tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post702484719444965574..comments2023-12-01T18:05:24.875-05:00Comments on Debunking Christianity: The Logical Problem Of Evil ReformulatedUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger132125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-32921719338606141112009-08-07T18:59:42.145-04:002009-08-07T18:59:42.145-04:00That's not a bad thing, but again, there is so...<b>That's not a bad thing, but again, there is something grand that is not accomplished in this that self determinism accomplishes.</b> <br /><br />But at what cost is it accomplished? Was this cost necessary? How do you define grand?<br /><br /><b>I don't see the problem with this. They are missing something good, but there are other ways in which creatures can be of value.</b><br /><br />Rob, this makes your argument merely possible, instead of plausible. It's possible for God to conceder anything and everything valuable, in which case nothing has value. This does not a good argument make. <br /><br /><b>Slippery slope arguments are logically fallacious because we can use discernment.</b><br /><br />Slippery slope arguments are valid when one fails to show their contingencies necessarily lead to their conclusion. I'll illustrated this in my latest comment..<br /><br /><i>"Even inside Christianity, there are radically different notions of God's nature, such as Calvinism. Furthermore, even given your definitions, it's clear we could have freedom and create moral character in a variety of settings which have significantly less or more or less suffering than we have now. When God punished Adam and Eve, he specifically influenced the amount of suffering we experience. If God has free will, then he could have picked some other level of suffering or even some completely different form of punishment. Yet he consciously and intentionally picked physical death, disease and suffering".</i><br /><br />You haven't shown why your particular amount of suffering we see is necessary. Instead you appear to claim that's the way "God wanted it." That God wouldn't want something else is based on your particular interpretation of God's nature. <br /><br /><b>A good God wouldn't create reprobate creatures.</b><br /><br />In case you didn't notice, I modified the scenario to illustrate how slippery this line of thinking can be. <br /><br /><i>Again, I could say God only wants people who's love is so deep that they die as martyrs. Therefore, he would be justified in creating some kind of <b>force</b> that persecutes and eventually kills people. Does this not speak to your intuitive experience of love? </i><br /><br />Furthermore, one could just as easily say a good God wouldn't create if it could result in kind of suffering we see.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11193595678064010528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-81300195691983767922009-08-07T18:58:56.076-04:002009-08-07T18:58:56.076-04:00I don't believe in contra-causal free will. I ...<b>I don't believe in contra-causal free will. I believe libertarian freedom involves indeterministic causation where a cause may have several possible effects. Nothing happens without a cause. That doesn't mean that what was caused was the only thing that could've been caused.</b><br /><br />Even libertarian freedom requires some aspect that is genuinely self-actualized, which you claim instantly came into existence. <br /><br /><b>I don't know how free will and responsibility are ultimately brought about any more than I know how to describe the color blue to a man born blind from birth.</b><br /><br />The supernatural does not actually explain anything, let alone free will. Instead it merely attempts to account for things. This is a completely different problem, which I'm not arguing here.<br /><br /><b> As before, I'll point out that this moral character created instantly or deterministically isn't self determined, by definition. It may be a moral character, but it is not self determined.</b><br /><br />And, by definition, things do not come into existence from nothing that are not caused. Did Adam come into existence through some other cause than God? You're presenting some form of special pleading in one way or the other. <br /><br /><b>He can make the necessity arise from within us, but not in an ultimate sense as the necessity goes back in a deterministic chain back to him. The love we'd have for God would really be God's self love looped around through his creatures.</b><br /><br />Rob, you seem to be merely arguing on definitions. Yes, I'm aware of your position, but you have given a reason why we should suspect using this definition is warranted in this case but not another, given the particular claims of Christianity. <br /><br />For example, if God an intelligent agent that created the universe, then it's unclear how he can escape having determined us.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11193595678064010528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-89500669053348554552009-08-06T23:45:44.566-04:002009-08-06T23:45:44.566-04:00Will heaven be bland, limited and determined?
I c...<em>Will heaven be bland, limited and determined?</em><br /><br />I could've sworn I've already answered this. Libertarian freedom isn't just for moral issues. There's creativity, consciousness and perhaps more. But of course, freedom isn't the thing that makes the difference between an incredible existence and a bland one. But it sure gives us a quality of an incredible existence that otherwise would not be possible.<br /><br /><br /><em>Third, I'm free to value my experiences even if I think I'm determined. </em><br /><br />Perhaps you are. If you are determinist, that doesn't mean that your actions and thoughts are determined. That means that you think your actions and thoughts are determined. But being a determinist does not demonstrate determinism is true.<br /><br /><em>In fact, I think the only reason we make decisions at all is because we are determined. </em><br /><br />This is true regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism is true. Indeterminism after all is not the claim that EVERYTHING is undetermined. It is only the claim that some things are determined. And if we are free creatures, then it is determined that we will face situations in which there is no specific determined outcome.<br /><br /><em>Again, I could say God only wants people who's love is so deep that they die as martyrs. Therefore, he would be justified in creating some kind of force that persecutes and eventually kills people. Does this not speak to your intuitive experience of love? This is what I'm referring to.</em><br /><br /><br />Slippery slope arguments are logically fallacious because we can use discernment. And so the discernment here highlights that your original suggestion involved reprobate creatures. A good God wouldn't create reprobate creatures.<br /><br />So what if they were just robots. The thing is, now we have God punishing innocent creatures in that scenario. The picture I paint is much better because it requires no evil, only the possibility. And of course, the possibility of evil is not evil in and of itself. If that was the case, then nothing would be good that we know of since anything can be twisted for evil's sake.Rob Rhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08937716910001145836noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-28881012710003497642009-08-06T23:45:10.731-04:002009-08-06T23:45:10.731-04:00post 2 of 3
Scott,
