The Moral Argument Revisited: Further Thoughts on Bill Craig's Presentation
In this article, I will revisit some thoughts I made last week about Dr. William Lane Craig's morality argument for the existence of God. The critique has been adjusted to answer the top two or three objections presented in the post, and also adds some additional thoughts I've had over the past week.
As you may recall, Bill's argument goes like this:
1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist.
3) Therefore, God exists.
First, some definitions.
Value def. "An idea by which one guides his or her life." (Craig 172)
Moral value def. "A value that can be identified as good or bad." (Craig 172)
Moral duty def. "A binding idea that one ought to do, in which doing so is 'right' and not doing so is 'wrong.'" (Craig 172)
Objective moral value def. "[A moral value] that is true independent of what people think or perceive." (Craig 173)
We assume objective moral duties, mentioned on page 175, are similarly defined, though Bill doesn't define that term himself.
To begin, one might note what the difference is between something that is "good" or "bad," and something that is "right" or "wrong." Craig seems to define the former (i.e. "objective moral value") as something nonbinding on a human being. For instance, Bill states that it is good for one to become a chemist, doctor, etc., but since one may choose only one profession, all of these professions, while good, are not binding on someone.
Bill then dives headlong into wondering whether "objective moral values" exist, slipping in the word "evil" for the word "bad," and including the Holocaust as an example. If a moral value, by Craig's definition, is not binding, how does this example relate to the thesis presented? If it isn't binding, it isn't objective by Craig's definition of the word. It directly depends on a human being, on the situation the human finds himself in, and so on; becoming a Nazi is not a choice one makes in the same sense as becoming a chemist or doctor.
Bill corrects himself without knowing it on page 173 by pointing out that being a Nazi is wrong, i.e. that it is something one ought not to do, i.e. that it is a moral *duty* under his terminology. So it seems to me, first of all, that there is a bit of equivocation going on between "moral value," and "moral duty." But no matter; Craig presents a similar argument on page 175 for objective moral duties, so we'll dismiss this for now and get straight to the heart of the matter, and take "objective moral values" to encompass both (although we will, as Bill does, mostly appeal to duty).
Premise (1) states that "If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist." As I stated before, we are not presented with evidence to verify this statement. All we have is a parade of arch-materialists like Richard Dawkins and crew, who present men as some kind of DNA-propagating birdbrained cretins lacking any sort of identity they think they have, because we evolved from beings that did not have that identity. One wonders whether they will state that we are really underwater, because our ancestors were all underwater, but whatever. They deny the identity of man as a rational being, by means of their own (mistaken) behavior as rational beings. Besides, the only thing that can be reached here is, at most: "If evolution is true, objective moral values do not exist," not Premise (1).
In addition to this, a regiment of philosophers is brought before us, who, like Nietzsche, already buy Premise (1). This is simply an appeal to authority, and also can't substantiate the premise.
Continuing on, the objection made in my earlier post was that I presented a false alternative; that objective moral values proceed from the identity of God, not from God's decree or from some other means independent of man and God. Very well; objective moral values can be divided into these two possibilities:
(1) Proceeding from or coexistent with God (by whatever means)
(2) Not proceeding from nor coexistent with God (by whatever means).
Craig dispenses of (2) entirely on page 178 and 179.
We are now left with the following statement from this information:
"objective moral values exist if and only if God exists"
Of course in this case, Premise (1) is automatically valid: if God does not exist then objective moral values obviously do not exist.
The problem is now in Premise (2) for this consideration: "Objective moral values exist" is equivalent to "God exists."
So the argument turns from
1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist
3) Therefore, God exists.
into
1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) God exists.
3) Therefore God exists.
The argument thus begs the question, and is invalid.
Someone wondered in the previous post why I said that the proof as Craig presents it does not prove that God is the moral lawgiver: Bill himself recognizes this difficulty on page 172 right after his introduction, but states that the conclusion that the morals come from God "tends to be implicit" in Premise (1). Bill leaves it at that, as he realizes the stove here is quite hot; that very point, i.e. the implicit direct relation between God and objective moral value as Bill defines it, is what makes the argument beg the question.
