tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post113778069654694834..comments2023-12-01T18:05:24.875-05:00Comments on Debunking Christianity: The Christian Illusion of Moral SuperiorityUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger24125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-64333300899611619752009-02-06T00:08:00.000-05:002009-02-06T00:08:00.000-05:00The realization just came to me that this post is ...The realization just came to me that this post is three years old and does not warrant a response for my comment. Nevertheless, I would like to make an additional point to further the basis of the above assertion.<BR/><BR/>The Old Testament provide additional evidence that supports a Biblical view that Christians and atheists should not differ in their sense of right and wrong, but have equal access to the same moral and ethical standards by which to live by. According to the Bible, people acquire access to these morals not by divine revelation, nor by supernatural or spiritual realization, but by listening closely to their understanding of what is right and wrong and what is good and evil or simply by thinking! <BR/><BR/>Proverbs 8:1-4 states the following:<BR/><BR/>"Does not wisdom call? Does not understanding raise her voice? On the heights beside the way, at the crossroads she takes her stand; beside the gates in front of the town, at the entrance of the portals she cries aloud. To you, O men, I call and my cry is for the children of man."<BR/><BR/>Wisdom is based on the understanding of basic commonly known morals and, using this basis, to discern and apply these set of morals to everyday situations. Solomon directed these proverbs not to just the Jewish people, but toward all the "children of man". The visit of Queen of Sheba attests to this acknowledgment of a wisdom shared not by the Jewish people alone but by peoples of different cultures. And he also says that wisdom can be heard anywhere, whether you are walking down the street or entering the city gates. Basically, Solomon is saying that any person anywhere at anytime has access to the same set of moral and ethical standards. It is just a matter of listening, figuratively, but of simply thinking, pondering and understanding, literally.Markhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13557137754537110808noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-61237148187046399142009-02-03T01:18:00.000-05:002009-02-03T01:18:00.000-05:00That translation of Romans 2:14-16 is confusing. ...That translation of Romans 2:14-16 is confusing. Here is hopefully a less confusing translation of the verse. <BR/><BR/><BR/>"When Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse them on that day when, according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus.Markhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13557137754537110808noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-79819009489726398292009-02-03T00:28:00.000-05:002009-02-03T00:28:00.000-05:00The Bible does not seem to agree with the view tha...The Bible does not seem to agree with the view that Christians have a superior moral standard or that atheists have a lack of or an inferior sense of morality, whether most Christians believe it or not. On the other hand, the Bible completely agrees with your view that all people, whether or not they have had a divine connection to or revelation from God regarding morality, do have a sense of what is right and wrong.<BR/><BR/>The story of Adam and Eve, whether to be taken literally or not, accounts for an explanation when our supposed ancestors ate from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. From that point on, every human was endowed with this knowledge, and so whether through "random accident" we were raised in India with Hinduism, or raised in China during the time of Confucianism, or as a native American Indian before the Europeans took over, we all have a basic understanding of what is good or evil, which may explain the reasons for the similarities in moral standards and lessons on ethics among not only the many various religions that exist in the world and throughout history but also among cultures in general.<BR/><BR/>Paul also makes reference to this knowledge or "concscience" as we call it. In his letter to the Romans, he says the following: <BR/><BR/>"for when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do the things in the law, these, although not having the law, are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and between themselves their thoughts accusing or else excusing them) in the day when God will judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ, according to my gospel."<BR/>Romans 2:14-16<BR/><BR/>These people that Paul are referring to are people who have not heard the gospel, nor the "law" as written by the Jews, nor had any explicit revelation from God regarding morality. These people have simply, according to Paul, obeyed a unwritten, not even verbal, "moral standard", according to their conscience. This knowledge of a "moral standard" (or the "moral standard", which begs another a question) is inherent, internal, and present within a person, as it seems Paul indirectly describes it. So, the judgment of a person's life is according to this knowledge of good and evil (or "conscience") and how we act and react in accordance to this knowledge (or "conscience", I will reiterate again). Hey, maybe there's a chance for unbelievers according to the Christian world view! Better listen to our consciences....