For the sake of argument, I...post 2 of 3<br /><br /><br />Scott,<br /><br /><br /><em>For the sake of argument, I'm assuming that genuine contra-causal free will is possible based on your own definition. In fact, this is key point in my argument.</em><br /><br /><br />I don't believe in contra-causal free will. I believe libertarian freedom involves indeterministic causation where a cause may have several possible effects. Nothing happens without a cause. That doesn't mean that what was caused was the only thing that could've been caused.<br /><br /><br /><em>This is NOT my argument. Instead, I'm questioning how these two things are brought about based on your own claims about God's abilities.</em><br /><br />Scott, as with every metaphysical claim that has ever been made and ever will be made, by science or religion, mystery stands at the limits of our knowledge. I don't know how free will and responsibility are ultimately brought about any more than I know how to describe the color blue to a man born blind from birth. But I don't need to know that. All world views involve mystery. It doesn't make them incoherent. Of course, I find mystery is a poor excuse for incoherence. If you want to demonstrate an incoherence, that is a more significant problem.<br /><br /><em>Surely, if God can instantly endow choices that genuinely originate from the individual, then it seems logical that he could give genuinely moral character that originates from the individual without an incremental process. </em><br /><br />Scott, I really don't know how it is that I haven't answered this question. But I do see some room for expansion though.<br /><br />As before, I'll say I grant that possibility. As before, I'll point out that this moral character created instantly or deterministically isn't self determined, by definition. It may be a moral character, but it is not self determined. It'd be determined by God. Why? Because the necessity for the moral character arises from God's choices and actions, not ours hence it's not self determined. He can make the necessity arise from within us, but not in an ultimate sense as the necessity goes back in a deterministic chain back to him. Here's the consequence. The love we'd have for God would really be God's self love looped around through his creatures. That's not a bad thing, but again, there is something grand that is not accomplished in this that self determinism accomplishes.<br /><br />God can endow within us libertarian free choice as long as those choices are not from him. I suppose he can endow within us moral character, as long as it is not the kind of moral character that is characterized by self determinism. <br /><br /><em>You know he want's this particular means despite the fact that he's designed (or changed though intentional punishment) the human reproduction system in a way that results in billions of souls that cannot go thorough this incremental process due to spontaneous abortions.</em><br /><br />It actually is speculation that these souls do not get to be placed in a context of moral free choice. But again, even if they don't then they just will not have that aspect of self determinism that we will have. I don't see the problem with this. They are missing something good, but there are other ways in which creatures can be of value.Rob Rhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08937716910001145836noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-35255978059769874612009-08-06T23:44:26.446-04:002009-08-06T23:44:26.446-04:00post 1 of 3
Scott,
For the sake of argument, I&...post 1 of 3<br /><br />Scott,<br /><br /><br /><em>For the sake of argument, I'm assuming that genuine contra-causal free will is possible based on your own definition. In fact, this is key point in my argument.</em><br /><br /><br />I don't believe in contra-causal free will. I believe libertarian freedom involves indeterministic causation where a cause may have several possible effects. Nothing happens without a cause. That doesn't mean that what was caused was the only thing that could've been caused.<br /><br /><br /><em>This is NOT my argument. Instead, I'm questioning how these two things are brought about based on your own claims about God's abilities.</em><br /><br />Scott, as with every metaphysical claim that has ever been made and ever will be made, by science or religion, mystery stands at the limits of our knowledge. I don't know how free will and responsibility are ultimately brought about any more than I know how to describe the color blue to a man born blind from birth. But I don't need to know that. All world views involve mystery. It doesn't make them incoherent. Of course, I find mystery is a poor excuse for incoherence. If you want to demonstrate an incoherence, that is a more significant problem.<br /><br /><em>Surely, if God can instantly endow choices that genuinely originate from the individual, then it seems logical that he could give genuinely moral character that originates from the individual without an incremental process. </em><br /><br />Scott, I really don't know how it is that I haven't answered this question. But I do see some room for expansion though.<br /><br />As before, I'll say I grant that possibility. As before, I'll point out that this moral character created instantly or deterministically isn't self determined, by definition. It may be a moral character, but it is not self determined. It'd be determined by God. Why? Because the necessity for the moral character arises from God's choices and actions, not ours hence it's not self determined. He can make the necessity arise from within us, but not in an ultimate sense as the necessity goes back in a deterministic chain back to him. Here's the consequence. The love we'd have for God would really be God's self love looped around through his creatures. That's not a bad thing, but again, there is something grand that is not accomplished in this that self determinism accomplishes.<br /><br />God can endow within us libertarian free choice as long as those choices are not from him. I suppose he can endow within us moral character, as long as it is not the kind of moral character that is characterized by self determinism. <br /><br /><em>You know he want's this particular means despite the fact that he's designed (or changed though intentional punishment) the human reproduction system in a way that results in billions of souls that cannot go thorough this incremental process due to spontaneous abortions.</em><br /><br />It actually is speculation that these souls do not get to be placed in a context of moral free choice. But again, even if they don't then they just will not have that aspect of self determinism that we will have. I don't see the problem with this. They are missing something good, but there are other ways in which creatures can be of value.Rob Rhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08937716910001145836noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-54868395685954202102009-08-06T14:32:21.616-04:002009-08-06T14:32:21.616-04:00Words on a blog page cannot illustrate the vast ri...<b>Words on a blog page cannot illustrate the vast richness of our experience of which freedom is an essential part. You may not value this aspect of your humanity, but that doesn't speak well for the experience of an atheist then.</b><br /><br />First, this is NOT my argument. Second, you seem to be implying that we simply cannot have rich experiences without the kind of suffering and "evil" we observe. This is not evident. Will heaven be bland, limited and determined? Third, I'm free to value my experiences even if I think I'm determined. In fact, I think the only reason we make decisions at all is because we are determined. None of what I experience is diminished. This is you're position, not mine. <br /><br />Andre provided an good summary which you can find here: <a href="javascript:void(0);" rel="nofollow">Point of Inquiry: Naturalism and the illusion of free will</a> <br /><br /><b>The slippery slope argument (and I don't know what slipery sloap argument you are advancing here) is logically fallacious anyway</b><br /><br />Again, I could say God only wants people who's love is so deep that they die as martyrs. Therefore, he would be justified in creating some kind of force that persecutes and eventually kills people. Does this not speak to your intuitive experience of love? This is what I'm referring to.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11193595678064010528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-70920591907269110982009-08-06T14:31:49.468-04:002009-08-06T14:31:49.468-04:00Rob,
I'll try this one more time...