As an aside, I do believe in objective moral values, although my definition for objective is "that which is based in reality," which is not necessarily Craig's definition. Since men ultimately exist in reality and have situations ultimately based in reality, and since men have a solid identity and their situations have a solid identity, objective moral values proceed from this. This doesn't itself rule out God, for a God could have brought us about with this identity, but it doesn't demand the need for a God, either. In my own opinion, God must be proven by different means, and I have not seen an effective proof (if God is well-defined to begin with).
I am looking forward to another good discussion on this important topic! I enjoyed the civility and focus when I first brought this up, and I want to thank everyone on both sides for maintaining it. :)
-Darrin
As you may recall, Bill's argument goes like this:
1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist.
3) Therefore, God exists.
First, some definitions.
Value def. "An idea by which one guides his or her life." (Craig 172)
Moral value def. "A value that can be identified as good or bad." (Craig 172)
Moral duty def. "A binding idea that one ought to do, in which doing so is 'right' and not doing so is 'wrong.'" (Craig 172)
Objective moral value def. "[A moral value] that is true independent of what people think or perceive." (Craig 173)
We assume objective moral duties, mentioned on page 175, are similarly defined, though Bill doesn't define that term himself.
To begin, one might note what the difference is between something that is "good" or "bad," and something that is "right" or "wrong." Craig seems to define the former (i.e. "objective moral value") as something nonbinding on a human being. For instance, Bill states that it is good for one to become a chemist, doctor, etc., but since one may choose only one profession, all of these professions, while good, are not binding on someone.
Bill then dives headlong into wondering whether "objective moral values" exist, slipping in the word "evil" for the word "bad," and including the Holocaust as an example. If a moral value, by Craig's definition, is not binding, how does this example relate to the thesis presented? If it isn't binding, it isn't objective by Craig's definition of the word. It directly depends on a human being, on the situation the human finds himself in, and so on; becoming a Nazi is not a choice one makes in the same sense as becoming a chemist or doctor.
Bill corrects himself without knowing it on page 173 by pointing out that being a Nazi is wrong, i.e. that it is something one ought not to do, i.e. that it is a moral *duty* under his terminology. So it seems to me, first of all, that there is a bit of equivocation going on between "moral value," and "moral duty." But no matter; Craig presents a similar argument on page 175 for objective moral duties, so we'll dismiss this for now and get straight to the heart of the matter, and take "objective moral values" to encompass both (although we will, as Bill does, mostly appeal to duty).
Premise (1) states that "If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist." As I stated before, we are not presented with evidence to verify this statement. All we have is a parade of arch-materialists like Richard Dawkins and crew, who present men as some kind of DNA-propagating birdbrained cretins lacking any sort of identity they think they have, because we evolved from beings that did not have that identity. One wonders whether they will state that we are really underwater, because our ancestors were all underwater, but whatever. They deny the identity of man as a rational being, by means of their own (mistaken) behavior as rational beings. Besides, the only thing that can be reached here is, at most: "If evolution is true, objective moral values do not exist," not Premise (1).
In addition to this, a regiment of philosophers is brought before us, who, like Nietzsche, already buy Premise (1). This is simply an appeal to authority, and also can't substantiate the premise.
Continuing on, the objection made in my earlier post was that I presented a false alternative; that objective moral values proceed from the identity of God, not from God's decree or from some other means independent of man and God. Very well; objective moral values can be divided into these two possibilities:
(1) Proceeding from or coexistent with God (by whatever means)
(2) Not proceeding from nor coexistent with God (by whatever means).
Craig dispenses of (2) entirely on page 178 and 179.
We are now left with the following statement from this information:
"objective moral values exist if and only if God exists"
Of course in this case, Premise (1) is automatically valid: if God does not exist then objective moral values obviously do not exist.
The problem is now in Premise (2) for this consideration: "Objective moral values exist" is equivalent to "God exists."
So the argument turns from
1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist
3) Therefore, God exists.
into
1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) God exists.
3) Therefore God exists.
The argument thus begs the question, and is invalid.
Someone wondered in the previous post why I said that the proof as Craig presents it does not prove that God is the moral lawgiver: Bill himself recognizes this difficulty on page 172 right after his introduction, but states that the conclusion that the morals come from God "tends to be implicit" in Premise (1). Bill leaves it at that, as he realizes the stove here is quite hot; that very point, i.e. the implicit direct relation between God and objective moral value as Bill defines it, is what makes the argument beg the question.
