tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post5592257163772623500..comments2023-12-01T18:05:24.875-05:00Comments on Debunking Christianity: On Plantinga's Ontological ArgumentUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger29125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-86444277057094149092009-01-21T03:36:00.000-05:002009-01-21T03:36:00.000-05:00D'oh! Duly fixed. Thanks for pointing that out.D'oh! Duly fixed. Thanks for pointing that out.Darrinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12757150483103267411noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-68113832549189903692009-01-20T23:09:00.000-05:002009-01-20T23:09:00.000-05:00"any infinite sum, when the elements of the sum ar..."any infinite sum, when the elements of the sum are reordered to the effect that the first term is greatest, the second term is at most the value of the first, the third at most the value of the second, etc., then the limit of the terms themselves must be zero as we tend toward infinity"<BR/><BR/> Um, for some constant a let S(n)=a+10^(-n)<BR/><BR/> for example, let a be 5. you have an infinite, monotonic decreasing sequence as follows: 5.1, 5.01, 5.001, 5.0001, ...<BR/> which certainly does not converge to zero.svenjaminhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09843201972958214387noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-67933619012663044472009-01-20T13:58:00.000-05:002009-01-20T13:58:00.000-05:00How can the same being exist in every logically po...How can the same being exist in every logically possible world?<BR/><BR/>Is there a logically possible world where this god is called Baal, not Yahweh?<BR/><BR/>Or would Baal be a different god to Yahweh, and not the same god?<BR/><BR/>Can the same being exist in all logically possible world if it has different properties in different worlds?Steven Carrhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11983601793874190779noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-25960548356489041302009-01-20T12:50:00.000-05:002009-01-20T12:50:00.000-05:00From the extremely Wikipedia knowledge of S5 I now...From the extremely Wikipedia knowledge of S5 I now have, doesn't the argument actually beg the question at hand?Darrinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12757150483103267411noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-84206284511824328802009-01-20T11:32:00.000-05:002009-01-20T11:32:00.000-05:00(Note that if Plantinga's argument is construed in...(Note that if Plantinga's argument is construed in a logically valid way, it becomes a trivial restatement of S5.)Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-46823766465178431712009-01-20T09:48:00.000-05:002009-01-20T09:48:00.000-05:00To be honest, I just don't understand why Planting...To be honest, I just don't understand why Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument is taken seriously by professional philosophers. The metaphysical quibbling over possible worlds, omni-whatnot and excellence is beside the point: the argument is simply <I>logically invalid</I>.<BR/><BR/>An ordinary person can be forgiven for not spotting the invalidity, but professional philosophers are supposed to be <I>experts</I> at formal logical reasoning. Critiquing Plantinga's argument on metaphysical grounds is like critiquing the choice of materials for plumbing a house without noticing that the plumber has failed to install U-traps on the drains.Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-36108607888275507262009-01-20T09:10:00.000-05:002009-01-20T09:10:00.000-05:00I had a couple of thoughts on this. Firstly, is hi...I had a couple of thoughts on this. <BR/>Firstly, is his argument that it is possible for God to exist, it is not possible that he doesn't exist?<BR/>Secondly, can it be re-phrased to argue for the opposite conclusion?<BR/>1. It is possible that no maximally great being exists.<BR/>2. If it is possible that no maximally great being exists, then there must be some possible world in which no maximally great being exists.<BR/>3. If there is a possible world with no maximally great being, then he cannot exist in any possible world<BR/>4. If he does not exist in any possible world, he cannot exist in the real world.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-11844754804995864322009-01-20T07:41:00.000-05:002009-01-20T07:41:00.000-05:00The wording of that first premiss has always irked...The wording of that first premiss has always irked me. Why isn't it written such that you don't have to turn your brain inside out to get it: God is that entity greater than which nothing can be conceived?<BR/><BR/>Just blowing off steam. As you were.mikespeirhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05397674737999065117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-64286633257518359422009-01-19T18:29:00.000-05:002009-01-19T18:29:00.000-05:00Perhaps I turned it off in an effort to ensure tha...<I>Perhaps I turned it off in an effort to ensure that mankind has free will. </I><BR/><BR/>Right. I have the ability to do whatever I want and know whatever I ask, I just choose to not use it. Nothing wrong with that.