For th...Rob, <br /><br />I'll try this one more time... <br /><br />For the sake of argument, I'm assuming that genuine contra-causal free will is possible based on your own definition. In fact, this is key point in my argument. <br /><br />As such, I'm not saying that genuine moral character could exist without libertarian freedom (or vice versa) in some kind of meaningful way. This is NOT my argument. Instead, I'm questioning how these two things are brought about based on your own claims about God's abilities. <br /><br />Supposedly, God is able to create genuine contra-causal free will. Out of nothing. No incremental process is needed to make choices that genuinely originate from the individual, instead of God. This happens instantaneously, as Adam & Eve were immediately responsible for their decisions.<br /><br />But when it comes to genuine moral character, you claim God must use an incremental process. You seem to assume, because you observe human beings gaining character over time, this must be necessary for God plan to be achieved. However, given the above claim, this does not follow. <br /><br />Surely, if God can instantly endow choices that genuinely originate from the individual, then it seems logical that he could give genuinely moral character that originates from the individual without an incremental process. <br /><br />In fact you say this is what happens when a blastocyst (a small sphere of cells) is spontaneously expelled after conception. However, you claim God gives them a perfect moral character, as if this is his only option. Again, this does not follow and God is supposedly capable of endowing contra-causal free choice. <br /><br />When pressed, you suggest that God "wants" us to gain a moral character via a incremental process. However, not just any incremental process, but a specific incremental process which is somehow tied to your interpretation of God's nature. You know he want's this particular means despite the fact that he's designed (or changed though intentional punishment) the human reproduction system in a way that results in billions of souls that cannot go thorough this incremental process due to spontaneous abortions. <br /><br />But, as I've illustrated, this is a slippery slope. Even inside Christianity, there are radically different notions of God's nature, such as Calvinism. Furthermore, even given your definitions, it's clear we could have freedom and create moral character in a variety of settings which have significantly less or more or less suffering than we have now. When God punished Adam and Eve, he specifically influenced the amount of suffering we experience. If God has free will, then he could have picked some other level of suffering or even some completely different form of punishment. Yet he consciously and intentionally picked physical death, disease and suffering.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11193595678064010528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-10162276608248907292009-08-05T23:43:25.764-04:002009-08-05T23:43:25.764-04:00I wrote: Again, you have given no reason to sugges...<em>I wrote: Again, you have given no reason to suggest why God could create genuine libertarian freedom but not genuine moral character without a incremental process. Instead you seem to imply that's how God "preferred it." it's a slippery slope.</em><br /><br />I don't know that God couldn't create creatures with genuine moral character without libertarian freedom. but I've already explained that he couldn't have creatures with a specific kind of love, consciousness, creativity, and soverignty, that they could not have reflected the image of God in the same way to the same degree without libertarian freedom. And even if God could create creatures with genuine moral character without freedom (not that moral character was ever an end which I recognized for it's own value, rather it is derived from the kind of responsible intimate love God intended us to be capable of), it still wouldn't be the same kind of moral character, the kind that is self determined. Self determination for creatures with a beginning is logically impossible without libertarian freedom. Besides self determinism, novelty and multiplicity of options in all of these areas has an intrinsic worth, so our experience would seem to suggest. That our experience suggests this is an understatement. Words on a blog page cannot illustrate the vast richness of our experience of which freedom is an essential part. You may not value this aspect of your humanity, but that doesn't speak well for the experience of an atheist then. it's why ultimately, the problem of evil comes down to subjectivity. And once that happens, it looses it's teeth, and it surely doesn't have logical force.<br /><br />The slippery slope argument (and I don't know what slipery sloap argument you are advancing here) is logically fallacious anyway.<br /><br />I've already said some of this. But why wouldn't I say it? You haven't refuted it.Rob Rhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08937716910001145836noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-64190379544120878882009-08-05T23:41:36.277-04:002009-08-05T23:41:36.277-04:00This comment has been removed by the author.Rob Rhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08937716910001145836noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-57729925875024694122009-08-05T13:15:58.790-04:002009-08-05T13:15:58.790-04:00Joel,
I can summarize my point with the followin...Joel, <br /><br />I can summarize my point with the following question. <br /><br />If we can make "free" choices, but apes cannot, our ability must be a mystery to God as he would have no idea why human beings choose at all. From God's perspective, it would be "magic." <br /><br />Should God have not designed and created our faculty to make choices, it would not exist and choices would not be made. If God did not decide how this factually worked, in detail, then it's unclear why it would actually result in choices, instead of a causing near infinite number of other possible phenomenon. <br /><br />Do you think God actually would view our ability as "magic?"Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11193595678064010528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-62750242207512471272009-08-05T13:11:58.277-04:002009-08-05T13:11:58.277-04:00Rob wrote: Well, then I'm even more confused i...Rob wrote: <b>Well, then I'm even more confused if your idea of an incremental process was the grounds for our communication.</b><br /><br />Rob, <br /><br />For us to communicate, we must have - at a minimum - a basic shared understanding of concepts such as an incremental process. <br /><br />Should this not be the case, it's unclear how we can communicate effectively. <br /><br /><b>Seems to me though that a better grounds for communication involves, amongst other things, a willingness to explain what you mean when someone says they don't know what you mean, even if that involves an "incremental process".</b><br /><br />I think it's fairly clear as to what I'm referring to. Furthermore, you said...<br /><br /><i><b>I don't know what an incremental process is.</b></i><br /><br />This is not asking for an explanation. It's admission of lack of understating of a fundamental concept. <br /><br />So, out of charity, I'm going to reproduce a few relevant parts of my comments again. <br /><br />I wrote: <b>When we note there are other ways that God could get X or that God supposedly created Z in final form without having to do anything else, you reply that God "wants" X by means of Y because only then is X "genuine".</b><br /><br />I wrote: <b>You're suggesting that God could create beings which were capable of making genuinely free libertarian choices without requiring an incremental process. Why should we think this is the case? <br /><br />Should God be capable of staring with nothing and instantly creating genuine libertarian freedom, why can't he start with nothing and instantly create up with genuine moral freedom? </b><br /><br />I wrote: <b>Again, you have given no reason to suggest why God could create genuine libertarian freedom but not genuine moral character without a incremental process. Instead you seem to imply that's how God "preferred it." it's a slippery slope. </b><br /><br />Agin, I think it's relatively clear what I'm referring to here. Instead, your response appeared to be an a (failed) attempt to deflect the issue rather than a genuine question.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11193595678064010528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-35283037980186237972009-08-05T11:58:21.827-04:002009-08-05T11:58:21.827-04:00Hello Joel