As an aside, I do believe in objective moral values, although my definition for objective is "that which is based in reality," which is not necessarily Craig's definition. Since men ultimately exist in reality and have situations ultimately based in reality, and since men have a solid identity and their situations have a solid identity, objective moral values proceed from this. This doesn't itself rule out God, for a God could have brought us about with this identity, but it doesn't demand the need for a God, either. In my own opinion, God must be proven by different means, and I have not seen an effective proof (if God is well-defined to begin with).
I am looking forward to another good discussion on this important topic! I enjoyed the civility and focus when I first brought this up, and I want to thank everyone on both sides for maintaining it. :)
-Darrin
27 comments:
Hi Darrin
I think you're confusing the necessary and sufficient conditions in an implication with a biconditional that's used to defend the implication. Here's the argument form of Craig's moral argument:
(1) ~P --> ~Q
(2) ~~Q
(C) ~~P
All this argument itself says is:
~Q (god's nonexistence)is a necessary condition of ~P (objective morality's nonexistence).
~P (god's nonexistence) is a sufficient condition of ~Q (objective morality's nonexistence).
This much is uncontroversial. However, you make the move to this:
Q (objective morality's existence)<--> P (god's existence)
and proceed to place this *within the context of Craig's moral argument itself*. While this conclusion (Q <--> P) is part of Craig's *defense* of premise one, it seems to me that you haven't made the proper substitutions in your reformulation of Craig's argument, which I think would go like this:
(1') (Q <--> P) --> (~P --> ~Q)
(2') Q <--> P
(C') ~P --> ~Q
(1) ~P --> ~Q (from C')
(2) ~~Q
(C) ~~P
Note, if your criticism is correct, it would follow that *any* argument of the valid modus tollens form would be question begging *if* a defense of the implication rests on a biconditional; however, I don't think that's at all the case: my example above shows how this move can be made in a perfectly valid way (which is how I read Craig's argument). Of course, the argument may not be sound, but it seems to me that you've not at all established that it's invalid.
Hey Darrin,
First, I want to let you know that I've enjoyed the discussion that has followed from your ideas and that I look forward to more posts from you in the future.
Concerning the biconditional and Craig's supposed circularity, I certainly agree that the theist is committed to the biconditional "God exists" <-> "Objective moral values exist".
However, even if Craig does think that these two are equivalent, he does not assume such in the argument. He assumes a weaker conditional in the argument itself. Even if "God exists" didn't imply "Objective moral values exist", this argument, as it stands, could be successful (Of course, I think not).
An interesting idea that I have come across (and which I have articulated in my blog) is the fact that both the theist and atheist (and indeed anyone logical) is committed to the truth of the statement:
"God exists" implies "Objective moral values exist implies God exists"
(It is of the form B->(A->B) which is true for any A,B)
So, we can construct the following counterargument:
1) "God exists" implies "Objective moral values exist implies God exists".
2) It is not true that "Objective moral values exist implies God exists"
3) Therefore, God does not exist.
Therefore, we can show that if the first premise of the Moral Argument is false, then God doesn't exist. And it is trivial to show that if the second premise of the Moral Argument is false then God doesn't exist also.
Thus, we can conclude that if the Moral Argument is false, then God doesn't exist. Thus, we have a positive argument for atheism.
Thoughts?
TKD
>>Eric
Let's make it *not* mt-form then, as I did in my first post. I think you can agree that the argument is equivalent to:
1) If objective moral values exist, then God exists.
2) Objective moral values exist.
3) Therefore, God exists.
Again, I don't see how (2) doesn't presuppose God necessarily and directly by Craig's implication.
I thought of a reformulation that works while I was driving from work today; I think it might be similar to your reformulation sans mt-form (eh? A nonbeliever wanting to help Craig out? Well, that's a benefit of being friends with reasonable Christians ... :D).
>>TKD
I do understand the assumed weaker state, but Bill takes pains to make sure we know the two states are equivalent while explaining the nature of what he means; in other words, he whittles away at the definition of "objective moral values" itself in the section of his text explaining premise (2). Perhaps Craig should wait to do that until the end of the argument, as he does with explaining the nature of the First Cause in Kalam.