<BR/><BR/>Unless I'm also supposed to be omnibenevolent, then things get messier. Not using my powers doesn't make me very benevolent. Actually it kind of makes me a callous jerk.Adrianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08694840174170043470noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-59906418754944856162009-01-19T14:44:00.000-05:002009-01-19T14:44:00.000-05:00Steven - sure. since a world can be possible, in ...Steven - sure. since a world can be possible, in a hypothetical way that has no relationship to reality, you can make it be whatever way you want. Toss in some mathematical-style logical arguments, and you can obscure the point that none of the argument maps onto reality. As soon as Plantiga can show that any one of these possible worlds has an actual (as opposed to a conceptual) existence, then we might take his arguments more seriously than mental masturbation. And that doesn't even take care of his other flaws that some have mentioned.<BR/><BR/>Seriously, just put the word "I" in place of the god part of the argument, and you can show that you, in fact, are God. Since it is possible that I exist in all possible, worlds, and that in one of them I am maximally greatest (which therefore means that I am that way in all possibilities somehow), this means that I am God, but for some reason I don't have my power and knowledge now. Perhaps I turned it off in an effort to ensure that mankind has free will.Badger3khttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04008838430274720250noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-85839889479040115232009-01-19T14:31:00.000-05:002009-01-19T14:31:00.000-05:00Does a maximally great being exist in every logica...<I>Does a maximally great being exist in every logically possible world,including worlds that contain vast amounts of pointless suffering? </I><BR/><BR/>I think that's in part two of Plantinga's argument. He's demonstrated that an omni-max God must exist everywhere if it's possible for a God to exist anywhere, so now we can conclude that since an omni-max God doesn't exist in our universe it must be <B>impossible</B> for such a God to exist anywhere.<BR/><BR/>Look for it in his upcoming series "More of God's Greatest Mistakes", "Just Who Is this God Person Anyway?" and "Well, That Just About Wraps it Up for God."Adrianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08694840174170043470noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-6877916556441673992009-01-19T13:53:00.000-05:002009-01-19T13:53:00.000-05:00I'm confused.Does a maximally great being exist in...I'm confused.<BR/><BR/><BR/>Does a maximally great being exist in every logically possible world,including worlds that contain vast amounts of pointless suffering?Steven Carrhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11983601793874190779noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-91029151357961588582009-01-19T13:03:00.000-05:002009-01-19T13:03:00.000-05:00Barefoot Bum has it right. I also think, though, ...Barefoot Bum <A HREF="http://rustbeltphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/01/two-ontological-arguments-warning-long.html" REL="nofollow">has it right</A>. I also think, though, that it's a bit unfair to cast maximal greatness as numerical: being maximally great in a world Wx is explicitly not a matter of having the largest greatness value in that world.<BR/><BR/>Consider, for instance, a godless world that nonetheless has one entity - call it a person just for the sake of naming it - that's more powerful, knowing, and moral than any other entity in that world. For Plantinga (and Craig, if he's using the same kind of argument), that person would just be the greatest in that world, not maximally great. While maximal greatness implies being greater than some number of other things (whenever other things exist, that is), being greater than other things is not in any sense a necessary condition of maximal greatness in this sense: as you yourself say, in the (hypothetical) world with nothing but God in it, God is still maximally great despite having a greatness factor of 0. Whatever numerical oddities you can produce, then, just reinforce the idea that greatness can't sensibly be talked about numerically.Elihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03543293341085230171noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-57359413938599516012009-01-19T10:42:00.000-05:002009-01-19T10:42:00.000-05:00Darrin,I would have to disagree that Craig and Pla...Darrin,<BR/><BR/><I>I would have to disagree that Craig and Plantinga are intellectually dishonest. I haven't seen as much of Plantinga as I have Craig, but I know Bill, and I see nothing roguish in the man's behavior or studies whatsoever. :) </I><BR/><BR/>They are both intelligent, learned and well-read but their (apologetic) papers contain fundamental logical/procedural flaws. Since they've managed to publish and achieve some respect within the community, perhaps these are indicative of a deplorable lack of standards within Apologetics or theology and Craig and Plantinga are merely prominent examples.