I wrote: You say, "I'm still ...Hello Joel<br /><br />I wrote: <i><b>You say, "I'm still unclear as to how God decides what is a free agent and what is not. Could cause a rock to make free choices?" </b></i><br /><br />Joel wrote: <b>Technically speaking God's "causing" a "free" action is a contradiction, so no. God's deciding what is a free agent has to do with being created in God's image, that is, possessing personhood: a faculty, so to speak, by which we are not determined by our physical environment and allows us to "contra-causally" choose between alternatives.</b><br /><br />Theists claim God is what caused the universe, along with human beings, to come into existence out of nothing. Therefore, It's a contradiction to say a creator God did not cause human beings to make choices. This seems to be special pleading on your part. <br /><br />Perhaps a summary on my part would be useful as well.. <br /><br />01. In the beginning, only God existed<br />02. Adam could not make choices as he did not yet exist. <br />03. God caused Adam to exist<br />04. Adam could make choices<br /><br />Somewhere along the line, God was the cause of Adam's ability to make choices. Should God had not been the cause, then Adam would be missing the ability to choose anything as nothing else existed. If God only created 75% of Adam there would be 25% of him still missing, as Adam did not create himself out of nothing. <br /> <br />So, to rephrase my question... <br /><br />01. Rocks exist, but they cannot make choices<br />02. God was the cause of Adam's ability to make choices when he did not exist. <br />03. Should God desire a rock make choices, could he give it the ability to make free choices?<br />04. If so, he would be the cause of the rock's ability to make choices, where it did not exist before. <br /><br />This is what I mean when I ask "Could God could cause rocks to make free choices?"<br /><br />We can ask a similar question about great apes as well. <br /><br />01. In the beginning only God existed. <br />02. Great apes could not make choices of any kind since they did not exist<br />03. God caused great apes to exist<br />04. Great apes can make choices, but they cannot make "free" choices<br /><br />Somewhere between steps 2 and 3, God must have left something out in the case of great apes, that he included in the case of human beings. As such God is the causal factor as to why we can make free choices, but great apes cannot.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11193595678064010528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-75002184993201408352009-08-05T11:56:12.685-04:002009-08-05T11:56:12.685-04:00Joel,
You're summary appears to be incomplet...Joel, <br /><br />You're summary appears to be incomplete and misleading in several ways. <br /><br /><b>1. If humans are completely determined, then there is only one physically possible outcome of their actions. </b><br /><br />First, human beings change over time. For example, had you asked me If I believed in God ten years earlier, I would have said yes. Two years ago, I would have firmly said not a chance. Today, I'd say it's extremely unlikely that the Christian (or the Muslim or hindu) God to exist, and say that it's unlikely that a God of some other nature might exist. <br /><br />Second, Yes, when you take into account "the whole" then everything would end up as one physically possible outcome. But individuals are not like factory robots that constantly respond the same way over and over again. <br /><br />We learn new things. We can see the results of our actions. We age, become injured / get sick and get well. All of these things change who we are and how we react. Instead, you seem to think there is some part of us that is immune from this process, which is simply not evident. <br /><br /><b>2. Humans are morally accountable for their actions only if there is not only one physically possible outcome for their actions.</b><br /><br />First, what do you mean by morally accountable? In a cosmic sense or that they are the causes that influence outcomes which have moral significance?<br /><br />Second, this is clearly incomplete. Would you say children have more than one physical outcomes? Are children morally accountable for their actions? If a human being has no idea that taking action X will result in Z, which causes harm to person Y, you would not consider that person morally accountable. <br /><br />Again, your definition, seems to hinge on the fact that moral agents know what is wrong, but are capable of choosing otherwise. This is no way excludes determinism. <br /> <br /><b>3. Thus, If humans are determined completely, they are not morally accountable for their actions. (1 and contraposed 2)</b><br /><br />They are accountable in areas of moral concern because they have alternate possibilities and a system to select from them. <br /><br /><b>4. But humans are morally accountable for their actions<br />5. Thus, humans are not completely determined. (3, 4 modus tollens)</b><br /><br />Humans are cosmically morally accountable by who? God? This is clearly not evident.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11193595678064010528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-41291776560254227322009-08-03T18:31:30.191-04:002009-08-03T18:31:30.191-04:00You said, "your description of your motives d...<em>You said, "your description of your motives didn't disprove any claims about God's involvement in your moral actions." This assertion is the type of arrogance I am talking about Rob.</em><br /><br />I thought arrogance had to do with what I thought about myself. My mistake!<br /><br /><br /><em>God doesn't govern my actions.</em><br /><br />right, you could be a total cretin and take all the credit. I never would claim to be a determinist. That God's grace enables us to do good does not mean that God's grace guarantees that we will do good.<br /><br /><br /><em>That is arrogant Rob and can only be based on a tautology informed by special pleading. Your intuition informs you that an assessment of my motivations is in line with your interpretation of scripture yet, when a person rejects this premise based on their use of the same intuition you question its veracity.</em><br /><br />I don't see what here makes my claim tautological. My claim could be wrong thus it isn't tautological. What you might be able to argue is that my claim is not falsifiable, but that doesn't make it tautological. And I'm not worried one bit that these specific beliefs are not falsifiable. If that was a problem, science itself would not be valid as it is founded upon many unfalsifiable assumptions. But it's not like nothing I believe is unfalsifiable. it just means that you can't fully evaluate my theology solely on these specific beliefs.<br /><br /><br /><em>Your intuition informs you that an assessment of my motivations is in line with your interpretation of scripture yet, when a person rejects this premise based on their use of the same intuition you question its veracity.That my friend is special pleading. </em><br /><br /><br />Oh, that's what special pleading is? Well, it's a good thing that I didn't do that as you described. I'm not working from my intuition. My claims come from biblically based doctrines (whether they are correct in their biblical interpretation or not) about how man is dependent upon God to do good. Sorry, your intuitions don't clearly cancel out scripture says as your intuitions themselves could be wrong. I know I can't demonstrate that my doctrinal claims are not right, but that was never the point. The point was that your claims from intution don't prove my claims wrong and YOU were trying to do just that.