Your argument is interesting. It's another bit for me to chew on as I sleep overnight, so I'll get back to you guys when I wake.
Hi Darrin
You wrote: "Let's make it *not* mt-form then, as I did in my first post. I think you can agree that the argument is equivalent to:
1) If objective moral values exist, then God exists.
2) Objective moral values exist.
3) Therefore, God exists."
I agree that the two formulations of P1 ("If god doesn't exist, then objective morality doesn't exist" and "If Objective morality exists, then god exists") are equivalent.
"Again, I don't see how (2) doesn't presuppose God necessarily and directly by Craig's implication."
It's not presupposed because it is an implication; you're always free to reject the implication.
(http://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.html)
If we switch from MT to MP we still have a valid argument:
(1) (Q <--> P) --> (P --> Q)
(2) Q <--> P
(C) P --> Q
(1') P --> Q (from C)
(2') P
(C') Q
I think Craig goes with the MT rather than the MP only because the first premise with the MT ("If god doesn't exist, then objective moral values don't exist") is more plausible, prima facie, than the logically equivalent first premise of your MP reformulation ("If objective morality exists, then god exists").
Eric,
I think Craig goes with the MT rather than the MP only because the first premise with the MT ("If god doesn't exist, then objective moral values don't exist") is more plausible, prima facie, than the logically equivalent first premise of your MP reformulation ("If objective morality exists, then god exists").
Precisely.
TDK,
The problem is that you'd need to develop a naturalistically acceptable explanation for the relevant moral phenomena. That's an uphill battle for you.
Darrin,
As with your first post on this subject, you've again offered a poor analysis due to two obvious blunders. Your first blunder comes when you say that there is no evidence for
(1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist,
since Craig in your view makes an appeal to authority. But the authorities to which Craig appeals are specialists in their fields, and therefore his appeals are informally valid. (Note that appeals to authority are only sometimes fallacious, not always.)
The claims made by naturalistic philosophers and ethicists -- experts in their respective fields -- should be seriously considered, and they do agree with Craig. Now this is not conclusive evidence since other naturalists would disagree with the ones Craig cites, but it should not be dismissed entirely as "invalid".
(There is also a strong logical case to be made in favor of that claim. To state it without rigor, it would go something like this: if every thing is a natural object, and natural objects do not give rise to objective moral values, then no objective moral values exist. (Naturalism is essentially the view that only natural objects exist (in other words, no God exists).) Since naturalists do, in fact, believe that every thing is a natural object, it follows that given naturalism no objective moral values exist. When Craig says "if no God exists" then perhaps that can be taken as shorthand for "if naturalism is true". If not, all the argument needs is a minor tweak along these lines. So there is certainly evidence to consider for (1).)
Your second blunder is twofold. First, you conflate the biconditional with the identity relation. 'x iff y' does not mean that 'x=y'. For example, sun rays exist iff the sun exists; but that doesn't mean that sun rays=the sun. The view in question is that objective moral values exist if and only if God exists. This doesn't imply that God is identical to a moral value(s). Yet you go on and say
(2) Objective moral values exist,
can be replaced with
(2*) God exists.
So the mistake is yours insofar as you conflate two quite distinct logical statements. Second, even if biconditionals meant the same thing as identity relations (weird), Craid doesn't assume the biconditional as part of his argument in the first place. He offers it as auxiliary defense.
To conclude, you've not even come close to demonstrating any problems with the moral argument Craig offers -- not to mention the moral argument in general. The objections in your first post, as well as those in this latest post, rest on confusion.
As a minor point, I would add that at the end, you further confuse the issue by saying that you do think that objective moral values exist.
The definition of "objective" you offer is not what philosophers mean when they talk about "objective moral values". It's pointless for you to say that you agree on something if you work with an entirely different definition. That's like saying that you agree wiht theists that God exists, but you define God as the feeling of love.
I think that your analysis is correct in that the theist is committed to holding that the biconditional holds between "God exists" and "Objective moral values exist" and that Craig implicitly admits this.
