Bill Craig Answers My Question

Remember what I asked? Here is his answer just after answering a previous one:
This question has relevance to my recent debate with Sam Harris on whether the foundations of morality are natural or supernatural. Following the debate my friend John wrote,
Bill, in your debate with Sam Harris you claimed God was the grounding of objective morality. That word "God" is problematic though. Until that word is defined, or until you tell us how we know what this "God" wants us to do, or what it is, what you end up saying is that there is an objective grounding to morality, and that's it. But then Sam Harris agreed with you on that score.
If you’ll look at the text of my opening statement in the debate, which I’ve posted on our Reasonable Faith Facebook page, you’ll see that I did define what I mean by “God.” I stated,
On the theistic view objective moral values are grounded in God. As St. Anselm saw, God is by definition the greatest conceivable being and therefore the highest Good. Indeed, He is not merely perfectly good; He is the locus and paradigm of moral value.
Since moral goodness is a great-making property, the greatest conceivable being must be morally perfect (as well as have the other superlative properties listed by Swinburne). Indeed, the greatest conceivable being will be the paradigm of moral value. Of course, it remains to be asked whether such a being actually exists. But the contentions I laid out for defense in our debate were conditional: IF such a being exists, then. . . . That’s why I think my first contention is almost obviously true. Of course, if such a greatest conceivable being exists, objective moral values and duties exist! How could they not?

The real question was whether Harris could provide an ontological foundation for objective moral values and duties in the absence of such a being. I presented what I take to be a decisive argument against his solution to what he calls “the Value Problem” (see QoW #208), as well as powerful objections to his attempt to derive objective moral duties from science and his desire to affirm objective moral duties in the absence of any sort of free will.

Finally, let me say again what I said in answer to Question #208: I do not need to provide an account of “how we know what this ‘God’ wants us to do,” since that is a question, not of moral ontology, but of moral epistemology. My concern is with the reality of objective moral values and duties; I’m open to any epistemological theories anyone wants to suggest for how we come to know the values and duties that there are.


Notice he keeps sticking to the debate topic. He still claims he does not need to provide an account of “how we know what this ‘God’ wants us to do,” because that is a question, not of moral ontology, but of moral epistemology.

I suppose he'll get around to it someday.

As for the greatest conceivable being, well, if we ignore conceptions that involve wildly improbable ideas or even contradictions, then this universe is by far the greatest conceivable being. And that is what Harris thinks grounds morality.