<BR/><BR/>Within the scientific community, I think "intellectually dishonest" would be a mild criticism. So what would you call someone who publishes papers which lacks rigour, fails to define his terms, assumes what he tries to prove and fails to validate his assumptions? (Besides "a theologian" I mean :) )<BR/><BR/><BR/>BTW: I do like the limit examples. When I see maximum, I immediately think about limits and infinite series. The way it's phrased, "benevolence" appears to be a single-value or attribute but I suspect it's actually a function of many values: compassion, empathy, charity, equality, altruism, self-sacrifice, etc. I also suspect that there are bound to be trade-offs between the different traits. For instance, to be charitable requires taking food/money/resources from one person and giving it to another. If you give everything you own then you will die and so be less effective than someone who lives; if you rely on donations or taxes then to your donors you are a drain and not a help. I would also bet that there is a staggering amount of species-ism under the surface which is going unexplored. The focus is always on caring for humans but beetles are more numerous and have more species diversity yet no one ever thinks that to be maximally benevolent a person must show as much compassion towards beetles as to humans. Might an omni-benevolent being kill humans in order to preserve the last members of an endangered species of tree frogs? Sounds horrible but we don't blink at the thought of an omni-benevolent being killing a malaria-carrying mosquito. Even if we found some self-serving rationale why an omni-benevolent being would care only for humans, there is such diversity of opinion that there will be humans who will feel upset, oppressed or neglected for the same reasons we see when we consider different species.<BR/><BR/>It may be that there is one (or many) ways of maximizing your benevolence through different combinations of these traits but it will definitely be a trade-off and there will be people who will think this person/entity isn't such hot stuff. I would bet that if they had the, well, let's say "courage" to properly explore these questions they would see that "maximally great" wouldn't be omni-anything but rather very-. Very smart, very powerful, very benevolent. We say "omnipotent" but what exactly would this be? If it means "do whatever I imagine, poof, magic" then that's clearly impossible. It's left the continuum of "powerful" and is no longer a function which we can maximize. It would have to be pooffed into existence by magic. Perhaps maximally powerful actually means able to do work with the theoretical minimum of energy loss. A 5000 mpg car may be maximally powerful, say. If this is the case, there is no reason to think that a maximally powerful or efficient car must exist in all possible worlds. It isn't omni-powerful, just maximally powerful.<BR/><BR/><BR/>When you break it down into the details, "maximally great" loses the halo and blind adoration which P/C use to turn "him" into "Him" and argue He exists in every possible world.Adrianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08694840174170043470noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-28049270089186078262009-01-19T04:19:00.000-05:002009-01-19T04:19:00.000-05:00>> William of Baskerville First of all, I wa...>> William of Baskerville <BR/><BR/>First of all, I want to thank you for your consideration of my post and for your scholarship and input into this topic. My response to several points you raised follows, with your original text separated by bars. <BR/><BR/>//I'm afraid that the summary version of the ontological argument, as presented in the Wikipedia (your evident source for it), is neither historically nor conceptually very precise.// <BR/><BR/>Thanks for raising the objection. I think I understand what you mean in the discussion that follows: http://www.princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/phi203/ontological.html<BR/><BR/>If the presentation in that paper captures Anselm's original meaning better than the Wikipedia presentation, I will edit my post to include that presentation (as opposed to Wikipedia's). In the meantime, I have included in my documentation that the presentation is quite possibly not correct. I have also included your commentary in my citation of your work, so that your authored views are represented more clearly to readers here. <BR/><BR/>I should note that I think my example inherently demonstrates that imagining the existence of 'x' is not necessarily greater than or equal to the actual existence of 'x.' One can imagine an alien ship about to destroy the Earth, but if this ship necessarily exists, I think it would be a bad thing. Perhaps my understanding is more fundamentally flawed, however. <BR/><BR/>//I love the way you try to play the same dramatics with Plantinga's ontological argument. If you can find a hole in it, so much the worse for all other versions of the argument. That's pretty dicey isn't it?//<BR/><BR/>Actually, you're quite right. Just because my opinion that Plantinga's presentation is the most challenging Ontological Argument possible doesn't mean that it defeats those I find less challenging, or that it defeats some other forms in the literature which my comments here do not address. <BR/><BR/>In accordance, I've changed the post to strictly state that this defeats Plantinga's version of the argument, as per my opinion. <BR/><BR/>//And doesn't it get even scarier if that's the approach you use to make the case for the non-demonstrability of God's existence simpliciter? I'm less sure than you are that you have demolished a particular argument by finding a hole in one version you have selected, let alone that doing so takes you on the way to demonstrating the non-existence of God.