Christian Philosopher Victor Reppert vs. Obnoxious Wanna-Be Paul Manata on Calvinism
To keep you up to date on the debate between Arminian Reppert and Calvinist Paul Manata which I previously reported about here, Reppert throws a knockout blow, which Manata doesn't realize because he's numbed by his faith. So all he can do is attempt a feeble reply. When will Calvinists like Manata ever understand how morally bankrupt their theology is and that it creates atheists?
29 comments:
I read both posts.
I can say definitively that this will be the 21st century's version of angels dancing on the head of a pin.
That educated men can believe this superstition is really astounding.
Reppert butts right up against the correct answer but can't quite get himself over the hump, preferring to huddle up with some "mystery".
But there's no mystery. A personal God doesn't exist. The world and the universe behave in exactly the ways we would expect them to if there were no personal God. It explains perfectly every bit of data asked of it.
You can choose to believe in the face of this and be a Deist, or you can face up to the evidence and be an atheist, or you can throw up your hands and claim to be agnostic, or you can go have lunch and stop worrying about it, but I don't think there's a logically salvageable theistic position in there.
Evan, exactly!
But Calvinism is a morally bankrupt theology, while Reppert fails to follow his argument to its conclusion, and that's the difference...a big one!
It really seems to me that when liberal Christians are talking about viewing the Bible in terms of its moral teachings and seeing it for the beautiful literature that's there and so on ... as Justin seems to be doing frequently here lately ... the best possible way to instill that reading to the text is to abandon its truth.
God the literary character is fascinating, in some ways spellbinding. But he's only that way if he doesn't exist. If he does exist the universe is monstrous. I love Paradise Lost, but even Milton couldn't make his God a warm figure and your heart really goes out to Lucifer when you read it.
O Prince, O Chief of many throned Powers,
That led the embattled Seraphim to war
Under thy conduct, and, in dreadful deeds
Fearless, endangered Heaven's perpetual king,
And put to proof his high supremacy,
Whether upheld by strength, or chance, or fate;
Too well I see and rue the dire event,
That with sad overthrow, and foul defeat,
Hath lost us Heaven, and all this mighty Host,
In horrible destruction laid thus low,
As far as Gods and heavenly essences
Can perish: for the mind and spirit remains
Invincible, and vigour soon returns,
Though all our glory extinct, and happy state
Here swallowed up in endless misery.
Hi John,
From what I've gathered it seems you oppose Calvinism because it makes God the author of a deterministic universe in which He decrees actions and then punishes His creatures for the actions they were forced to do. Maybe that wasn't precise enough, anyway hopefully that makes sense.
When I consider the naturalistic viewpoint, I see the same deterministic universe, but without the moral law giver, etc...
Would you say that's accurate from your perspective? (You hold to a deterministic universe)
Its interesting because I have never really thought about free will in the context of purely naturalistic interactions. Given that, it seems like even the most complex cognitive decisions can be boiled down to some sort of chemical/electrical reaction, which are I guess only attributed to outside factors that ultimately derive from that "first move".
Does that sound about right or am I off in right field? :)
I'm afraid watching one apologist deliver a "knockout blow" to another is, to me, much like watching one mugger challenge another mugger for an old woman's purse. There is no real victory for civilization.
David, with regard to freedom in a naturalistic universe I happen to think we have it.
I just found it amusing that, in Reppert's mind, Dawkin's The God Delusion ranks right up there with Pol Pot, 9/11, and the Holocaust.
When I consider the naturalistic viewpoint, I see the same deterministic universe, but without the moral law giver, etc...
We secular scientists know that determinism (at least, in any recognizable sense) is strictly false--atomic level events (like radioactive decay) happen without sufficient causes. So, I would say you are off in left field, but it's a common detour.
"When will Calvinists like Manata ever understand...their theology... creates atheists?"
Hopefully never ;)
john w. loftus writes: ...with regard to freedom in a naturalistic universe I happen to think we have it.
david writes: Its interesting because I have never really thought about free will in the context of purely naturalistic interactions. Given that, it seems like even the most complex cognitive decisions can be boiled down to some sort of chemical/electrical reaction....
It's not clear to me how, in a purely naturalistic universe, it would even make sense to talk about "morality," at least as people typically use the term.