<br /><br />Course, it seems that you are are more guilty of what you accuse me of here since even if I was going purely on intuition, my goal was not to prove you wrong but to show that your criticism was not clearly effective. You on the other hand were attempting to use your intuition to prove what you thought was my intuition wrong.<br /><br /><em>This assessment hardens me to the truth-claims of its believers. If you want to exempt yourself from this dynamic that's fine but you are involving yourself in more selfish delusion and proving my point.</em><br /><br />And I take away from this discussion that not only do you insult when you run out of valid criticisms and the ability to carry them forward, but you then resort to very bad attempts at manipulation.<br /><br /><br /><em>it does not provide proof to any evangelical theology.</em><br /><br />Chuck, I would never claim that I could prove evangelical theology and this discussion has never been about that. We've followed rabit trails from the problem of evil, but nevertheless, from the beginning of the discussion, it has been about demonstrating the problem of evil from another angle. As far as I can tell from what I understand and have articulated here, the criticism has not been succesful. Not because I think I've proven evangelical theology as you mistakenly have taken it, but because it is within the scope of orthodox theology (including evangelical theology) to deflect the criticism.Rob Rhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08937716910001145836noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-74165162588213083262009-08-03T03:21:13.476-04:002009-08-03T03:21:13.476-04:00Scott continued,
Now, you raise many good questi...Scott continued, <br /><br />Now, you raise many good questions about the nature of libertarian freedom itself, so let me address some at least: <br /><br />You say, "I'm still unclear as to how God decides what is a free agent and what is not. Could cause a rock to make free choices?" <br /><br />Technically speaking God's "causing" a "free" action is a contradiction, so no. God's deciding what is a free agent has to do with being created in God's image, that is, possessing personhood: a faculty, so to speak, by which we are not determined by our physical environment and allows us to "contra-causally" choose between alternatives.<br /><br />In the example of the icecream-choosing robot, you ask "Ok, so what if after considering all input, the factors in favor for chocolate and vanilla is equal? Given that the alternate possibilities are such that both are not an option, the robot uses a random function to select one or the other."<br /><br /> In such a situation, the robot is not free because the function to select randomly is still a function: it is determined. It may "look" free, but on the real level, it is still determined.<br /><br />You say, "you seem to imply agency is having knowledge of what they should not do, but have the capacity to select that option regardless." <br /><br />Yes, I believe this matches up with our experience. For instance, (I confess), a long time ago I stole a small amount of money that had been left sitting on a desk. I had the knowledge that i should not steal. But my selfish desire to steal consumed me, and I stole anyway. I am morally culpable because I chose to go obey my desires and not do what was right. <br /><br />You ask, "In other words, Is determinism wrong because it requires a reformulation per-se, or because you happen to disagree with the particular reformulation presented?"<br /> <br />The reformulation involves the determinists' attempt to retain the idea of moral accountability. To do so, they must put it in terms of the necessity for punishment. While I agree that punishment is necessary to prevent crime, it is also true that moral culpability and punishment are separate things. For instance, we could strive to prevent rocks from dislodging from cliffs by, say, tying nets over unstable areas of the cliff. This would work to prevent the natural tendency for the rocks to fall. But this does not mean that we've held these rocks moral accountable for their actions. In the same way, if humans are determined, then we could act to prevent their natural tendencies, but this would say nothing about the moral status of their choices.<br /><br />Well, this post has become too long. Thanks for discussing!Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00199007103169642063noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-58401469871900438212009-08-03T03:20:36.600-04:002009-08-03T03:20:36.600-04:00Scott,
I appreciate the thought you've put i...Scott, <br /><br />I appreciate the thought you've put into the issue. I'm struggling to figure out where to start responding to your colossal aggregate of argument-chopping. <br /><br />Perhaps to clarify a bit where we stand in the discussion, let me state my basic argument more analytically and see what points you've raised in the last responses. <br /><br />1. If humans are completely determined, then there is only one physically possible outcome of their actions. <br />2. Humans are morally accountable for their actions only if there is not only one physically possible outcome for their actions. <br />3. Thus, If humans are determined completely, they are not morally accountable for their actions. (1 and contraposed 2)<br />4. But humans are morally accountable for their actions<br />5. Thus, humans are not completely determined. (3, 4 modus tollens)<br /><br />So the argument follows logically, but are the premises (1,2,4 true)? (1) is part of the definition of what it means to be determined. <br /><br />Against (1) you say, "You're suggesting that human beings cannot expand their knowledge or expand their maps of actions and their outcomes." <br /><br />Yes, they can, but the point is that if they do, such an expansion is ITSELF determined. The decision to expand their knowledge is also determined, so that, given the total set of circumstances, the human is ultimately determined to act only one way. <br /><br />When I use the example of the robot being held morally accountable for a crime, you state, "Robots are programmed by human beings. Human beings make mistakes... had the robot been aware [programmed to take into account] of other options, a non-lethal action would have been taken." <br /><br />This remphasizes the previous point: On determinism, humans are like robots and any "being more aware" of options is itself a determined feature of humans. We simply cannot say, "well, if humans had thought more about the options, they could have made a better choice." <br /><br />Against (2), you state, "However, in the case of killing someone, the man would have been the cause of their death as he had options in that situation, yet chose that specific action. The choice the man made was the determining factor in the outcome. Rocks cannot choose anything because they lack a system to make choices. Therefore, they cannot be the source of choices. Human beings can. Therefore, they can be culpable."<br /><br />I believe the whole argument boils down to this issue here. On determinism, the man in the example HAD no choice in the matter. The environment, desires, beliefs, and his biological constitution determined his outcome. It was physically impossible for him, given his circumstances, to act any differently. And this is precisely my point, just as the rock lacked the ability to choose, so the human lacked the ability to choose, so neither of them are culpable on determinism. <br /><br />Against (4) you ask "what do you mean by accountable?" Well, I simply mean that we consider a person's actions moral or immoral. Good or evil. If an action is immoral, the subject is morally culpable. And I think we agree on that.<br /><br />So I don't think any adequate damage has been done to the argument itself. I could have overlooked any direct attack on the premises, so if I have, sorry, let me know, and I will respond to them. Important thing to be noticed is that if (1), (2), and (4) are true, the conclusion follows logically.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00199007103169642063noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-59055954705743031132009-08-03T03:17:01.067-04:002009-08-03T03:17:01.067-04:00Thanks for the response Andre.