<BR/><BR/>Please respond. Thanks.Markhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13557137754537110808noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-41889647288355709082007-04-20T01:36:00.000-04:002007-04-20T01:36:00.000-04:00Aristotle uses "that which we wish for on its own ...Aristotle uses "that which we wish for on its own account" to describe eudaimonia (happiness, though the term in English does not mean the same as in Greek) as an empirical observation. Much of what he describes are empirical results from looking at people, as Aristotle meant for his ethics to be practical, above all.<BR/><BR/>Very nice treatment of the Euthyphro dilemma, btw, John.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-62446201412202358082007-03-20T10:59:00.000-04:002007-03-20T10:59:00.000-04:00don't you think that anyway the christian moral is...don't you think that anyway the christian moral is not defined ?<BR/><BR/>Ask a christian to give you the specific list of the rules to follow.<BR/><BR/>Ask him why there are 3 different 10 commandments<BR/><BR/>Ask him why he retain exodus 20 and not 21 (where there is slavery ...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-11933814572797170482007-02-02T10:13:00.000-05:002007-02-02T10:13:00.000-05:00John, so did one of my team:
http://christianskep...John, so did one of my team:<br /><br />http://christianskepticism.blogspot.com/2007/01/euthyphros-dilemma.htmloddXianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15427095709766850092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1147987264247999722006-05-18T17:21:00.000-04:002006-05-18T17:21:00.000-04:00John,I commented on the euthyphro dilemma here for...John,<BR/><BR/>I commented on the euthyphro dilemma here for you --><BR/><BR/>http://calvindude.com/dude/blog/2006/05/the-euthyphro-dilemma/Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1139024046958103792006-02-03T22:34:00.000-05:002006-02-03T22:34:00.000-05:00John,Woah there.I was going to write a longer post...John,<BR/><BR/>Woah there.<BR/>I was going to write a longer post adresing the fact that he might be using a "wholistic" definition of happiness (which was what I assumed initialy because that was how I could force the sentance to make sense) but if that was not how you understood it then I would have just confused the discussion so I opted for the track using the normal definition of happiness.<BR/><BR/>Anyway I determined that my point 1 was not dependant on any specific definition (unless your definition is meaningless - which I figured I could tackle if that arose) - so I said it anyway.<BR/><BR/>basically two things<BR/>1) a wide definition of hapiness that resembles "any end which we wish for on its own account" reduces the statement to a tautology. <BR/>and <BR/>2) I think there are more fundimental ways to understand how minds work than this - but I'm really likely to get off track if I try to explain that.<BR/><BR/>Anyway off to read some aristotle as commanded.......<BR/><BR/>--------<BR/><BR/>Rigtio.. done<BR/>Basically as I first guessed<BR/>Lucky I read fast. <BR/><BR/>Rightio off to the beach now.Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1139014688111953792006-02-03T19:58:00.000-05:002006-02-03T19:58:00.000-05:00Me personally, I don't think there's any good acco...Me personally, I don't think there's any good account of the foundations of morality. I don't think one can be given, because I'm an anti-realist about morality. (If you want a good introduction to the issues from the realist perspective, I'd check out Russ Shafer-Landau's <I>Moral Realism: a Defense</I>.)<BR/><BR/>But I doubt it's just morality's problem. I think the same problems plague prudential norms, means-end norms, epistemic norms, anything with normativity in it.<BR/><BR/>In any case, I find it quite farcical when Christian apologists to blithely assert the superiority of theism as a foundation for morality, without even addressing the must basic, 2400-year old problem with the view.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1139011220052023552006-02-03T19:00:00.000-05:002006-02-03T19:00:00.000-05:00Genius, Aristotle is more complicated than that, a...Genius, Aristotle is more complicated than that, and I don't have the time to type his whole theory here for you. Just do a search for it.<BR/><BR/>Suffice it to say he spoke of holistic happiness and not hedonistic happiness. Read him before you comment back to me. Several modern moral philosophers are coming back to him as the foundation for Virtue Ethics.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1139010216742103102006-02-03T18:43:00.000-05:002006-02-03T18:43:00.000-05:00> And yet Aristotle claimed that happiness is the ...> And yet Aristotle claimed that happiness is the one "end which we wish for on its own account." <BR/><BR/>1) I think Aristotle is probably wrong (what a simplistic view!) <BR/><BR/>2) Is sounds like "the thing I believe explains itself" so I guess there is an impasse.