It seems to me that the concept of morality depends on all sorts of metaphysical concepts that would have no place in a strictly scientific worldview. These include concepts such as a "person" who has "free will" to do things both "good" and "evil." It depends on the idea that actions can be "right" or "wrong."
But in a scientific worldview, where everything is ultimately reduced to physical components, electrical and chemical interactions, and so on, how would any of these metaphysical concepts have a place?
In my observation of the discussions here, it seems that a common view is that only scientific explanations are valid in any ultimate sense. But then I'm surprised to read phrases such as "morally bankrupt." What does that phrase mean? Is there a scientific instrument that detects "morality?" Did Mr. Loftus point that instrument at Calvinism and it failed to detect any trace of morality?
I guess I trying to figure out how, in a purely naturalistic universe, where only scientific explanations are valid, is "morality" possible? Does "morality" get redefined somehow?
For example, if I am nothing more than a bunch of molecules, in what way is it "wrong" for me to mug an old woman and steal her purse? The old woman also is just a bunch of molecules, as is her purse. In what sense is it "wrong" for one bunch of molecules to remove another bunch of molecules from a third bunch of molecules?
What I have often seen is that "morality" gets redefined in some way. Thus a "right" act is an act that tends to promote the survival of the species, or something like that. But that's certainly not what most people mean by "right."
And redefining morality is similar to what the Calvinist does with concepts such as "goodness" and "love." God predestines most of humankind to be tortured in hell for eternity, yet he is "good" and "loving," and somehow the people thus tortured deserve punishment even though they had no choice in the matter. The idea is that God has a different definition of "good," "love," and "morality," and that our ideas about these concepts are wrong.
In an odd way, aren't the naturalist and the Calvinist in the same boat? One redefines morality in scientific terms. The other redefines morality in theological terms. And both believe that our normal beliefs about morality are incorrect.
Good Morning friends
Joe Holman wrote: "It's not clear to me how, in a purely naturalistic universe, it would even make sense to talk about "morality," at least as people typically use the term."
If we make a decision to define morality as something, are we presupposing something about our consciousness? Do we presumptively acknowledge our existence as objectively valuable to ourselves and loved ones by questioning ourselves regarding what we should do? If we do nothing, then certainly we would not violate what Christianity defines as moral, but if we do nothing, then we would shortly starve. Does this mean that by deciding what to do we commit to a morality? This opens a can of worms, but one of my personal heroes, Ayn Rand, wrote about this.
"To challenge the basic premise of any discipline, one must begin at the beginning. In ethics, one must begin by asking: What are values? Why does man need them?
"Value" is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. The concept "value" is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are possible.
I quote from Galt's speech: "There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or nonexistence—and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms. The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action. Matter is indestructible, it changes its forms, but it cannot cease to exist. It is only a living organism that faces a constant alternative: the issue of life or death. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that action, it dies; its chemical elements remain, but its life goes out of existence. It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible. It is only to a living entity that things can be good or evil."
To make this point fully clear, try to imagine an immortal, indestructible robot, an entity which moves and acts, but which cannot be affected by anything, which cannot be changed in any respect, which cannot be damaged, injured or destroyed. Such an entity would not be able to have any values; it would have nothing to gain or to lose; it could not regard anything as for or against it, as serving or threatening its welfare, as fulfilling or frustrating its interests. It could have no interests and no goals."
"The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, 15
The brute fact is that we want to go on living. How we go about accomplishing this is the stuff of ethics and morality.
Maybe I just don't get it, but the mental exercise that is the debate between these two theological systems comes down to how we define free will. Not whether we have free will, but what does it mean to be a volitional creature.
Not one person is saved in Arminianism that is not saved in Calvinism and not one person is saved in Calvinism that is not saved in Arminianism, because....everyone who comes to christ, comes because they have a "DESIRE" to come. The only question that needs to be answered is where does the "DESIRE" come from? Calvinist also believe that "whosoever will, come."
The perception I get is that there is this mass of people who would be going to hell in a calvinistic universe that would not go to hell in an Armininan universe. Wrong Cochise! Arminians still have the problem of explaining how God deals with those who were not fortunate enough to hear the gospel.
The debate centers around the nature of God and his eternal decree, is he a tyrant who pushes biddy's in the creek or is he impotent, wanting everyone to be saved but just not quite able to pull it off?