I do believe that...Thanks for the response Andre. <br /><br />I do believe that the response to the scenario I presented is consistent with determinism. I would make a few comments though. You say that your reaction to think that the murderer committed a morally negative action would be determined. But would you? Remember, our reactions to different situations are based on our understanding of the situation: <br /><br />Suppose I am rock climbing and a rock dislodges from a cliff and hits me on the head. My reaction to THAT is not one of moral blame. My understanding of the universe's natural laws makes me realize the rock was determined to fall. In the same way, once our understanding fully realizes that the murderer had no more choice than the dislodged rock had, our reaction should be the same: we can be frustrated or angry, but we should not be morally outraged since both were ultimately determined to happen. <br /><br />You say, "There is no need to think that "Moral accountability loses meaning in a deterministic universe." We still have to punish and put away people that will jeopardize the well being of other citizens..."<br /><br />Yes punishment is needed. But punishment is a different issue than moral accountability. For instance, we could strive to prevent rocks from dislodging from cliffs by, say, tying nets over unstable areas of the cliff. This would work to prevent the natural tendency for the rocks to fall. But this does not mean that we've held these rocks moral accountable for their actions. In the same way, if humans are determined, then we could act to prevent their natural tendencies, but this would say nothing about the moral status of their actions.<br /><br />The problems you bring up in the last paragraph are legitimate issues that certainly need to be addressed by theists, but, like you said, perhaps they can be discussed in another forum. Free will vs determinism is no small piece of cake. :)<br /><br />Enjoying the discussion.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00199007103169642063noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-14657941861810813062009-08-02T13:50:50.624-04:002009-08-02T13:50:50.624-04:00The humble opinion that I've developed as I...<b>The humble opinion that I've developed as I've studied this issue is that if one is to retain a belief in determinism, one is forced to speciously reformulate our intuitive understanding of moral accountability and duty. And this conclusion can be reached, I hope, by anyone who perspicuously studies the issue with integrity</b><br /> <br />In no way did it I suggest that a reformulation of our understanding of moral accountability and duty would not be required. If I did, it was not intentional. Furthermore, having listened to the Point of Inquiry episode listed in Andre's comment, such a reformulation was presented by the guest: Tom Clark. <br /><br />However, in using the word 'speciously' you seem to suggest that such a reformulation is wrong. On what grounds have you reached this conclusion? <br /><br />In other words, Is determinism wrong because it requires a reformulation per-se, or because you happen to disagree with the particular reformulation presented? <br /><br /><b>But what kind of "freedom of choice to go through with it" is there on determinism? Like I said in a previous post, if we are determined, we are simply like robots. Given certain input, we have only one physically possible course of action. </b><br /><br />You're suggesting that human beings cannot expand their knowledge or expand their maps of actions and their outcomes. What good would result in punishing someone for their actions if said punishment did not influence their future choices? To make us feel better?<br /><br /><b> In fact, truth is, why even prevent crime at all? Let nature run its natural course, after all, if determinism is true, it MUST run it's natural course. </b><br /><br />Should determinism be true, then both the desire to commit and prevent crimes is determined. Should an overall reduction in crime occur, such a reduction would have been determined by our nature, along with other factors. <br /><br />Instead, you seem to be creating a kind of dualism here where none is implied as a means to support your position where none is apparent. <br /><br /><b> If you believe in determinism, you are forced to conclude logically and inescapably that this man was no more morally culpable for killing children than a rock is morally culpable of dislodging from a cliff and hitting someone in the head.</b><br /><br />If this same man were shot by a bullet, would he have a choice to be injured or not? No, he would not. Nor could the rock decide not to fall down on the man's head. However, in the case of killing someone, the man would have been the cause of their death as he had options in that situation, yet chose that specific action. The choice the man made was the determining factor in the outcome. Rocks cannot choose anything because they lack a system to make choices. Therefore, they cannot be the source of choices. Human beings can. Therefore, they can be culpable. <br /><br />Now, my reaction to the man's actions would also be determined by who I am. <br /><br /><b> Moral accountability loses meaning in a deterministic universe. And this is why, in all honesty, even if I were not a theist, I simply could not bring myself to believe in determinism.</b><br /><br />Cosmic moral accountability? Yes. Accountability as to causing suffering. No. <br /><br />Again, you seem to think that a free agent is one that knows what is right, but is has the capacity to do otherwise.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11193595678064010528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-28693012203092279782009-08-02T11:40:59.960-04:002009-08-02T11:40:59.960-04:00It wouldn't make sense to bring a robot to cou...<b> It wouldn't make sense to bring a robot to court and condemn it for committing a moral crime. It wouldn't make sense because the robot simply acted according to its inputs and had no choice to the contrary. </b><br /><br />Robots are programmed by human beings. Human beings make mistakes. Should we suspect a robot's programming resulted in the death of human beings, we'd have a very good reason to determine if it was the cause of these deaths. Perhaps it had bad data? Perhaps it was programmed to think doing x would result in y instead of z. Even when it observed this was not the case, it might not have the ability to update it's map of outcomes to correct for the descrepency. Perhaps it assumed there were only two options in a particular situation instead of 50, either of which would result in causing harm. However, had the robot been aware of other options, a non-lethal action would have been taken. <br /><br /><b>A thief could have chosen differently, but he decided to do what was wrong. In other words, he made a morally negative decision. </b><br /><br />If there was nothing that caused their decision to steal, then why did they choose anything at all? Surely, the thief's decision was due to a multitude of factors, including their perceived number of options given their current situation, their perceived happiness due to material gain, their perceived impact of their theft on others, etc. Otherwise, they'd be randomly choosing to steal. <br /><br /><b>Thus, unless we undermine the grounds of moral justice (that is to say, render moral justice meaningless), there must be an aspect of human beings which transcends the causal inputs and influences that nature has upon them. </b><br /><br />Cosmic moral justice or a sense of what is fair, along with punishment and protection?