But, my opinion, what should be of concern is not what the theist holds (as he already believes God exists, thus any belief entailing the existence of God is, in a sense, question begging). The question should revolve around the reasons Craig gives for dispensing of the idea that morals are neither coexistant nor proceeding from God. This is the view that the atheist is committed to should he/she believe objective moral values exist. If his reasons for justifying this move are shown to be suspect, then the rest of the argument simply doesn't follow. He must show that atheists are committed to putting objective moral values into category (1). I'm not sure that you posts to date have addressed this fact.
Furthermore, if it can be demonstrated that moral value actually fits in (2) and not (1), then it can be positively shown that God (as traditionally conceived) does not exist (should my previous comment hold any water).
Darrin,
While I'm certainly not a philosopher, I can see the premise you've outlined and there as some questions that are left unattended.
Primarily, you've stated that man knows OMV because he (man) exists in reality. My question is upon what basis does man know moral good?
Man must have a basis for perception of good/bad. Society, with it's diversity of views and opinions certainly is not the repository of that knowledge even though we can all acknowledge that the knowledge of OMV exists. Our existence in reality does not DOES NOT assure that we have, know or understand moral values.
History is replete with evidence in support of my statements.
Kingdoms, societies, nations have done both extremely terrible and horriffic things when left to their own devices and have made extremely acceptional and good accomplishments also. To claim that we should know OMV because we exist in reality is to make all accomplishments (good or bad, favorable to humanity or not) equal because both good and bad have taken place in reality.
In contrast, biblically I can examine nations that committed both moral and immoral practices and examine the results and judgements of God toward each type of nation and or person in effort to help me understand the capacity for human morality and immorality. The biblical narrative also allows me to examine the nature of God's moral goodness.
While one cannot have this conversation without ultimately examining the nature of the morality of God, it is clear that whatever standard we have as human beings is NOT derrived because we're ARRIVED or live in time and space...
I believe that argument is a very short-sighted assumption to make and when examined through the lens of history does not pan out favorably for those who hold that humans are moral because they exist.
So, for me, the primary focal point for this conversation is to examine how does man guage or adjudicate moral dichotomies in his/her life? What is the method, if not by OMV as given by God, that man knows the difference between right and wrong?
I do not believe that your answer is an equally as strong substitute for the argument that Dr. craig lays out, and ultimately his answer provides a great deal more knowledge to help me and others establish a basis for their moral actions within time and space.
Thank you.
>>Eric
Yes, that reformulation is quite right.
Thinking about it, the implied notion that Bill presents is that "objective moral values," if gathered by men, do not carry with them the idea of God that is implicit in Bill's actual definition. Correct?
>>kiwi
Very well; I believe moral values are neither objective nor subjective, and that the case where the two are presented as the only options is a false alternative.
>>Charlie
Well, I would have to counter by pointing out Bill's adherence to two types of thinkers, outlined in my post:
(1) The naturalists like Dawkins, and
(2) Existentialists like Nietzsche.
The problem with appealing to case (1) is that quoting e.g. Dawkins (the famous "there is at the bottom no blah blah" quote) appeals to people who are in no way authorities *in that field.* Dawkins is a biologist, not a philosopher, and I think you and I can agree that it painfully shows :)
The problem with (2) is that Bill seems to put forth statements like Nietzsche's story about the results of killing God (he uses this in many debates) as an absolutely true and incontrovertible view that nontheists must take.
In my view, a proper appeal to authority would be to help back up a statement which is open to further defense (i.e. "many medical doctors consider cigarette smoking harmful to one's health") not to find a big name who makes the statement and leave it like that (i.e. "even the German Chancellor Adolf Hitler thought the Jewish race was a curse," to use an extremely absurd example).
I agree with your parenthetical explanation, but I would not argue against Bill's notion of objective moral values in that way (note I did not do this explicitly in my post); however, I would argue that naturalistic objects could give rise to nonsubjective moral values, and that, as I mentioned previously, the notion of subjectivity versus objectivity under Craig's definition is a false alternative. As kiwi pointed out, not many philosophers accept this viewpoint, but that doesn't mean such discussion isn't in fact true, so I'd have to disagree with kiwi that a discussion about this is pointless.