As for Calvinism causing atheism, it was actually the arminian evangelist one day who in his "alter call said with considerable hand wringing, "god wants to save you today if you'll let him, won't you let him," that caused me first to question arminianism, it was the doctrine of the fall that as a calvinist caused me to question and then reject, Calvinism, on the grounds that I simply could not reconcile omnibeneficence with such a horrific plan.
Evan, you callin' me out?
;)
Evan wrote:
It really seems to me that when liberal Christians are talking about viewing the Bible in terms of its moral teachings and seeing it for the beautiful literature that's there and so on ... as Justin seems to be doing frequently here lately ...
No, but thanks for noticing.
... the best possible way to instill that reading to the text is to abandon its truth.
Which truth? That of the Arminian reading or the Calvinist reading? Liberal reading or fundamental reading? Mine or yours? Most of these resulting "truths" are mutually exclusive.
Reppert and Manata are arguing against shadows. As are we.
Justin, I'm not calling you out. I'm just calling them as I see them. You specialize in crypto-criticism where you adopt a third position that allows you to avoid the literalism of fundamentalism and at the same time disparage the position of skeptics.
Which truth? That of the Arminian reading or the Calvinist reading? Liberal reading or fundamental reading? Mine or yours? Most of these resulting "truths" are mutually exclusive.
So you see exactly the point I'm making. There is NO special truth in the Bible. My truth is that the Bible is a collection of writings made by primitive men, and is no more inspired than any other writing. What's odd is that after reading all of your posts over the last month or so, I have no idea what your truth is.
Ruppert said:
Look, given this picture [from a Calvanist viewpoint], if you don't have (sic) at least notice a prima facie problem with God's conduct from a moral point of view, then you don't need an argument, you need help.
Manata said:
[I]f you believe in a god who looked into his crystal ball and saw all the evil that would result from creating humans, and then he just let it all happen anyway, when he could have prevented it, then you don't need an argument, you need help.
Manata also said:
If you believe in a god who desires all men to be saved and knows that not all men will be saved, then you have an irrational god who desires an end he knows is impossible. If so, you don't need an argument you need help.
And finally Manata said:
Or, if he can't guarantee that everyone freely does what is right in heaven, then we (sic) maybe someone will rape someone else in heaven. If you believe those sorts of things you don't need an argument, you need help.
Well...
I agree with both debaters' conclusions: If [you believe in Arminian or Calvinist doctrine], you don't need an argument, you need help.
Curious how each cooking vessel in this debate is commenting on the visible appearance of the other...
Also curious is that neither seems able to make the leap that both viewpoints are fallacious, and that neither position solves the problem of evil, or absolves god of any responsibility.
Furthermore, it is always amusing to observe the in-fighting amongst theists -- especially those whose doctrines have quite a bit in common. It's a wonder that none of them recognize that they are all arguing from the same text, with varying interpretations, and that as such they are unable to further recognize that perhaps the text itself is the source of the problem, and that therefore any philosophy or doctrine which stems from it (the text) should be suspect.
Curious, indeed.
--
Stan
Shygetz: You thought I was serious about putting Dawkins up there with Pol Pot? I'd better get my tongue out of my cheek before it gets stuck there.
Evan wrote:
You specialize in crypto-criticism where you adopt a third position that allows you to avoid the literalism of fundamentalism and at the same time disparage the position of skeptics.
"Disparage" is such an ugly word. I prefer "critique".
Look, Evan (and everyone else), I'm not here to bust your chops. I'm just offering another viewpoint--albeit an atypical one. Just as you don't believe theistic arguments are above criticism, I don't believe skepticism is above criticism, either.
We're all about critical thinking here, aren't we? That's why I like this blog.
What's odd is that after reading all of your posts over the last month or so, I have no idea what your truth is.
All the better. I'm still looking for it.
While Stan makes an excellent point with this:
... any philosophy or doctrine which stems from it (the text) should be suspect.
I don't agree that blame should lie on the text.
Justin-
Thanks for finding my point excellent, but I must also assume that however excellent you thought it, you apparently disagreed with the conclusion drawn from it.
First, you clearly imply that instead of faulting the text, we should fault the interpretations of it, and, by proxy, its interpreters.
To me, this is only so much hand-waving, and seems on the extreme to be endorsing relativism (which is not a threat to my system, though I am not yet convinced either way). As you well know, a great many Christians hang their hats on absolutism, but why, then, are there so many opposing interpretations in such an absolute world...?
