedia article on Radiometric dating seems pretty good. Have a read.

How can points 3, 4, or 5 be known? If they are not known, then how can the date determined by the method be reliable? Aren't these totally dependent on the assumptions of the scientists?

4 is part of the well-established theories of nuclear physics. 3 and 5 are are subsidiary per-sample hypotheses.

First: Scientific knowledge is not certain. It is always logically possible that we could be fooled, superficially or deeply. At worst, it may be the case that everything we think we know might be the result of a gigantic coincidence. I can discuss this point at greater length, but scientists must "bite the bullet" philosophically and abandon certainty.

As far as 4 (historical constancy of the rate of decay) it is the simplest hypothesis to explain a multitude of observations, most of which have nothing to do with the age of the earth. Either we are being extremely deeply fooled by observation, or the rate of decay is constant.

As far as 3 (initial composition) and and 5 (sample integrity) go, they are hypotheses: If we unpack any given statement about the results of any radiometric dating, it would say: Assuming (a hypothetical assumption) the initial composition was C and assuming the sample has maintained its integrity, then the sample is x years old.

But here's the thing... scientists don't just take one sample. In order for radiometric dating to be off by 8-10 orders of magnitude a whole lot of samples have to have an initial composition and/or lose integrity in exactly the same way. This kind of consistency calls out for explanation: by definition, accidental or contingent causes cannot account for a consistency except by the most improbable coincidence.

You have to look at the whole body of observational fact: all of our hypotheses are evaluated against that body of fact, or as much of that body as we can manage.

Larry Hamelin said...

Additionally, if these types of dating methods are reliable, then why have rocks formed by Mt. St. Helen in the 1980s been dated at several million years old? Why is carbon-14 regularly found in coal, supposedly formed millions of years ago, and in diamonds, supposedly billions of years ago? Carbon-14 shouldn't be measurable in objects more than about 60,000 years old, it should all be gone.

I'm not a geologist; I do not have the facts at my fingertips. You'll have to reference the primary scientific justification for these assertions if you want me to evaluate them. Sad to say, many YEC sources have a poor reputation for factual accuracy.

Adrian said...

Webling,

For example, radiometric dating, as I understand it, requires 5pieces of information in order to work: 1) the present ratio of parent to daughter elements, which is measurable in the present. 2) The rate of decay, which is measurable in the present. 3) The initial ratio, which is not measurable in the present, and must be assumed. 4) One must assume the rate of decay has been constant, and 5) No parent or daughter elements have either left or been added, due to leaching, etc.

How can points 3, 4, or 5 be known? If they are not known, then how can the date determined by the method be reliable? Aren't these totally dependent on the assumptions of the scientists?



Points 3 (the initial ratio) and 5 (contamination) are inferred based on knowledge of the material (e.g.: whether it is permeable to daughter elements) and deposition technique. There are usually many ways to validate any "assumptions", for instance since C14 is absorbed into organisms through the atmosphere we can double-check this by looking at the C14 ratios in bubbles in ice core samples. It is only when people start looking at single data points in isolation (like the Mt St Helens frauds) that you can manufacture whacky results.

There are several techniques which can be used to check for contaminants. TalkOrigins has an Isochron FAQ which you can start with.


Point 4, a constant rate of decay, isn't an assumption either but a conclusion. The rate of decay is related to other physical properties which can be observed. By looking at distant stars we are observing the light emitted thousands, millions or billions of years ago and by examining the colour and spectra we see that atomic physics has not changed in billions of years.

Some Creationists have proposed that the decay varies with depth or pressure but this is directly contradicted by evidence. Dating of rocks does not vary with depth and pressure at all. In some places layers are thick, in others they are thin or even inverted. It isn't a factor.

As for Mt St Helens, that one was a farce, a clear example of an ideologically-motivated circus stunt. They picked K-Ar dating which cannot be used for young samples just like carbon dating can't be used for very old samples resulting in error bars which dwarfed any measurements losing everything to noise. With very young samples, any initial contaminants can dramatically skew the results, something he should have known (probably did know, hence the stunt).


C14 in coal - this varies with the radioactivity of surrounding material indicating that the C14 is being slowly created by absorbing emitted particles rather than as being present from the beginning. Again, talkorigins has a faq.

Larry Hamelin said...

By looking at distant stars we are observing the light emitted thousands, millions or billions of years ago and by examining the colour and spectra we see that atomic physics has not changed in billions of years.

Keep in mind that the idea that stars are millions or billions of light-years away is also a conclusion.

The speed of light is not just the speed at which light travels; it's intimately bound up with all our theories of physics.

Either the stars really are millions and billions of light-years away, and the light has been travelling at a constant speed since then, or we have been fooled by a massive series of coincidences, or we must descend into the philosophical trivialities of Last Thursdayism.