// <BR/><BR/>Please be very careful here! My post specifically states that I cannot reach the existence of God via the Ontological Argument. Perhaps in my studies I would find that the Kalam Cosmological Argument works, that the book by N.T. Wright about Christ's Resurrection is solid, that Shabir Ally's Islamic theology is convincing, or the Dalai Lama's works on spirituality are sound. Like Anthony Flew, I would change my mind with little care for the consequences. Until then, I hold to nontheism, since I have not seen any proof that works. <BR/><BR/>I don't think there's anything in my post cheering on that I've made the case against God easier in any way, as you claim. The Ontological Argument is not a widely accepted argument, and, as I mentioned, even Bill Craig marginalizes it in the last few pages of the last chapter on his proofs for God. <BR/><BR/>Even given the assumption that I've set out to prove the impossibility of establishing God's existence, I've done no more than kick an extra point, since something like the Teleological or Moral Arguments are more widely used and accepted. But I am not here to do that. I am here as a skeptic analyzing the arguments for God as critically as I can, correcting and changing what mistakes I make when people comment on my posts, and then reaching the most sound conclusion possible. <BR/><BR/>//This has absolutely nothing to do with assigning numbers to greatness distributed over the available number of logically possible worlds. There is an issue here, but it has to do with the different versions of modal systems one can use in constructing or evaluating an argument.// <BR/><BR/>On the contrary: I am quite familiar with the objection, but I left it alone because I am not qualified to evaluate the validity of his chosen version of modal logic. It's been at least a decade since I've seen formal philosophical logic back in my undergrad days. <BR/><BR/>However, I submit that the incoherency of the methodology used to establish the inductive premise, as given by Plantinga and reviewed by Mr. Mears paper (listed in my citiations at the end), renders this premise faulty apart from the need to analyze the logical axiomatic assumptions underlying Plantinga's case for this premise. Although challenging Plantinga's modal axioms may be an easier route, I would invite you (not being snarky here!) to present a criticism that the mathematical approach that I and Mears took is by necessity irrelevant to the premise. <BR/><BR/>//What I'm getting at is this: As you are working through your project of "debunking Christianity," please make sure that you're not doing so at the cost of creditable scholarship.// <BR/><BR/>What's so odd is that I'm likely the single blogger here who is not writing to debunk Christianity, but to give as much of a definitive presentation of my critiques of theistic arguments as I can here on this blog. Many DC posters and perhaps a few constant readers know this. <BR/><BR/>The only versions of Christianity I'd ever set out to debunk are those which hold to theonomy or dominionism, something that even other Christians (such as Spurgeon) have attempted. I may post about those particular Christian worldviews in the future, but the majority of my posts here are directed toward the existence of God, which is one of the most important questions one can ponder. Although one may find it easier to simply believe, I weigh the metaphysical more than the epistemological, and the more important the question is in a metaphysical sense, the more critical my approach will be. <BR/><BR/>In the given context of my current knowledge, I maintain that I am still unconvinced. <BR/><BR/>// I have always said that if Christianity is true it should be able to withstand the hardest legitimate questions. Shouldn't the same criterion apply to a non-Christian world view? // <BR/><BR/>Of course it should! John and I didn't spend hundreds of dollars, nearly a week of our lives, and 3000+ miles driving to the Providence Apologetics Conference and meeting with people like Craig, Habermas, and Copan for the purpose of bragging or laughing at Christianity, you know. ;) <BR/><BR/>My scholarship in some particular subjects requires more reading and thought, admittedly. But those subjects which I am more qualified to present are posted here, with as much honesty to scholarship and dedication to discovering the truth as my mind allows. My friend John has graciously provided me with an opportunity to post my more thorough writings here despite any difference in ultimate purpose. The greatest result, to me, is an opportunity to view criticisms from both Christian and non-Christian worldviews alike in these commentaries, since this blog is out there to be read by scholars such as yourself. <BR/><BR/>I don't approach the believer's half of my library or all the archived debates here on the Internet with the predisposition of "I'm gonna destroy this!" I used to have that notion, and it led me to stop reading any sort of scholarly work, and if it weren't for honest people on both sides of the question knocking my