<BR/><BR/>3) Related to (1) does hedonism create morals at all? In theory anything could make a person happy. In a sense we pick the things that make us happy. For example I am happy if I win a competition - but only because I declare it to be something I want - if I decided I didn’t want it I wouldn’t be happy if it happened.<BR/><BR/>4) Hedonism has some interesting limiting cases usually involving lots of drugs that most people don’t like (underlining the contradiction).Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1139001870212424752006-02-03T16:24:00.000-05:002006-02-03T16:24:00.000-05:00Jeremy:This last point is worth paying attention t...Jeremy:<BR/><I>This last point is worth paying attention to. The problems raised in Euthyphro-like questions can be raised about any meta-ethical view.</I><BR/><BR/>Yes, this is true, and yet Aristotle claimed that happiness is the one "end which we wish for on its own account." "Thus it seems that happiness is something final and self-sufficing, and is the end of all that man does."Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1138978639059854432006-02-03T09:57:00.000-05:002006-02-03T09:57:00.000-05:00This last point is worth paying attention to. The ...This last point is worth paying attention to. The problems raised in Euthyphro-like questions can be raised about any meta-ethical view. If morality is based, for instance, on whatever rational people would agree to follow if they were concerned only about self-interest (which many contemporary social contract theorists of morality believe), then we have to ask a Euthyphro-like question. Is it good merely because rationally self-interested people would prefer it, or would they prefer it because it's good? The same line of questioning could very easily be raised about any meta-ethical grounding for ethics.<BR/><BR/>I should say that the Aquinas model doesn't seem quite as bad as the straw man divine command theory that this discussion has assumed. The Aquinas model grounds ethics in God's nature because God is good, but it isn't fair then to ask what makes God's nature good, because Aquinas is talking about two different kinds of good. Moral good ends up being grounded in God's metaphysical perfection. That's the good of God's nature that he intends ethics to be based in. That doesn't sound anywhere near as arbitrary as the view that just says that whatever God was like would make it good, because that view then makes it empty to praise God for being good. Aquinas' view isn't like that.Jeremy Piercehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03441308872350317672noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1138949651328360832006-02-03T01:54:00.000-05:002006-02-03T01:54:00.000-05:00> it's hard to find anyone who thinks that theism...> it's hard to find anyone who thinks that theism provides a good account of the foundation of morality.<BR/><BR/>Before one gets all sanctimonious<BR/>Does atheism provide a good account of the foundation of morality? Who thinks it does - and can you define how that works? And if not what sort of form would an acceptable answer take?Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1138937737746042582006-02-02T22:35:00.000-05:002006-02-02T22:35:00.000-05:00If you actually check out the Plato, I think it's ...If you actually check out the Plato, I think it's clear that he's focusing on the <I>nature</I> of the pious. In other words, I don't think it's primarily a <I>semantic</I> issue, one of analysis or definition. Rather, it's primarily a <I>metaphysical</I> issue, one of the identification of moral properties.<BR/><BR/>In any case, if you take a look at contemporary metaethics, it's hard to find <I>anyone</I> who thinks that theism provides a good account of the foundation of morality. All the tough talk from Christian apologists, as near as I can tell, is just bluffing.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1138862847118061532006-02-02T01:47:00.000-05:002006-02-02T01:47:00.000-05:00Pat,> "What does 'God is good' mean?"Well my first...Pat,<BR/>> "What does 'God is good' mean?"<BR/><BR/>Well my first point was that divine command could be defended my second post suggested a rational answer to the above. <BR/><BR/>anonymous,<BR/><BR/>> "What does 'God is good' mean if God is supposed to set the standard of goodness?"<BR/><BR/>What sort of meaning are you looking for? It is one of these questions where I sugest one needs to ask oneself "what is a satisfactory answer?"<BR/><BR/>Anyway, I guess if one says "god is good" one could be using a slightly different more colloquial definition of "good".<BR/><BR/>E.g. defining a package of "good" things as determined by some pannel of human experts and measuring god's results against a set of other rules. Of course if you accept god is good by definition and good is god then saying god is good is obviously a tautology.<BR/><BR/>> That's like letting all students set the standard of "A" in your courses.<BR/><BR/>If my students were all worthy of A's it wouldn't matter!Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1138849676422783252006-02-01T22:07:00.000-05:002006-02-01T22:07:00.000-05:00The question is not "Is God good?" but, "What does...<I>The question is not "Is God good?" but, "What does 'God is good' mean?" Appealing to the essential nature of God as being good does not answer that question.</I><BR/><BR/>Not exactly, "Genius." I think the proper phrasing is, "What does 'God is good' mean if God is supposed to set the standard of goodness?"