All that aside, I suppose I should embrace your implication, and agree that the fault rather lies with the interpreters (or at least with their interpretations).
If we assume this, then I am well within my rights to call myself a Christian, whose interpretation of the bible is such that there is no god, that Jesus was a mere mortal and illegitimate son of Joseph, that the Old Testament is largely fiction (though some is admittedly greatly embellished historiness -- to borrow from Stephen Colbert's "truthiness"), and so on, as I see fit in my own interpretation, which I deem as definitive.
Of course, you can only agree with me here, with the notable exception being with my last statement; you would likely consider my interpretation to be incorrect.
This is precisely my point, and I'm at a loss as to how you can recognize its strength, then deny the logical conclusion from that strength. Since the bible is apparently so ambiguous as to afford so many mutually exclusive interpretations, then it clearly isn't the valuable resource Christians claim it to be, and since my argument (that I could claim to be a Christian with an atheistic interpretation of the bible) is valid, then just as potentially valid would be a theology which denied the bible altogether -- if for no other reason than the fact that it, too, could be considered an interpretation (in the blind, as it were) of the bible.
In point of fact, and at much personal amusement, I must point out the unintentional pun in the above. By your reckoning, or so I gather, virtually all interpretations of the bible are 'in the blind'.
So despite the possible insult you may incur, Evan's assessment of your position seems pretty accurate. Substitute "critique" for "disparage" if you like, but it's true. Your admission that you are "still looking for [your truth]" serves mostly to show me your unwillingness to commit, which is fine, but it's increasingly frustrating when attempting to engage in useful argument, as the assumptions we must make regarding your position invariably turn out to be wrong, or so it seems.
I guess it seems that you agree with the stated goal of this blog: you think evangelical Christianity deserves debunking. I'm sure you will disagree, but the fact remains that you do "adopt a third position that allows you to avoid the literalism of fundamentalism and at the same time [critique] the position of skeptics."
That third position is, by definition, not evangelical Christianity.
Sorry if you're offended... :)
--
Stan
Justin I'm happy to accept criticism and I agree that that is one of the primary purposes for me to be here, to test their beliefs against the best apologetics there are to see if I have somehow overlooked something, but when you say:
Just as you don't believe theistic arguments are above criticism, I don't believe skepticism is above criticism, either.
I have to wonder exactly what your criticism is, since you admit you don't even know what you believe.
At the risk of sounding like Michael Palin, I have to point out that an argument is a series of logically connected propositions, it's not just contradiction.
If I have no idea what you believe, and you see that as a good thing, it should make you wonder exactly what you're doing.
Victor, I'm afraid I've been a victim of Poe's Law far too many times, on both sides of the equation.
My mistake.
jim holman said: But in a scientific worldview, where everything is ultimately reduced to physical components, electrical and chemical interactions, and so on, how would any of these metaphysical concepts have a place?
No scientist claims that values do not exist; some may claim that they have no objective existence outside of the observer, but subjective criteria do exist. I think you will agree that subjective values can be measured; indeed, this is a large part of psychology. So, science can and does measure individual morality. We can also ennumerate how popular certain moral stances are, again via very straighforward measurements. When a moral stance becomes widespread enough in a society (e.g. the injustice of substitutionary atonement) one can speak of it in general terms of "right" and "wrong" with a justifiable expectation that the vast majority of the audience will agree with you.
Science has probed the foundations and varieties of morality, morality in non-human populations, and the benefits of various moral stances. Science has also begun looking into free will, with intriguing results. Even if free will is false (which I do not concede), it does not preclude actions from being right and wrong, nor does it invalidate the ideas of punishment, approbation, or censure from the community.
For example, if I am nothing more than a bunch of molecules, in what way is it "wrong" for me to mug an old woman and steal her purse?
It is wrong because society has reached a consensus that it is wrong--you can also see similar reactions in social animals (example). If you look at what little human morals are actually universal (incest, murder, theft), they are shared with social animals. There are excellent reasons why we all think those are wrong, and they have to do with societal success.
The old woman also is just a bunch of molecules, as is her purse. In what sense is it "wrong" for one bunch of molecules to remove another bunch of molecules from a third bunch of molecules?