skull about it, I'd be on one of Dawkins' buses thinking Robert Ingersoll did it all, not here begging for critiques of my work. <BR/><BR/>Yes, sometimes I err in my presentation of the scholarship, but I correct myself when I do. I've misrepresented nontheistic scholarship here before, too. But that's typically from a misstep in understanding the arguments or from a bit of sloppiness en route to a main point, not from any deliberate noncritical quote-mining used for the effect of dressing up some uncritical predisposition of mine with an appearance of scholarly citation. The important question of God's existence doesn't deserve that. <BR/><BR/>I look forward to the criticism more than the compliments - finding the facts is why I'm here. ;)Darrinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12757150483103267411noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-32235534901519394802009-01-19T02:10:00.000-05:002009-01-19T02:10:00.000-05:00>>TyroThanks for the commentary. I mentioned...>>Tyro<BR/><BR/>Thanks for the commentary. I mentioned in the paper that Plantinga has clearly not defined a means by which one is to quantify excellence in a particular world. Perhaps he has in other works, but I have neither seen nor heard of any numerical gauge used. I proposed a gauge in my paper, however. <BR/><BR/>I would have to disagree that Craig and Plantinga are intellectually dishonest. I haven't seen as much of Plantinga as I have Craig, but I know Bill, and I see nothing roguish in the man's behavior or studies whatsoever. :)Darrinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12757150483103267411noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-39871847536415588812009-01-19T02:01:00.000-05:002009-01-19T02:01:00.000-05:00>>Barefoot Bum Nice analysis. I especially e...>>Barefoot Bum <BR/><BR/>Nice analysis. I especially enjoyed the first comment. :)Darrinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12757150483103267411noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-89072155467167860772009-01-19T01:43:00.000-05:002009-01-19T01:43:00.000-05:00>> John It looks like Hick jumped my "F...>> John <BR/><BR/>It looks like Hick jumped my "Fred Sanford" example in my paper. He's correct of course. <BR/><BR/>And bah. Every time I think I got something original, I find someone else has already cooked it up. I gotta keep on reading =)Darrinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12757150483103267411noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-63992212736477596472009-01-19T01:41:00.000-05:002009-01-19T01:41:00.000-05:00>> Damian That's not quite a rewording o...>> Damian <BR/><BR/>That's not quite a rewording of the argument, according to Plantinga et. al. They would counter at point #3, more than likely, since it is logically possible on-the-face that a world exists with a blue sky. <BR/><BR/>Some logical workings in your presentation are akin to the "desert island refutation" objections that I wrote in regards to Craig and Plantinga.Darrinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12757150483103267411noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-66441133284497837782009-01-18T18:47:00.000-05:002009-01-18T18:47:00.000-05:00William of Baskerville,"I have always said that if...William of Baskerville,<BR/><BR/>"I have always said that if Christianity is true it should be able to withstand the hardest legitimate questions. Shouldn't the same criterion apply to a non-Christian world view?"<BR/><BR/>I'm not entirely sure why I do, but I do have some serious problems with this statement.<BR/><BR/>First, you are assuming that the claims of the existence of a Christian god are on equal footing as a positive claim with a default position that there is no such god or gods. Yes, your claim should be able to withstand the hardest legitimate questions, and if it cannot, then it is not a legitimate claim. <BR/><BR/>The end. <BR/><BR/>Of course, if we cannot say for sure whether or not there is a Christian god, just because no one has proved that there isn't one, that does not mean that there is one!<BR/><BR/>It appears to me that you are assuming that unless someone can prove that there is no Christian god, then your claims are credible. If this is not the case, please tell me what you meant when you said "shouldn't the same criterion apply to a non-Christian worldview?". Thanks.Teleprompterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13014919684351529479noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-21576095220125302812009-01-18T17:30:00.000-05:002009-01-18T17:30:00.000-05:00I agree with most of the above analysis and I agre...I agree with most of the above analysis and I agree that Plantinga's argument fails for a multitude of reasons. Even he doesn't quite accept the conclusion of his own argument, as Beachbum points out in entry on the subject.<BR/><BR/>However, I tend to agree more with the classical objections with Geisler. There is no logical contradiction inherent in assenting to the proposition "God does not exist" as logic (in-and-of itself) makes no positive existential claims without entering existential premises. It is for this reason that we can enter the premise:<BR/><BR/>'It is logically possible that a maximally great God exists' <BR/>or <BR/>'It is logically possible that a maximally great God does not exist', <BR/><BR/>yielding contradictory conclusions from premises that both seem relatively harmless at first glance and both of which seem to be able to be justified in ways similar to Craig's method.