<BR/><BR/>Now that's a question that hits to the heart of what's problematic. That's like letting all students set the standard of "A" in your courses. What happens to the evaluation of the claim: "I got an A in John's course?"<BR/><BR/>More problems can be found here: http://gods4suckers.netAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1138767814302145162006-01-31T23:23:00.000-05:002006-01-31T23:23:00.000-05:00I thought I was the only one who noticed that the ...I thought I was the only one who noticed that the argument in "Euthyphro" can be used effectively to counter christian claims. I thought of it as a way to show that the christian definition of sin - what God hates - is nonsensical.<BR/>BTW, I think that Plato's argument is stronger than you describe. It is more than just a practical point - that it makes God's commands arbitrary. It actually renders the divine command theory into a logical impossibility. In other words, you can not say that God loves something because God loves it. If you say that you will be stuck saying "because God loves it" all day. You are therefore forced to say that it is God-beloved because of a quality it posesses. Then you are free to say that it has that quality whether or not there is a God.The Jewish Freakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00959225860182589944noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1138732535775950412006-01-31T13:35:00.000-05:002006-01-31T13:35:00.000-05:00One argument might be that in complex world with ...One argument might be that in complex world with complex concequences if there are a set of competing theories (no need to consider non competing theories) and one is backed up by a super intelligent being - then, that is likely to be the only "functional" plan.<BR/>A christian/religious person could then claim moral superiority because it was simply implausible that anyone else would have considered even a fraction of the information required to deal with the side effects of their actions and thus are at a massive disadvantage.<BR/><BR/>Just liike if you are a passanger in a plane the most important question is "does the pilot know how to fly" not "where does he want to go". And if you had to pick a pilot and if only one person knows how to fly - you would probably pick him.<BR/><BR/>I.e. gods plan is right for the most part due to omniscience as opposed to anything else.Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1138713092215902462006-01-31T08:11:00.000-05:002006-01-31T08:11:00.000-05:00I don't think the view you're responding to is one...I don't think the view you're responding to is one that any serious Christian thinker has held. No one really claims that Christians have some special moral insight simply because of their meta-ethical view. Christians might claim that having the indwelling Holy Spirit might give them access to removal of the consequences of the fall that blind us to moral truths, but that's nothing like the view you're critiquing. There's also the view that scripture would contain moral truths that we might not want to believe and might need a revelation to help us overcome the tendencies of the fall not to believe the moral truths that otherwise would be obvious to anyone. But that's not having some special insight as the result of a meta-ethical theory either.<BR/><BR/>There is a view that I think something like a divine command theory is offered up as support for. That view is that other views have no grounding for ethics. Craig does in fact make this argument. He says if ethics is based in God's nature then it has a foundation. He doesn't think any other foundation will serve. This isn't a claim about special Christian access to moral truth but a claim about meta-ethical foundations of other ethical views.<BR/><BR/>By the way, Thomas Aquinas is generally thought to be the earliest person to argue that God's nature grounds ethics. It's purely a semantic debate whether you want to call that divine command theory. You seem not to want to. William Alston, Robert Adams, and Norman Kretzmann have defended it as a divine command theory.<BR/><BR/>Regardless of what you call it, it's clearly a third view from the standard Euthyphro horns. One grounds ethics merely in God's commands, and virtually all philosophers since Plato have viewed that as an arbitrary and inadequate account. The only major exceptions I know of are Ockham and Locke (with the possibly exception of Descartes, though he only clearly takes a divine command theory about logic and mathematics, not ethics). The other horn places ethics as completely independent of God. More Christians have adopted this sort of view, including Richard Swinburne, who takes morality to be necessary but not grounded in God's necessary nature. But the main theistic philosophers have grounded morality in God's nature, and this includes Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, and in my experience most contemporary philosophers of religion who deal with this issue.Jeremy Piercehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03441308872350317672noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1138686789236320892006-01-31T00:53:00.000-05:002006-01-31T00:53:00.000-05:00I think your approach the divine command theory in...I think your approach the divine command theory involves a flawed approach to the world.