As for your second objection, you have to be careful here: I don't equate *God* with "objective moral values," as you seem to imply here when you state that I would equate sun rays with the sun. With your sun example, the *existence* of the sun *can* be equated with the *existence* of the sun's rays in the proper context, just as God's *existence* can be equated with the *existence* of objective moral values in the proper context.
This does not mean that the identities of the constituents are exactly the same. It simply means that one's existence implies the other's existence and vice versa; I go no further than that in my objection.
However, Eric and TKD's implied objection to my presentation, i.e. that realizing the existence of objective moral values, if valid, do not carry with them the realization of God even though Craig ties them together logically, is the objection I endorse for this case.
>>Harvey
Unfortunately I don't have time right now to address the good points you have raised entirely, but I want to clarify that I don't mean man's *existence in reality* gives rise to moral values, but that man's *identity* gives rise to these values. The examples you presented are valid objections to both the Biblical standard of morality and the morality that can be derived from the identity of man, i.e. the morality I advocate (which, as I've said before, neither affirms nor denies a God).
Darrin ~ "but I want to clarify that I don't mean man's *existence in reality* gives rise to moral values, but that man's *identity* gives rise to these values."
I thought I identified this in the previous post and the more you explain the more I see. It looks like you've taken Any Rand's "existence exists" and theories of self awareness and replaced some of the mechanisms with identity BUT a rose by any other name SMELLS just as sweet.
So what is implied by identity? If it is mere "self-awareness" then the redefinition does not tell us the means by which moral values are derived under your system, because IF we are assuming that OMV are a product of either identity or self-awareness, as a person we are still lacking a standard for morality.
I could go further but a clarification is in order.
Thanks.
I guess to the point, that within the Christian worldview we have a much easier time explaining both where our moral values come from and why we have them.
As Dr. Craig has communicated it is much simpler to confess that OMV's exist due to the nature of God, the relationship of God WITH his humanity. This is why I believe Dr. Craig's moral argument for God's existence becomes so powerful in the face of alternative methods by which OMV's derrive.
In my opinion, and as I have read the attempts, to explain OMV's any other way is simply an exercise.
Thanks.
i've been really enjoying reading this discussion but there are a few points I would like to make.
The first is that it is impossible for god to exist because it is a concept that contradicts itself by definition and has absolutly no evidence for it's existence.
The second point is that saying god created morality doesnt even answer the question about morality and I think it actually makes it more difficult. For instance if you can have one god that exists and that explains morality then why only one god? And How can we tell which gods version of morality is the correct one? Followers of any given religion say that their god is the true god so how can we settle the question of who is right so we can follow that gods morality commandments?
And then that raises the problem of consistency. If we were to take the christians version of god as the correct god then we would have to look to the bible as our guide to morality since of course we can't just ask god. But there is some confusion here as well. For one God commands not to murder but himself murders entire villages and at one point the whole world save for moses and some animals. What are we to make of this contradiction of words vs actions? There are also a number of things commanded including murder, slavery, and forcing a woman to marry her rapist that most people would view as morally evil.
Seeing as how god cannot be the answer since god cannot exist and infact does not even answer the question we are back to the question of objective morality without a god.
Morality is a set of rules or guidelines that tell a person how they should act. Because we cannot derive an ought from an is, morality can only simply ever be how someone should act, not how they must act. Like the scientific method it is optional but you cannot be right without it.
Since morality defines actions for people, and since people live in a logical and consistent world/universe, moral rules must be logical and consistent. Otherwise they are not describing realty and are therefore invalid.
To define a moral rule it must have moral content and be logical and consistent. It is by these standards I think that we can define objective morality.
Craig's arguments are even more ridiculous when taken in the context of his entire Christian worldview. I don't have time to look up the articles regarding Craig here, but I'm sure Mr. Loftus could back me up with citations.
Remember, Craig is the guy who has said that killing is only wrong unless God explicitly commands it. If God says to slaughter your enemies and their children and take the virgins for yourself, those actions are now right. Therefore, the only Objective Moral Values in his worldview are Commands From God. The only immoral act is disobeying God.
Ergo, his original argument is actually this:
1) If God does not exist, then commands from God do not exist.
2) Commands from God exist.
3) Therefore, God exists.