<BR/><BR/>In order for Plantinga's argument to be successful, he must instead talk about metaphysical possibility. He must be able to state as a metaphysical fact that it is possible that a maximally great God exists in some possible world. That is, there exists (modally speaking) a metaphysically possible world in which a maximally great God exists. But this is a positive existential claim which I would love to see demonstrated. Such a demonstration would require the entering of an existential premise and metaphysical principles. He must be able to conclude that there is no metaphysically possible world in which a maximally great God fails to exist, which is a mighty claim.<BR/><BR/>The metaphysical problem boils down to this:<BR/><BR/>1) If it is possible that a maximally great God exists, then a maximally great God exists.<BR/><BR/>1*) If it is possible that a maximally great God does not exist, then a maximally great God does not exist.<BR/><BR/>But this is virtually identical to the kinds of things that the Ontological Arguments of the past have claimed. Without a grounding in metaphysical fact, the argument makes the mistake of conflating conceivability with metaphysical possibility. For these reasons, I just don't see Plantinga's argument as much of an improvement over the other modal arguments given by Hartshorne and Malcolm.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-49369918677896313292009-01-18T17:26:00.000-05:002009-01-18T17:26:00.000-05:00Dear Darrin and readers,Thanks for the reference t...Dear Darrin and readers,<BR/>Thanks for the reference to Norm Geisler's and my principle of the contingency of all finite entities in the universe. Of course, I'm not sure we mean it in the same sense as Hume did, but it's always nice to see it when people realize that there is an unspoken assumption underlying the ontological argument, namely that something exists. <BR/>I'm afraid that the summary version of the ontological argument, as presented in the Wikipedia (your evident source for it), is neither historically nor conceptually very precise. The first descriptor, <I>aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest</I> does not use the word "entity" (<I>ens</I>), which Anselm deliberately avoided. I'm intentionally stating the Latin so that people can see how much we frequently import into Anselm's very carefully chosen phrases. That sentence is the opening premise of the supposed "first" argument by Anselm, whose decisive criterion is the distinction between the lesser greatness of existing in the mind alone and the greater greatness of existing both in the mind and reality. It is impossible to understand this distinction without a willingness to immerse yourself into an ancient form of metaphysics and see where this notion comes from before attempting a creditable criticism of it. There is nothing about "necessary existence" in the first argument. <BR/>The notion of "necessary existence" emerges in the second argument, which is based on the inconceivability of the nonexistence of whatever is insurpassible in its being. This observation would apply even if we did not care to apply the term "God" to it, and, in fact, Anselm intentionally works up to why it should be called "God" subsequently. Here all we get is <I>Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. </I> Then, the next sentence heads a long section deriving the attributes of God from this "necessary being." <BR/>In <I>God and Other Minds</I>, Plantinga picked one particular version of the cosmological argument, called it the <I>locus classicus</I>, shot a noisy blank at it, and declared it to be dead. I love the way you try to play the same dramatics with Plantinga's ontological argument. If you can find a hole in it, so much the worse for all other versions of the argument. That's pretty dicey isn't it? And doesn't it get even scarier if that's the approach you use to make the case for the non-demonstrability of God's existence <I>simpliciter</I>? I'm less sure than you are that you have demolished a particular argument by finding a hole in one version you have selected, let alone that doing so takes you on the way to demonstrating the non-existence of God.<BR/><BR/>I'm also disappointed to see that you are unaware as to the meaning of Plantinga's premise that "if this maximally great being exists in some logically possible world, He exists in all possible worlds, including our actual one." This has absolutely nothing to do with assigning numbers to greatness distributed over the available number of logically possible worlds. There is an issue here, but it has to do with the different versions of modal systems one can use in constructing or evaluating an argument. Planting is consciously accepting a system called "S5," which allows the premise to stand, but other systems, e.g. "T," "B," and "S4" would not allow that premise. <BR/>What I'm getting at is this: As you are working through your project of "debunking Christianity," please make sure that you're not doing so at the cost of creditable scholarship. For many years, I and other teachers of Christian apologetics have tried to impress on our students that they need to study hard in order to make a solid case for the truth of Christianity, though I'm afraid we haven't always been successful. However, essays such as the one you posted appear to demonstrate that neither is it necessary. What use is solid Christian scholarship if non-Christians write essays such as the one you posted that make scholarship unnecessary? I have always said that if Christianity is true it should be able to withstand the hardest legitimate questions. Shouldn't the same criterion apply to a non-Christian world view? <BR/>Thanks again for the reference. Have a good day.