<BR/><BR/>Lets say water is wet. Is it wet because it is water or is it water because it is wet? This is a nonsense question - furthermore it is a nonsense thought experiment to consider non wet water (ok there might be wet stuff that is not water but that jsut points out the lack of perfection of the example).<BR/><BR/>From this perspective in a sense it is nonsense to propose "if god was not benevolent would you suport him" question has a practical implication because you believe it is fundimentally untrue.<BR/><BR/>Ie the higher standard and god's standard are fundimentally the same neither is "created" by the other any more than water is created by wetness. <BR/><BR/>Or more clearly it is a bit like saying if 1+1=2 does the 2 create 1+1 or does 1+1 create 2?Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1138369386065496592006-01-27T08:43:00.000-05:002006-01-27T08:43:00.000-05:00This was a very good chapter, with some very helpf...This was a very good chapter, with some very helpful distinctions. I've highlighted some crucial sentences of his:<BR/><BR/><B>The position we have been defending avoids the Euthyphro dilemma by contending that God’s commands are rooted in His essential nature. The Divine Nature Theory (hereafter DNT) secures God’s commands and reasons in His character, it effectively makes the divine nature the ultimate standard of moral value.<BR/> <BR/>Neilsen’s reformulated objection contends that we cannot legitimately use the beliefs and faculties that God Himself has given us to reason back to the goodness of God. Imagine that you live in a land whose ruler is an evil tyrant. Unknown to you, this ruler has implanted a microchip into your brain that dictates the kind of thoughts you are able to have. Wouldn’t this undermine your belief that the ruler was a good man? <BR/><BR/>This argument has a certain appeal, and I must grant that it has a valid point. The point is that any explicit justification of my belief that God is good will be circular. But that point can be happily conceded. Circularity need not be vicious, and the kind of circularity involved here is not in any way peculiar to my position. Indeed, any theory that posits objective values will face the same problem, which is essentially a sceptical one. A fair sceptical challenge is one that does not fault a position for not answering questions that no position could be expected to answer. But no position could help us to provide explicit non-circular justifications for all of our moral beliefs, and DNT is no exception here.</B><BR/><BR/>My comments:<BR/><BR/>What Steve Lovell defended is indeed circular, as he admits. I have two questions. One question remains to be defended is whether he’s correct that any theory that posits “objective values” will face “the same problem.” If by the term “objective values” he means “ultimate objective values,” or “values objectively grounded in a divine being,” then he is indicting his own theory all over again, and hence, his accusation here is true by definition. It would also mean Lovell is not offering a fair alternative to his own theory for comparison, since there are alternative non-ultimate objective ethical systems which do not face an infinite regress of standards because they do not rest upon the nature of a divine being or an ultimate ethic.<BR/><BR/>The second question is whether or not the circularity that is inherent in defending the DNT reveals something metaphysical about the nature of God’s existence? I personally think the inherent circularity in trying to defend the DNT points to the non-existence of God.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1138312124470802422006-01-26T16:48:00.000-05:002006-01-26T16:48:00.000-05:00John: I'd very much like to see your response to t...John: I'd very much like to see your response to this paper, by Steve Lovell, on the Euthyphro dilemma. <BR/><BR/>http://www.theism.net/article/29<BR/><BR/>If there are objective moral values then we have a situation in which there are two sets of facts; facts about the way things are, which are describable, perhaps, by science in naturalistic terms, and facts about how things ought to be, which, at least on the face of things, defy scientific description. <BR/><BR/>There seems, on the face of things, to be a profound tension between moral success, on the one hand, on most understandings of morality, and Darwinian success, which is measure in terms of the extent to which a person passes on his genes. Contrast this with the view of human beings as the product of a loving God, whose in which case fulfillment of human nature and doing the will of God can be identified.Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21219785.post-1137850296156269002006-01-21T08:31:00.000-05:002006-01-21T08:31:00.000-05:00Nicely done, DJ.In addition to what you've provide...Nicely done, DJ.<BR/><BR/>In addition to what you've provided, I would also add that the inherent inability to reconcile conflicting moral decisions on the part of moral objectivists leads ultimately to only one conclusion:<BR/><BR/>The notion that a moral objectivist position has more authority in a moral decision process than any other holds about as much water as a colinder.Soundsurfrhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04657457695145963930noreply@blogger.com