<br /><br /><b>Given determinism, how is that you provide a meaningful foundation for moral accountability? That is, if human beings are determined to act the way they do, how do we, say, hold a murderer morally accountable--after all, he couldn't have acted differently.</b><br /><br />What do you mean by accountable? What do we gain by saying someone is accountable? <br /><br />If people are free to choose evil despite what they know, believe and experience, then what do we gain by holding people accountable?<br /><br />Here, you seem to imply agency is having knowledge of what they should not do, but have the capacity to select that option regardless.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11193595678064010528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-43330660182772378252009-08-02T11:39:32.508-04:002009-08-02T11:39:32.508-04:00Hello Joel,
While I think we've made some pr...Hello Joel, <br /><br />While I think we've made some progress, I'm still unclear as to how God decides what is an free agent and what is not. What would prevent God from pointing to anything that makes choices and declaring it a free agent? <br /><br />Could God cause rocks to make free choices?<br /><br />You seem to be saying that you know agency when you see it, which would be based on observing the resulting choices after they were made. Or perhaps free agents are free merely because we treat them as if they were free agents or because God supposedly will judge them as if they made free choices?<br /><br />Many great apes share several behaviors with human beings. One example is that some apes would rather go hungry if receiving food directly resulting in causing another ape harm. In addition, some species of great apes recognize themeless in a mirror, while others do not. <br /><br />Could God have decided these apes were morally free agents, but chose not to? If we start holding apes morally accountable would this somehow cause them to become free agents? Or is there something intrinsically different between apes and human beings we could point to that can qualify whether a choice was actually free or not? <br /><br /><b>To speak in the simplest of terms, something that is determined is like a robot: it is programmed to act a certain way with certain inputs (from the programmer and the environment.) The robot itself cannot "choose" between two alternatives.</b><br /><br />If the robot did not choose between alternatives, then what did it do? What about a computer simulation that chooses between thousands of aircraft design variations to determine which would result in the least number of injuries or deaths given a wide range of crash scenarios?<br /><br /><b>Now, could the robot have selected differently than it did? Well, obviously not, given THOSE conditions and the robot's programming, it doesn't matter how long and hard the robot processed environmental factors: it could never have chosen vanilla. Indeed, given the total set of circumstances, it was physically impossible for the robot to choose vanilla.</b><br /><br />Ok, so what if after considering all input, the factors in favor for chocolate and vanilla is equal? Given that the alternate possibilities are such that both are not an option, the robot uses a random function to select one or the other. To be more efficient, the robot cached the results going forward. <br /><br />Was this a free choice? Would it not appear to be a free choice?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11193595678064010528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-39746339473058211902009-08-02T09:56:36.422-04:002009-08-02T09:56:36.422-04:00Hi Joel,
In the case I say something considered f...Hi Joel,<br /><br />In the case I say something considered false by my fellow skeptics, I will say that I speak for myself, here, and in general for any comments I make on this blog. As John says, "I could be wrong about some things", I'm a seeker of truth, and am open to be shown where I'm wrong.<br /><br />Now, as to your challenge, I guess I will have to admit that I am determined to think that the person was morally wrong for killing my children. Can I choose not to think that it was wrong? I do have the choice, but then what is it that makes me choose to accept that it is wrong?<br /><br />I do realize that you chose to use the words "for fun". But what if I chose to take revenge in my own hands and kill him in return. Would not my actions be considered morally wrong, yet was I also not determined in my reaction? <br /><br />Whether or not he chose to kill them for fun, my contention is, there is nothing that we do that is not determined. We cannot do anything that cannot be done, therefore it must be determined for us to do what we can do. So to kill "for fun", it still falls under determinism.<br /><br />Now, I would have chosen to kill him in the name of payback, but both cases are examples of the compatibility with certain types of free will and determinism. And this is also where the "approximate" accountability of our actions come in. There is no need to think that "Moral accountability loses meaning in a deterministic universe." We still have to punish and put away people that will jeopardize the well being of other citizens, because they do play a part in committing the crime or wrong doing, unless mental issues are involved. If you still feel the urge to ask why, just ask yourself if that isn't also determined.<br /><br />I would also like to add that since the object of this blog is Debunking Christianity, no matter what you or I conclude about this issue, I must point out then that there was no need for the God of the old and Jesus to react the way did towards us "human beings". Thus, such a God or gods are highly improbable. But I won't go too much into that as to not get too far off topic.<br /><br />I agree the discussion has been enjoyable.Ignerant Phoolhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13166860576010836032noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-12151414994359213532009-08-02T00:06:59.252-04:002009-08-02T00:06:59.252-04:00Andre,