Can you tell the difference between your car and an Auto Zone? Then I think we can agree that the particular arrangement of the parts is very important.
What I have often seen is that "morality" gets redefined in some way. Thus a "right" act is an act that tends to promote the survival of the species, or something like that. But that's certainly not what most people mean by "right."
No, what you have seen is people explain how we have come to view certain ideas as right.
In an odd way, aren't the naturalist and the Calvinist in the same boat? One redefines morality in scientific terms. The other redefines morality in theological terms. And both believe that our normal beliefs about morality are incorrect.
How do you define morality? Do you agree that individual morality is subjective? Then why can we not make an objective observation of the prevalence of a subjective opinion, and base our societal morality on this objective measure?
Do you think there is an objective standard that normalized morality? Then why do humans all disagree (often violently) on what is moral? Assuming you will avoid the asinine argument that people who disagree with you know deep down that they are evil, seems like the best that you could argue is that there is an objective morality, but we cannot observe it objectively, only subjectively. In that case, how can you (or I or anyone) differentiate between morality that is subjective at its core, and morality that is a subjective and widely varying interpretation of an objective standard that cannot be objectively measured in any way?
I think you probably have quite a few misconceptions about yourself and the world. Wouldn't be surprised if I have quite a few myself. The difference is, I am still looking for verifiable answers instead of just deciding to be comfortable in the same intuitive ignorance that told us the world was flat, the sun circled the Earth, time was constant, the sky was a dome, every event had a specific set of causes, etc.
At the risk of sounding like Michael Palin, I have to point out that an argument is a series of logically connected propositions, it's not just contradiction.
Is not.
shygetz writes: When a moral stance becomes widespread enough in a society (e.g. the injustice of substitutionary atonement) one can speak of it in general terms of "right" and "wrong" with a justifiable expectation that the vast majority of the audience will agree with you.
In the way that people normally speak of morality, they speak of it as something that is true whether or not the majority of people agree. For example, if morality is determined by a majority vote, so to speak, and if a majority of people were Calvinists, then it would make no sense for John Loftus to say that Calvinism is "morally bankrupt." In such a context he would would be either irrational or uninformed. We would respond "but aren't you aware that the majority says that Calvinism is morally right?"
I can't speak for him, but I would bet that even if all the world were Calvinist except for him, he would still hold that Calvinism is morally bankrupt.
Going out on a limb here, but I believe he would say Calvinism is morally bankrupt even if Calvinism made people happier, more productive, physically healthier, and more attractive.
Holman wrote: The old woman also is just a bunch of molecules, as is her purse. In what sense is it "wrong" for one bunch of molecules to remove another bunch of molecules from a third bunch of molecules?
shygetz responds: Can you tell the difference between your car and an Auto Zone? Then I think we can agree that the particular arrangement of the parts is very important.
Yes, the arrangement of parts is important, but if we are all just bunches of molecules, how is that arrangement morally significant?
shygetz: Do you think there is an objective standard that normalized morality? Then why do humans all disagree (often violently) on what is moral?
I believe that there is such a thing as moral truth -- that things can be "really right" or "really wrong" -- regardless of what a society might vote on them.
Yes, there are moral disagreements. But humans disagree on all sorts of things. But disagreement does not entail that there is no objective body of knowledge. For example, if you say that the earth is round, and I assert that it is flat, that doesn't mean that there is no objective shape of the earth. It just means that I'm wrong, whether I realize it or not.
shygetz: Assuming you will avoid the asinine argument that people who disagree with you know deep down that they are evil, seems like the best that you could argue is that there is an objective morality, but we cannot observe it objectively, only subjectively.
I think that people can be wrong about morality, in the same way that they can be wrong about anything else. In many cases, what seem to be disputes about morality are actually disputes about the facts of the situation.
For example, many people believe that certain kinds of contraception are wrong because a fertilized egg is a person. I believe that a fertilized egg is not a person. Thus, what on the surface may appear to be a moral disagreement is actually a disagreement about the facts related to the fertilized egg.
I'll try to make the point that I wanted to make -- perhaps unsuccessfully -- in my first post. If someone wants to argue against theism based on the idea that only scientific explanations are valid, that's fine. But that argument also is an argument against the metaphysical concepts that make the traditional view of morality possible.