<BR/>WinWilliam of Baskervillehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17303678585018736753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-38220537968472240592009-01-18T15:57:00.000-05:002009-01-18T15:57:00.000-05:00I read a book, "Classical Apologetics" by Sproul e...I read a book, "Classical Apologetics" by Sproul et. al., which raised some interesting points.<BR/><BR/>One, the ontological argument proves that we can only think of perfect being as existing. To argue against it, we first have to prove that we can think in another way.<BR/><BR/>Second, it is impossible for us to define the alternative to being: nothing. As soon as we say what nothing is (!), we have made it something. <BR/><BR/>I commend that book's discussion of this argument.J. K. Joneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02329537522697826005noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-84008526909315542152009-01-18T11:26:00.000-05:002009-01-18T11:26:00.000-05:00Talking about maxima and minima and omni- qualitie...Talking about maxima and minima and omni- qualities are well suited to mathematics but I have a hard time believing that they have any relevance to real-world beings.<BR/><BR/>What does it mean for any being to be omnibenevolent or omniscient? How could we tell if we thought we'd found an omni being?<BR/><BR/>Why does Craig/Plantinga think that a maximally anything being exists? How could it evolve? How could even a stepwise process of refinement (which evolution is not!) ever achieve maximality? We may be able to conceive of "omniscience" in abstract but what reason do we have to think it's possible for any being to ever achieve this?<BR/><BR/>It sounds like this argument assumes that God is omni-everything, that God can exist and that God must exist and uses this to conclude that God does exist for surely the only way to side-step around these vital issues is to just say that this omni entity is "necessary" and thus dodge any responsibility for demonstrating how it arose.<BR/><BR/>Yet what is "necessary"? I've only taken a couple years of physics in University and read some pop physics science but I've never seen any physics theory using any necessary being. Why is it that only armchair theologists talk about what's necessary for the universe in puffy, ill-defined terms and the people that actually understand our physical cosmological theories do not? Could this "necessary" being not be necessary after all?<BR/><BR/>In my philosophy courses we would frequently prove theories to be wrong by starting with a set of assumptions and then deriving a contradiction. I see a lot of potential contradictions here. Perhaps the only thing that the ontological argument demonstrates is that the premises are false and that it is not possible that a maximally great being exists.<BR/><BR/>Another thing I see in the sciences is a nearly obsessive effort to disprove one's own theories. When Penzias and Wilson first encountered radio noise they could not explain they did not publish and claim a great discovery though they must have thought about it. Instead they did everything they could to account for all other explanations they could think of, even the wildly improbable. In one case they thought it might be caused by pigeon droppings even though this was a long shot but they put in the time and effort to clean the droppings and eventually shot all the pigeons. They published only when they could stand up in front of a crowd of hostile, informed colleagues and present, knowing they had thought of everything that might undermine their theory.<BR/><BR/>I don't see even a glimmer of this sort of intellectual honesty from Plantinga or Craig. Everything is abstract as if it were referring to some mathematical domain yet this is never specified and they actually act like this represents the real world yet they haven't provided the first step towards verifying their ideas. My second year math professor would give this a fail (and my philosophy prof wouldn't touch it) so why does this pass with high honours in theology?Adrianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08694840174170043470noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-13697033503700451622009-01-18T08:58:00.000-05:002009-01-18T08:58:00.000-05:00I'll confess too that my brain has a hard time com...I'll confess too that my brain has a hard time comprehending the formal logic and math as well. However, the way Damian put the argument made it easier for me to understand it.Stephaniehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13623622575394014759noreply@blogger.com