I enjoyed the audio clip you posted. The ...Andre, <br /><br />I enjoyed the audio clip you posted. The idea of compatibilism which Clark eloquently presents is a very well known topic in the philosophical literature. And great minds come down on each side of the issue. The humble opinion that I've developed as I've studied this issue is that if one is to retain a belief in determinism, one is forced to speciously reformulate our intuitive understanding of moral accountability and duty. And this conclusion can be reached, I hope, by anyone who perspicuously studies the issue with integrity. <br /><br />Now, you state, "Yes, when one commits a crime, one should be punished based on 1) The freedom of the choice to go through with it, and 2) The level of the crime committed"<br /><br />I agree. But what kind of "freedom of choice to go through with it" is there on determinism? Like I said in a previous post, if we are determined, we are simply like robots. Given certain input, we have only one physically possible course of action. <br /><br />You state, "We can understand this better when we will admit no matter the crime, one of the first thing we do is to wonder why the wrong doing or "evil" is committed."<br /><br />Absolutely, and this provides good reason for promulgating moral education, etc. However, simply eliminating certain conditions that could lead to crime doesn't itself address the issue of moral accountability. If determinism is true, we can attempt to eliminate the "seeds" of crime, but this implies nothing about the moral status of crime itself. In fact, truth is, why even prevent crime at all? Let nature run its natural course, after all, if determinism is true, it MUST run it's natural course. <br /><br />At the risk of becoming too personal, I challenge you to respond to the following scenario. Suppose someone came into your house this evening and tortured and killed your children for fun. Has this person done anything morally wrong? if you are a determinist, attempting to answer this question positively with integrity is very difficult. If you believe in determinism, you are forced to conclude logically and inescapably that this man was no more morally culpable for killing children than a rock is morally culpable of dislodging from a cliff and hitting someone in the head. The man and the rock were both determined by causal laws to act in a single manner. Moral accountability loses meaning in a deterministic universe. And this is why, in all honesty, even if I were not a theist, I simply could not bring myself to believe in determinism. <br /><br />Enjoying the discussion.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00199007103169642063noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-91563865113695173472009-08-01T09:07:31.877-04:002009-08-01T09:07:31.877-04:00This comment has been removed by the author.Ignerant Phoolhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13166860576010836032noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-46042219455918612052009-08-01T09:03:40.692-04:002009-08-01T09:03:40.692-04:00Hello Joel,
As to the burden you placed on Scott,...Hello Joel,<br /><br />As to the burden you placed on Scott, I think a reasonable response can be heard here: http://www.pointofinquiry.org/tom_clark_scientific_naturalism_and_the_illusion_of_free_will/<br /><br />The key issue for me here is "approximate" accountability. Yes, when one commits a crime, one should be punished based on 1) The freedom of the choice to go through with it, and 2) The level of the crime committed. But what remains at the root of our actions are the determined factors. We did not choose to or necessarily want to become the way we are. Given the circumstances, conditions, environment, and experience during one's lifetime, it can force the individual to react in many different ways.<br /><br />We can understand this better when we will admit no matter the crime, one of the first thing we do is to wonder why the wrong doing or "evil" is committed. We ask ourselves and each other, "What could have caused the person to this?" I would like to think that nobody was born wanting to do the bad things they end up doing. We did not choose the mental or physical state we were/are born in.<br /><br />Having this understanding, was one of the reasons that led me to reject the teachings of Christianity 9 years ago. It became clear to me (even if I didn't make the point I wanted to make here more clearer, or whether you just don't agree) that the God of the bible, the authors, and Jesus had no idea about human behavior as we do here in the 21st century.<br /><br />Anyhow, what do I know. Hopefully you'll check the link and see what you think.Ignerant Phoolhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13166860576010836032noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-20371202147107501232009-07-31T00:57:48.497-04:002009-07-31T00:57:48.497-04:00Scott,
I believe you are very close to capturing...Scott, <br /><br />I believe you are very close to capturing my view (and I'm sure that any confusion is due to my inability to express ideas as cogently as I would like). <br /><br />Perhaps this encapsulates the theist's view: God creates humans who are moral agents. That is, they have the capability to choose between right and wrong, good and evil. Now, what does it mean to be able to choose? Now, since you and I are both very nit-picky with words, we need to realize this question is philosophically loaded. <br /><br />To speak in the simplest of terms, something that is determined is like a robot: it is programmed to act a certain way with certain inputs (from the programmer and the environment.) The robot itself cannot "choose" between two alternatives. It could not, say, truly choose between vanilla and chocolate icecream. Now, supposed, we had a very complex robot, so complex that it was programmed to take into account MANY factors concerning vanilla and chocolate icecream. Finally after taking all these factors into account, it selects chocolate. Now, could the robot have selected differently than it did? Well, obviously not, given THOSE conditions and the robot's programming, it doesn't matter how long and hard the robot processed environmental factors: it could never have chosen vanilla. Indeed, given the total set of circumstances, it was physically impossible for the robot to choose vanilla. <br /><br />However, it is very difficult to see how such a robot could be a moral agent in any meaningful sense. For example, we hold thieves morally culpable because they had a choice to steal or not steal, and they chose to steal. A thief could have chosen differently, but he decided to do what was wrong. In other words, he made a morally negative decision. Moral justice is founded on the ability for people to choose. It wouldn't make sense to bring a robot to court and condemn it for committing a moral crime. It wouldn't make sense because the robot simply acted according to its inputs and had no choice to the contrary. <br /><br />The important point is that if human beings are determined, then they are like very complex robots. Yes, there could be the "illusion" of choice, but humans would ultimately, like the robot in the court-example, be entirely determined. <br /><br />Thus, unless we undermine the grounds of moral justice (that is to say, render moral justice meaningless), there must be an aspect of human beings which transcends the causal inputs and influences that nature has upon them. They must be free to choose at least in some non-deterministic sense. And this aspect of human beings theists call "agency." And it is the notion of agency which provides the foundation for ability to freely choose, and it is the ability to freely choose which establishes the basis for moral justice. <br /><br />I hope this serves to clarify what is meant in the discussion. Now, I am going place some of the burden on you. Given determinism, how is that you provide a meaningful foundation for moral accountability? That is, if human beings are determined to act the way they do, how do we, say, hold a murderer morally accountable--after all, he couldn't have acted differently. So, how is that you provide a basis for moral justice within a deterministic view?Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00199007103169642063noreply@blogger.com