If someone wants to ditch the traditional view of morality, that's fine with me. But then I'm surprised when that same person expresses moral "outrage" over some situation. In other words, if we're all just atoms and energy, fine. But then there simply is no basis for moral outrage, any more than some piece of phytoplankton might be "outraged" over being consumed by a crustacean.
Stan,
For the most part you are correct... I AM closer to being a relativist than an absolutist, and yes I do fault the bible's interpreters for their own reactions and activities they base upon their reading of it--good and bad.
You can call yourself purple, and I'd be willing to bet you could, with some effort, find a way to justify it with some biblical proof-text. So, call yourself "Christian", if you really want. I really don't care. Your right in that I might consider my interpretation to be correct and yours not, but that is a given, and no real revelation or oddity. We all think that.
I don't believe the text [bible] to be ambiguous. I believe the lenses through which people read it--the culmination of their experiences, emotions, desires, brain chemistry, physiology, etc.--are as varied as there are people on earth. And, unless the vast majority of those people are somehow invalidated, somehow, as imbeciles, their interpretations are real and valid.
Yet, the bible is still here, 4500 years later, translated into nearly every known language, in all sorts of forms, and we are here arguing about it. The declaration that it is or is not a "valuable" resource seems irrelevant in light of its pervasiveness.
Yes, the same could be said about many religious texts. Anecdotally, I believe most others have a way to go to reach the same printing volume. Apparently, many people think it IS valuable.
After being commited to a single interpretation for a very long time, much like the ex-evangelicals on this blog, no, I am not yet ready to commit. I'm enjoying the richness of the varying thought and views on the bible and God, too much narrow my focus. Those tiny bits of truth I find in everyone's comments and thoughts are just too good to ignore. If that is not useful to you, and if the majority on this blog feel that way, rather than wear out my welcome, I'll stop and move on to other prospects. But I must ask, why must you assume anything about what I believe to defend your own beliefs? Are your beliefs dependent on having some contender to be valid? Is skepticism only useful if there is something to be skeptical about?
I do think evangelical Christianity deserves debunking, or at very least a heavy dose of inquisition. And I don't deny the "third" position I take. In fact, I would hope to be demonstrating the n-th position, if only to show that the skeptical arguments aren't always applicable or fairly applied. I agree to the same extent about the theistic arguments. Broad brushes are for elementary school art time.
You are right, I am not here to defend evangelical Christianity. Does that really matter, considering John's boasts to be able to debunk liberal, catholic, and orthodox Christianity just the same? Does it really matter to any skeptic, here?
I'm not offended, and I don't want to be a troll, that's not my intent.
Evan,
Shygetz beat me to the punchline...
You wrote:
I have to wonder exactly what your criticism is...
The fundamentalist reading of the bible is not the ONLY reading, and not the most widely held reading. Therefore, to paint all Christianity with the broad fundy/literalist brush--which is exactly what is done, not just here on DC, but by all popular skeptical/atheist pundits--is to neglect other, widely varied and valuable contributions to the religion conversation. It seems to me the ignoring of those varied viewpoints--even the cherry-picking of the more extreme ones and holding them up a "normal" or "standard"--is not just an oversight, but a calculated tactic to control the debate in favor of a predetermined conclusion.
I also don't like it from the other side, that is painting all skeptics as genocidal, facist, amoral monsters. My criticism cut's both ways.
But, I admit, the broad brush approach makes better copy.
... it should make you wonder exactly what you're doing.
Evan, I wonder that every morning.
Justin you really are all over the map.
First you say:
I don't believe the text [bible] to be ambiguous.
Then you add:
Yet, the bible is still here, 4500 years later, ... and we are here arguing about it.
Would not your first statement be invalidated by your second?
Then you make the wild claim that:
The fundamentalist reading of the bible is not the ONLY reading, and not the most widely held reading.
I think globally that this is probably wrong. But I know with certainty that in the US this is wrong. The majority of US Christians believe the earth is 10,000 years old or less, mankind did not descend from apes, and there were 2 people God made from dirt named Adam and Eve who are ancestors of us all. This is not some minority reading, but the majority belief.
If you believe it's wrong, argue against it. If you believe it's a rare viewpoint, you are not living in the US (a possibility). But I am living in the US and therefore this is the most common belief here (viz, Jamie Steele, District Supervisor Harvey Burnett, the briefly seen Tom and Tom2 et alia).