Check out Dan Barker's 'Godless' where he shows how Craig's formulation of the Kalam Cosmological Argument begs the question. It is really a pattern with Craig. I'm going to start checking his premises more closely to see if has an argument where he DOESN'T beg the question.
that means its not just that its ok to murder and rape these particular people but that it is morally good to do so. And so it follows that to not murder and rape when commanded to by god is morally evil.
I can't believe people actually believe that this should be the basis of morality and i would also like to point out that we do not have commandments from god, what we have is a book written by people 1900-3400 years ago telling us what they said god told them.
"I'm going to start checking his premises more closely to see if has an argument where he DOESN'T beg the question."
You have to be very careful when it comes to deductive arguments. Mill mistakenly argued that all deductive arguments are question begging; if a mind as acute as Mill's can be taken in here, we're all in trouble if we're on our own. (I haven't read Barker's criticism, but if it focuses on the minor premise, then he's almost certainly guilty of the same error as Mill). De Morgan's test can be of some help here: If an argument comprises more than one premise, and if none of its premises are superfluous, then the argument isn't question begging. Craig's moral argument and his Kalam argument quite obviously pass this test with ease. (Note, if you're thinking about counterexamples, an argument that leads to a self evident conclusion isn't question begging, though it is circular -- another important distinction!)
Hi Openlyatheist
You wrote: "Remember, Craig is the guy who has said that killing is only wrong unless God explicitly commands it. If God says to slaughter your enemies and their children and take the virgins for yourself, those actions are now right. Therefore, the only Objective Moral Values in his worldview are Commands From God. The only immoral act is disobeying God."
This confuses moral values with moral obligations. Craig doesn't deny that our *moral obligations* (i.e. right and wrong human action)arise from god's commands; however, moral values (i.e. the nature of good and evil) derive from god's nature (with 'evil' understood in the traditional sense of 'privation'). However, it is clear, as you claim, that Craig does support the notion of a 'teleological suspension of the ethical.' What's important to keep in mind, however, is that 'the ethical' refers to god's commands *to us*; god cannot 'command' himself, so he doesn't have any moral obligations in the same sense we do (according to my understanding of Craig's divine command theory).
You wrote: "Ergo, his original argument is actually this:
1) If God does not exist, then commands from God do not exist.
2) Commands from God exist.
3) Therefore, God exists."
Because of the distinction between 'values' and 'obligations,' you cannot reformulate Craig's moral argument in this way. (An act can be good, yet not obligatory, and so on.)
Also, note that your reformulation *is not question begging*. It's a perfectly valid modus tollens. To mistake it as question begging is to be guilty of the same error I referenced in my previous post, i.e. Mill's error.
I think that wether or not craigs argument is begging the question or not is not really important. Just looking at the content of the argument shows he is assuming without any logical proof a number of his key points. He is assuming that god is valid concept. he is also assuming that the christian god is the correct god. He also assumes that God did in fact command the things written. He is also assuming that without god there can be no standard of objective ethics. he also assumes that there is an objective standard of moral values. None of these things are proven. It would seem that everything having to do with god is assumed since none of it can ever be tested or varified in anyway.
Also if morality is defined as what god commands but as you point out god cannot command himself then by what standard is god judged as morally good? In other words how do we know we should listen to what god says about morality?
hpot said...
I think that wether or not craigs argument is begging the question or not is not really important. Just looking at the content of the argument shows he is assuming without any logical proof a number of his key points. He is assuming that god is valid concept.
Just so. Call it question begging, or circular reasoning, or concept smuggling (as Dawson Bethrick might say). At any rate, Craig's game is to take something, anything, in this case objective morality, and magically present his God as just the thing to account for that phenomenon. What a coincidence! Isn't it amazing how God always has the exact trait necessary whenever its needed by an apologist's argument?
Also if morality is defined as what god commands but as you point out god cannot command himself then by what standard is god judged as morally good?
Well caught. If what is good is what God commands, and God cannot command himself, how can God commit a good act? I'm sure he has some special property that magically solves that problem too. God's ways are not our ways, after all.
^ a being who would necessarily refrain from doing anything wrong would (analytically) not need commandments. Many theistic conceptions of God imply that She is morally good in this 'necessary' sense. So the commands could apply to humans because for each human, it's possibly that that human does something wrong -- not so for God.
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