Then you say:
Therefore, to paint all Christianity with the broad fundy/literalist brush--which is exactly what is done, not just here on DC, but by all popular skeptical/atheist pundits--is to neglect other, widely varied and valuable contributions to the religion conversation.
And I keep waiting for what these actually are. You keep hinting at them, but never seem to remove the feline from the satchel.
It seems to me the ignoring of those varied viewpoints--even the cherry-picking of the more extreme ones and holding them up a "normal" or "standard"--is not just an oversight, but a calculated tactic to control the debate in favor of a predetermined conclusion.
No it's a tactic that addresses the beliefs that are most widely held in my country of origin.
Look I've been a fundamentalist. It's what I grew up with. Most of my family still are. Trust me, they consider atheists and liberal Christians to be all of a piece. If you think liberal Christianity has some miraculous truth that the fundies don't have, let's see it.
Put forward that truth into a series of connected propositions and lets see if it makes any sense.
Justin-
I don't think anyone really wants you to leave, but it is frustrating at times when attempting to debate your position, because it's so dynamic.
Again, that's not so much of a problem as an annoyance.
Anyway, you're certainly entitled to that dynamic position, but now that I've recognized it, I'll adjust my tactics -- in your case, at least -- to accomodate.
As to the ambiguity of the bible, I don't know how you can honestly say it is not ambiguous.
Merriam Webster Online lists the following two definitions of the word "ambiguous":
1: doubtful or uncertain especially from obscurity or indistinctness;
2: capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or ways
No one could possibly argue that the second is not true, and it is hardly defensible that the former misses the mark as well.
As a Physics major, I've taken a fair amount of math courses, and since I haven't yet completed my schooling, I have a fair deal more in my future. That being said, none of my math texts can be considered ambiguous.
None of them.
Not my college math texts (Calculus, Linear Algebra, Differential Equations, Physics), not my high school math texts (Algebra and Trigonometry through Calculus), not my elementary and middle school texts.
1 + 1 = 2
This is not ambiguous.
The bible, clearly, is an ambiguous text, and as such its value is necessarily diminished. Since the literal interpretation is so clearly incorrect in so many scientifically independent ways, the whole text becomes suspect.
Due to its many incompatible interpretations (my obviously fecitious interpretation notwithstanding), the argument that the whole damned thing should be scrapped seems especially strong, even if there is a true, definitive interpretation.
Considering the apparent eternal consequences, I think it is hardly unreasonable for us to require that god provide us with a more clear text.
--
Stan
Stan and Evan,
While crafting a reply, I read John's latest post. I'm thinking I should just let it go.
I can send you my reply privately, if you wish...
--Justin
It's Humanity.
Look, I don't know if there are "objective moral truths" or not. Furthermore, I don't if the human intellect could ever fully isolate the variables to find them. But fine, let's get down to first principles.
There is only one single intelligent being on earth. Is there anything this being could do that would be universally considered immoral and why?
Now put a bunch of intelligent beings around him/her/it. Is the question easier to answer?
I don't know what else demands morality, but humanity certainly does.
jim holman, I tried to answer your response point-by-point, but it was too long. For the sake of the readers, I am making an effort to be more concise (too late!) So, I will sum up what I think is the most important point.
If someone wants to ditch the traditional view of morality, that's fine with me. But then I'm surprised when that same person expresses moral "outrage" over some situation. In other words, if we're all just atoms and energy, fine. But then there simply is no basis for moral outrage, any more than some piece of phytoplankton might be "outraged" over being consumed by a crustacean.
When you say "there is no basis for moral outrage" you are unwittingly begging the question. There is no objective basis for moral outrage, but subjectivists (which are different from relativists) do not think that an objective standard is important for a moral belief. And as I hope to demonstrate, neither do you.
Let's say there exists (in a purely metaphysical sense) a foo. Now, let's say that it is physically and theoretically impossible to interact with this foo in any way, through any number of intermediaries. Now, what is the epistemeological difference between this foo existing and it not existing--that is, how does this foo's existence change what we know in any way?
It doesn't. Even though it exists as an objective metaphysical object, since we cannot measure it in any way it cannot change what we know whatsoever. By definition, from our point of view it is exactly as if it does not exist, and no matter what we do we cannot tell the difference between "foo" and "no foo".
OK, so lets say that the foo does interact with us, but in chaotic fashion. That is, whenever one observes the foo, one sees something that is wholly unpredictable. What can we know about the foo based on these subjective measurements? Nothing--we can't even say the foo exists, because some people see something and some see nothing, and it is impossible to predict (even with probabilistic models) what someone will see. It becomes essentially part of the random error that pervades our observation of the universe.
So, let's translate this example to the moral realm. Let's postulate for the moment that there does exist some objective moral standard, but that we cannot measure it in any way. How does the existence of this objective moral standard change our existence? It does not, not in any way.
OK, but what if we can measure this objective moral standard, but this measurement is wholly chaotic; that is, some people measure one thing, others measure something else, and there is no predictability. What can we say about the objective moral standard? The same thing we can say about the foo; nothing. We can't even say it exists, because our subjective experiences of the objective moral standard disagree wildly, and there is no repeatable objective measurement possible.
Now, this leaves moral objectivists in a conundrum. How do they reconcile a consistently measurable objective moral truth with differing morals among people with similar abilities--after all, I have shown that a metaphysical object that is not consistently measurable (note, I did not say consistently measured, I said measurable) gives us no more knowledge about our universe than no object at all? People with similar abilities will all measure the circumference of the Earth to be about the same--why is this not true of people measuring the pretended objective moral truth? If you claim that people who disagree with you regarding the measurement of objective moral truth are faulty, then you beg the question unless you can come up with an objective testable mechanism of how they are faulty, and even then you have to demonstrate it (e.g. I can demonstrate objectively how people who mis-measure the objective circumference of the Earth are doing it wrong). You have done no such thing, and I hope you are too wise to attempt it.
This conundrum is perhaps most easily observed if you consider what happens when you change your mind regarding a moral truth (which I imagine has or will occur to you at least once in your life). Did the objective moral truth that you measure change, and if so how do you know? Was your previous measurement of the objective moral truth faulty, and if so how do you know your current measurement is correct assuming that you have not undergone some dramatic morphological change in the split second between changing you assessment? Were you previously refusing to measure an objective moral truth that you now choose to measure, and if so why did you sustain your previous moral truth as correct? Are you now perceiving a moral truth that was imperceptable to you a moment ago, and if so what morphological change occurred that gives you both the ability and the confidence to state that you are accurately measuring this objective moral truth now?
I've said it before and I'll say it again--unless you can make measurements of this pretended objective moral truth that is sufficiently consistent to be considered objective measurements, then the metaphysical existence of an unapproachable metaphysical truth is unprovable; worse, it is uninteresting, as such existence gives us absolutely no knowledge.
In many cases, what seem to be disputes about morality are actually disputes about the facts of the situation.
I will take your example and show how this is usually not true. You argue that the abortion argument is based around the "fact" that embryos are people. However, the "personess" of an object is not an objective fact; it is a political distinction--who is entitled to a set group of rights and responsibilities. Need I remind you that African slaves were once determined to be 3/5 of a person--do you claim that Revolutionary politicians literally thought that slaves were equivalent to heavily amputated humans? If the argument was based on the question of "Is an embryo a unique organism that falls within the parameters of "human" that, at some point and time, may be capable of independent life and reproduction?" then the answer is clearly "Yes", and most people on both sides will admit to this. However, the argument is based on the moral question of how such entities should be treated, and is most definitely not a question of empirical fact. The same is true of pretty much all of the great moral questions of modern US society (e.g. euthanasia--the dispute is NOT over the existence or non-existence of people who are in pain and claim to want to die).
Morality is a matter of opinion. Of course I think my opinion is better than yours; if I did not, I would subscribe to your opinion. So I can (and am) outraged when someone performs an act that violates my moral opinion. When I argue the superiority of my moral opinion, I am attempting to persuade others to subscribe to my opinion and thus increase the societal censure for violating my moral truth. In cases where I choose to make my outrage known, it is part of the censure mechanism that attempts to persuade others of the value of following my opinion.
Why would an objectivist express outrage over a moral opinion? In your case, the moral offender is either incapable of viewing the moral truth or refuses to do so (the latter stance being one that you rightly seem to avoid). So are you not chastising a person for being unable to see what you see, and is this not unjust? After all, since the person did not knowingly choose to not see objective moral truth, how can you justify outrage at his inherent inability to do so?
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